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ABSTRACT 
Co-management has been recognized as an important scheme in successfully 
governing common-pool resources (Ostrom, 1990, 2002). Contrary to Hardin’s 
Tragedy of the Commons (1968) or Olson’s Logic of Collective Action (1965), 
empirical research has found many long-lasting self-governing communities through 
extensive case studies (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1989). This is 
no exception in fishery (Pinkerton, 1994). Fishery cooperatives, where fishermen 
collectively manage the fishery, have been garnering much attention from both 
regulators and academics (Costello, 2012; Deacon, 2012; Townsend, Shotton, & 
Uchida, 2008). In fact, Northeast multispecies groundfish fishery in US has 
implemented a sector management system, in which voluntarily formed sub-groups of 
harvesters may manage their collective total share of the harvest as a group right 
(Pinto da Silva & Kitts, 2006). Thus, understanding how and why fishery co-
management succeeds is not only important but also timely in terms of policy 
relevance. 
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to investigate how co-management in 
a fishery can contribute to better societal outcomes. To meet this goal, I construct the 
following two objectives and the hypotheses associated with each objective. The first 
objective corresponds to manuscript 1, and the second objective spans over 
manuscripts 2 and 3.  
The first objective is to examine how common property management systems 
may emerge endogenously. In particular, recent trends in fisheries management are to 
further devolve responsibility to users by partitioning allowable extraction and 
  
assigning them to groups of users. Each group may manage their collective share of 
the harvest of each species as a group right, which results in a fishery with a single set 
of total allowable catch concurrently managed by multiple management groups. I 
designed a laboratory experiment based on the Rhode Island Fluke Sector Pilot 
Program, which features a sector managed by individual quota and a common pool 
derby for harvesters who do not join the sector. I allowed harvesters to choose whether 
to join the individual quota sector prior to each season based on the outcomes they 
experience under each system. The main hypothesis is that subjects move toward the 
individual quota system, which supports the efficient harvesting strategy as 
equilibrium, rather than adopt cooperative strategies in a less restrictive common pool 
institution, or stay in an inefficiently operating common pool. I then associate 
individual variation in the rate of moving to the individual quota system with other-
regarding preferences, risk preferences, and a taste for competition.  
Through successive fishing seasons, the frequency of subjects' choosing the 
individual quota sector rises from half to over 80 percent of subjects. This suggests 
that the efficiencies associated with strong individual fishing rights may emerge 
endogenously from the sectorization process, even without imposing them through 
regulation. The results also find enjoyment of competition becomes significant at later 
seasons, but other-regarding preferences and risk preferences are not a significant 
driver in the long run. 
The second objective is to explain why and how revenue sharing arrangement in a 
co-managed fishery can achieve successful management and to provide insights into 
revenue sharing arrangement as an alternative management tool. Under revenue 
  
sharing arrangement a group of harvesters shares catch and/or revenue among 
members of a fishery cooperative equally, or according to an agreed rule, regardless of 
individual effort or performance. Social capital potentially affects the efficiency that 
revenue sharing brings while revenue sharing can foster social capital, which could 
eventually lead to better management outcomes. I hypothesize the synergy between 
the two factors, i.e., revenue sharing arrangement and social capital. An important 
intermediary between the two factors and the outcomes is collective efforts performed 
as a group often in a community-managed fishery. The following four hypotheses will 
be tested under this objective. First, the fishery groups under revenue sharing 
arrangement achieve better outcomes in a fishery, compared with similar groups 
without such arrangement. Second, the fishery groups with greater social capital 
achieve better outcomes in a fishery. Third, the interaction between revenue sharing 
arrangement and social capital further enhances success in a fishery. Lastly, the groups 
under revenue sharing arrangement foster greater social capital.  
I quantified social capital using controlled economic experiments with fisherman 
subjects as well as surveys. Using the data collected from ten fishery groups engaging 
in a small-scale trawl fishery in northern Japan and wild cluster bootstrap for small 
sample inference, I find the indirect effect of revenue sharing augmenting information 
network, which then improves an economic outcome in a fishery. Revenue sharing 
arrangement provides disincentives to compete and accompanies synchronized 
collective fishing operation, which encourages fishers to exchange sensitive fishing 
information that would not have been shared otherwise. This greater information 
network then has a positive impact on economic performance because it enables 
  
fishery groups to effectively coordinate in fishing efforts and other collective efforts. 
However, the direct effect of revenue sharing improving an outcome does not seem to 
be robust. In addition, I find evidence of various aspects of social capital improving 
both outcomes in a fishery. While trust increases the ex-vessel prices, the groups with 
fishers having similar information network size achieve better stock conditions over 
time. Interestingly, revenue sharing fishers are no more likely to cooperate 
unconditionally (i.e., unilaterally) and furthermore they are less likely to cooperate 
conditionally (i.e., only if others cooperate). 
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PREFACE 
Manuscript Format is in use for this dissertation. The dissertation consists of three 
manuscripts along with overarching introduction and conclusion. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
Direct regulation, or so-called command-and-control, has been a standard 
management tool for regulators in balancing the conservation of coastal resources and 
achieving economic efficiency of resource use. However, direct regulations are often 
ineffective in achieving these goals. This is in part due to the fact that for regulations 
to meet both environmental and economic goals in fishery they need to have an 
extensive knowledge on the resources and fishers’ harvesting activities. It is apparent 
that this is often not the case. 
First suggested by Christy (1973), an individual quota or a catch shares system 
has been recognized as an effective alternative to direct regulations for better fishery 
management (Arnason, 1990), but not without limitations. While often dubbed as 
decentralized or privatized system so as to suggest that it needs minimal involvement 
of governments, the catch share system requires governments with strong enforcement 
powers and well-established market institutions. For example, without an effective 
monitoring and enforcement of allocated share (i.e., making sure that no one exceeds 
the share) the catch share system will be undermined and could eventually collapse 
(Copes, 1986). If a share is transferable, market institutions are necessary to ensure 
transactions and to set the market price that reflects the shadow value of the fishery. 
Co-management has been gaining attention in fishery management in the US. For 
example, the Northeast multispecies groundfish fishery implemented a sector 
management system (Amendment 16), in which voluntarily formed sub-groups of 
harvesters may manage their collective total share of the harvest of each species as a 
group right. Fishery cooperatives, where fishermen collectively manage the fishery, 
  
 
2 
have been garnering much attention as a way to complement and/or supplement 
existing management systems such as rights-based management from both regulators 
and academics (Deacon, 2012; Townsend, Shotton, & Uchida, 2008). Thus, 
understanding how and why the fishery co-management succeeds is not only 
important but also timely in terms of policy relevance. 
Co-management is a broad concept that its precise definition can hardly be 
complete. It can be agreed, however, that co-management represents a “collaborative 
and participatory process” of decision-making as regards to management of one or 
more natural resources among or between multiple stakeholders such as user-groups 
and government agencies (Wilson, Nielsen, & Degnbol, 2003, p. 3). In this 
dissertation the essential aspect of co-management is that resource users possess 
independent regulatory power to set and enforce their own rules of management under 
the authorities. Thus, it is not exclusive to non rights-based management or other types 
of rights-based management. In the case of fisheries management co-managed 
fisheries can self-implement the individual quota system, transferable or not, in 
addition to other operational and management rules.  
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to investigate how co-management in 
a fishery can contribute to better societal outcomes. To meet this goal, I construct the 
two objectives and the hypotheses associated with each objective (Figure A).  
While regulators rarely implement a new system to manage natural resources 
without facing any opposition, resource users’ voluntary transition to an efficient 
management system, if possible, can ease such political hindrance. All regulators need 
to do is to let a community decide what is best for them. In fact, sector management in 
  
 
3 
Multispecies Groundfish Fishery in Northeast US has allowed harvesters to essentially 
decide how to manage an allocated share of the catch. As a result, the fishery has been 
experiencing the transition to a catch shares system since 2010 although some doubts 
on to what degree a decision was voluntary during later years have been expressed 
(Olson and Pinto da Silva, 2014). Furthermore, voluntary transition to a more efficient 
management of the resources can eventually bring harvesters’ awareness of co-
management because the transition may signal the importance of engaging in 
management decisions as a community.  
The first objective in this dissertation, addressed in the first manuscript, is to 
examine how common property management systems can evolve endogenously. In 
particular, recent trends in fisheries management are to further devolve responsibility 
to users by partitioning allowable extraction and assigning them to groups of users. 
Each group may manage their collective share of the harvest of each species as a 
group right, which results in a fishery with a single set of Total Allowable Catch 
(TAC) concurrently managed by multiple management groups. I designed a controlled 
economic experiment based on the Rhode Island Fluke Sector Pilot Program 
(Anderson & Uchida, 2014; Georges Bank Cod Fixed Gear Sector, 2010; Pinto da 
Silva & Kitts, 2006; Verani, 2006), featuring a sector managed by individual quota 
and a common pool derby for harvesters who do not join the sector. I allowed 
harvesters to choose whether to join the individual quota sector before each season 
based on the outcomes they experience under each system. The main hypothesis is that 
subjects move toward the individual quota system, which supports the efficient 
harvesting strategy as equilibrium, rather than adopt cooperative strategies in a less 
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restrictive common pool institution, or stay in an inefficiently operating common pool 
(H1). I then associate individual variation in the rate of moving to the individual quota 
system with social preferences, risk preferences, and a taste for competition.  
Revenue sharing arrangement is a type of co-management practice, in which 
harvesters share catch and/or profits among the members of a fishery cooperative. 
Employment of such arrangement is a collective action that a group of harvesters 
takes. The role of revenue sharing arrangement in fishery co-management has been 
studied in the literature (Gaspart & Seki, 2003; Platteau & Seki, 2001; Uchida & Baba, 
2008), but less studied are the quantitative effect of revenue sharing on management 
outcomes (H2a) and its mechanism, through which revenue sharing arrangement 
attains success. In manuscripts 2 and 3 I hypothesize that the interaction between 
revenue sharing and social capital exists; revenue sharing affects social capital in a 
community and among fishers, and social capital also influences various incentives 
possibly induced under revenue sharing and the efficiency that such arrangement 
brings (H2c).  
Social capital is a concept that the attributes such as trust, cooperation, and 
reciprocity among people and norms and networks in a community are important in 
improving economic life (Fukuyama, 1996; Putnam, 2001). In particular, the role of 
social capital in a community that self-governs a community resource has been 
highlighted (Ahn & Ostrom, 2008; Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Gutiérrez, Hilborn, & 
Defeo, 2011; Pretty, 2003). In fact, Carpenter and Seki (2011) showed a strong 
correlation between fishermen’s propensity to cooperate and fishing productivity. 
Social capital is also found to be empirically associated with economic productivity in 
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other workplace (Barr & Serneels, 2009; Bouma, Bulte, & van Soest, 2008; Carter & 
Castillo, 2002; Karlan, 2005; Knack & Keefer, 1997). 
The objective consisting of the manuscripts 2 and 3 is to explain why and how 
revenue sharing arrangement can achieve successful management of a fishery. The 
manuscript 2 provides the first rigorous analysis on measuring the direct effects of 
revenue sharing (H2a) and social capital (H2b) in a community-managed fishery, and 
to identify the indirect effects resulting from the interaction between revenue sharing 
and social capital (H2c). An important intermediary between the two factors, revenue 
sharing arrangement and social capital, and the outcomes of a fishery is collective 
efforts defined as any efforts performed as a group to increase harvesting performance 
of a fishery. The efforts include stock enhancement, rotation of fishing grounds, 
collective search for schools of fish, and collective use of fishing boats and/or fishing 
gear. Revenue sharing arrangement and social capital enhance the effect of the 
collective efforts, which leads to efficient and sustainable use of resources in the long 
run. Contribution to the group efforts aligns with self-interest when a group of 
harvesters shares revenue and harvesters are devoted to collective value due to social 
capital in a community.  
The manuscript 3 provides the quantitative effect of management systems—
whether the group has employed revenue sharing or not—on the social aspect of a 
community (social capital). In particular, this manuscript asks whether a difference in 
management systems can result in different cooperative relationships and different 
information networks in a community (H3). This manuscript provides the first 
rigorous analysis to measure the effect of different management systems on social 
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capital and provides insights into an effective policy that can be employed for 
development of social capital. 
I empirically test the hypotheses in the manuscripts 2 and 3 using the data 
collected in Japan, which is one of the countries that have a long history of co-
management in a fishery (Yamamoto, 1995) as well as ample cases of revenue 
sharing. Many Japanese fisheries operating under revenue sharing have been 
successfully managing the resources as well as generating resource rents (Carpenter & 
Seki, 2011; Platteau & Seki, 2001; Uchida & Baba, 2008). I collected this unique 
dataset containing group information from ten fishery groups engaging in small-scale 
trawl fishery and individual information on 79 skippers belonging to the ten groups. 
To quantify cooperation controlled economic experiments with fisherman subjects 
were conducted. As for trust and information network indices are constructed from 
survey responses of the same fisherman subjects. For the manuscript 2, I collected four 
measurements of the outcomes in a fishery: ex-vessel price per kilogram (economic 
outcome), resource stock density measured per squared meter (biological outcome), 
and the other two from the survey (economic success perceived by fishers and 
resource conditions perceived by fishers). Using wild cluster bootstrap for small 
sample inference of the ten fishery groups, I rigorously quantify the effect of revenue 
sharing and social capital. In addition, I explore the mechanism, through which those 
factors interact with each other and affect the outcomes in a fishery. 
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Abstract 
While management of common pool resources has long recognized the value of 
including resource users in the governance process, recent trends in fisheries 
management are further devolving responsibility to users by partitioning allowable 
extraction and assigning them to groups of users. Each group may manage their 
collective share of the harvest of each species as a group right, which results in a 
fishery with a single set of total allowable catch concurrently managed by multiple 
management groups. This paper investigates how individual and aggregate outcomes 
emerge as groups gain experience with use of their collective rights. We designed a 
laboratory experiment, which features a sector managed by individual quota and a 
common pool derby for harvesters who do not join the sector. We allowed harvesters 
to choose whether to join the individual quota sector before each season based on the 
outcomes they experience under each system. Through successive fishing seasons, the 
frequency of subjects' choosing the individual quota sector rises from half to over 85 
percent of subjects. This suggests that the efficiencies associated with strong 
individual fishing rights may emerge endogenously from the sectorization process, 
even without imposing them through regulation. Interestingly, a taste for competition 
prohibits a complete transition into the individual quota sector. 
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1.1 Introduction 
While management of common pool resources has long recognized the value of 
including resource users in the governance process (McCay & Acheson, 1987; 
Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1999), recent trends in fisheries management are further 
devolving responsibility to users by partitioning allowable extraction and assigning 
them to groups of users. These “use share” programs involve users not to determine a 
single set of use rules, but rather encourage the formation of sectors—groups allocated 
a collective share of total extraction that they may manage in any way they wish. 
Different groups may manage their extraction in different ways while pursuing the 
same resource, which integrates heterogeneity in management system preferences as 
an intentional element of regulation. Sector management has emerged as progressive 
user groups within large, heterogeneous fisheries; these fisheries has coalesced to 
implement a particular management innovation, but without establishing the political 
consensus for management change among all harvesters. This mitigates the task of 
managers persuading all participants to use the same system, facilitating political 
progress. However, it requires a framework for predicting outcomes when different 
sectors must strategically interact with one-another (Anderson & Uchida, 2014; 
Scheld, Anderson, & Uchida, 2012).  
A mechanism anticipating that groups will affiliate and manage themselves 
differently became an explicit element of federal management of fisheries. 
Amendment 16 of the Northeast Multispecies Management Plan associates a historical 
catch level of each regulated species with each harvester, assigns the quota to the 
sector joined by the harvester, and allows the sector to manage; harvesters who do not 
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join a sector operate in a common pool under legacy days-at-sea regulation. In early 
applications, a group of harvesters petitioned management for an allocation of a share 
of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) to manage internally, with more flexibility than 
harvesters who continue under legacy management (Georges Bank Cod Fixed Gear 
Sector, 2010; Pinto da Silva & Kitts, 2006; Scheld, Anderson, & Uchida, 2012; 
Verani, 2006). The first year saw 17 sectors form, mostly using some form of 
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ), along with the common pool (Northeast Fishery 
Science Center (NEFSC), 2011). However, even where ITQ systems—expected by 
economists to maximize returns—are implemented directly, collective management 
often emerges. On the West Coast US, the groundfish fishery implemented a standard 
ITQ program, and participants responded by developing collective management 
systems and risk pools to manage limiting species that closely resemble cooperatives 
reviewed in the self-governance literature (Holland & Jannot, 2012).  
Similarly, a mixture of different management systems governing the same 
resource stock can be observed in other types of common pool resources. Forest ejidos 
in Mexico resulted in a mixture of different stages of privatization of forest nationwide 
after the federal government passed the law to allow resource users to convert some 
plots of common property forest into private forest (Barnes, 2009; Barsimantov et al., 
2010). From groundwater in California to forest in the Himalayan ranges groups of 
resource users adopt management systems suiting the community’s own needs and 
preference where possible, creating heterogeneity in management institutions 
(Agrawal, 1994; Blomquist, 1992, 1994; Trawick, 2001). 
These cases suggest that, while ITQ systems are thought by economists to 
 15 
work through the market to produce efficient outcomes, these systems continue to 
evolve institutionally after transferable rights are established, and that competitive 
markets of arm's length transactions are often a relatively small component of the 
management institution that prevails. This raises the question of what properties the 
emergent management systems will have. As catch share programs expand, what 
predictions can be made about how self-management will evolve, to support biological 
and social evaluation mandated through the Environmental Impact Analysis process?  
Will they take a consistent form? Or, will they take different forms that result in 
improvements in efficiency? Will they be Pareto safe? What sorts of rules for 
migrating among sectors facilitate the greatest improvements in efficiency most 
quickly? 
Theoretical guidance on these questions is scarce, largely because regulatory 
processes around the world have focused on trying to implement final structures, 
which are restricted to evolve only in very limited ways after they are implemented. 
Economic theory generally predicts that rights holders will gravitate toward 
institutions with incentives that support efficiency as an equilibrium (Gürerk, 
Irlenbusch, & Rockenbach, 2006). An alternative set of hypotheses emerges from the 
self-governance literature, which offers reasons that users might establish cooperative 
institutions (Agrawal, 2002). These cooperative institutions can be efficiency 
enhancing even in the absence of individual incentives to do so. While both models 
predict efficiency, the resulting institutions differ importantly in attainability, 
distributional consequences, or robustness to resource shocks. 
To begin developing a framework to address these questions, we designed a 
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controlled economic experiment based on the Rhode Island Fluke Sector Pilot 
Program (Anderson & Uchida, 2014; Georges Bank Cod Fixed Gear Sector, 2010; 
Knapp, 2008; Pinto da Silva & Kitts, 2006; Scheld, Anderson, & Uchida, 2012; 
Verani, 2006), featuring a sector managed by individual quota, and a common pool 
derby for harvesters who do not join the sector. We allowed harvesters to choose 
whether to join the individual quota sector before each season based on the outcomes 
they experience under each system. We test the hypothesis that subjects move toward 
the individual quota system, which supports the efficient harvesting strategy as 
equilibrium, rather than adopt cooperative strategies in a less restrictive common pool 
institution, or stay in an inefficiently operating common pool. We then associate 
individual variation in the rate of moving to the individual quota system with social 
preferences, risk preferences, and a taste for competition. 
 
1.2 Experimental design 
Continuous Fishing Game 
A two-stage sequential game is repeated for 20 “seasons”, in each of nine 
experimental sessions with twelve inexperienced subjects each. In the first stage, all 
subjects simultaneously choose to affiliate with either an individual quota (IQ) 
group—where each subject receives their quota share as an individual allocation—or a 
common pool (CP) managed group—where the quota associated with each subject is 
placed in a shared pool to be used be accessed by all subjects choosing CP.  In the 
second stage, players learn how many others are in each group and then earn money 
fishing under the rules of their chosen management group.  
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The fishing subgame is a quasi-continuous common-pool resource game with a 
contemporaneous price externality, developed by Anderson and Uchida (2014) based 
on Walker et al. (1990) and Gardner et al. (1997). The setup is as follows. Consider a 
common-pool resource appropriated by 𝑖 = 1,⋯ ,𝑁 players. Each player i chooses 
effort level 𝑒 and maximizes the following payoff function regardless of choice of 
management systems in the first stage:  
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖𝐸 ℎ(𝐸)[𝛼 − 𝛽ℎ(𝐸)] − 𝑐(𝑒𝑖) 
where ℎ(∙) is a concave production function, 𝑐(∙) is a linear cost function, and 
𝐸 = ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 . The unit price is determined by the term 𝛼 − 𝛽ℎ(𝐸), which decreases in 
total landings from all players regardless of management systems. Thus, players can 
maximize their profits by fishing in weeks when the total landings are lower. 
Assuming identical players and replacing 𝐸 with 𝑛?̅?, the first-order condition is: 1
𝑁
�
𝑑ℎ(∙)
𝑑𝑒
𝑃(𝑁?̅?) + ℎ(𝑁?̅?)𝑑𝑃(∙)
𝑑𝑒
� + 𝑁 − 1
𝑁2?̅?
ℎ(𝑁?̅?)𝑃(𝑁?̅?) − 𝑑𝑐(∙)
𝑑𝑒
= 0 
where 𝑃(𝑁?̅?) = 𝛼 − 𝛽ℎ(𝑁?̅?). 
When 𝑁 = 1, the equilibrium is optimal; marginal revenue equals marginal cost. 
When 𝑁 > 1, the equilibrium is no longer optimal and the equilibrium effort increases 
up to where average revenue equals marginal cost. 
 We apply the model to a fishery within a season of 𝑡 = 1,⋯ ,𝑇 weeks 
(Gardner, Moore, & Walker, 1997). Following Anderson and Uchida (2014), we 
assume zero discount rate and no stock effect on the harvest function. The 
maximization problem becomes: 
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𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑇      𝜋𝑖𝑖 = ��𝑒𝑖𝑖𝐸𝑖 ℎ(𝐸𝑖)[𝛼 − 𝛽ℎ(𝐸𝑖)] − 𝑐(𝑒𝑖𝑖)�𝑇
𝑖=1
 
 
  subject to                   0 ≤ 𝑒𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚 
            𝑇 ≤ 𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑚 
            ∑ ℎ(𝐸𝑖)𝑇𝑖=1 ≤ 𝑚𝑞� for a CP group 
            ∑ ℎ(𝑒𝑖𝑖)𝑇𝑖=1 ≤ 𝑞� for IQ players. 
CP and IQ players face the same maximization problem except that their total harvest 
for a season is constrained to collective quota for players under CP management and 
individual quota for IQ management.  
Consider the specific parameter values chosen for the game (Table 1.1). In the 
parameterization used, subgame perfect equilibrium is for all identical players to 
choose IQ, and play a Nash equilibrium strategy of constant average effort of 1.92 
days in all weeks in the continuous fishing game. The symmetric Nash equilibrium 
under CP management is, regardless of m, at 𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚, which is less than at a point where 
average revenue equals marginal cost. Notice that a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) 
quota (= 𝑁𝑞�) is “binding”; a TAC is relatively scarce compared to a potential total 
catch (= 𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ(𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚)). In such a case, the optimal harvesting strategy for IQ players 
is to time the landings to equalize the total landings from both groups throughout a 
season and thus ℎ(𝐸∗) = 𝑁𝑞� 𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑚⁄ . Table 1.2 presents all Nash equilibria contingent 
on an outcome of management choice in the first stage. 
Measurement of Risk Preferences 
To explain variation in management choices, subjects completed three 
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supplemental instruments. To measure risk attitudes, we used a elicitation method for 
risk aversion by Holt and Laury (2002). Players choose which lottery to enter, either 
“safe” or “risky,” for every pair of ten pairs (Table 1.3). The stakes are $2 and $1.60 
for the “safe” lottery and $3.85 and $0.10 for the “risky” lottery. The probability of 
winning the higher payoffs in both lotteries starts with ten percent and increases. 
Conversely, the probability of winning the lower payoffs in both lotteries starts with 
90 percent and decreases. Players switch at some point from the “safe” lottery to the 
“risky” lottery. This switch identifies the range of relative risk aversion. While risk 
seeking players switch to the “risky” option before the expected utility of the “risky” 
lottery is less than the “safe” lottery, risk averse players stick to the “safe” option even 
after the expected utility of the “safe” lottery is greater than the “risky” lottery.  
Measurement of Other-regarding Preferences 
 
We conducted the ultimatum game for the stake of $10. In the two-player 
ultimatum game, one player is designated as a “Proposer” and makes an offer to divide 
$10 between oneself and the other player. If the other player designated as a 
“Responder” accepts the offer, the payoffs for the two players are realized as 
proposed. If a “Responder” rejects the offer, both get nothing. In the strategy method 
of the ultimatum game subjects are asked for their contingent behaviour in both roles, 
choosing an offer from $0 to $10 in an increment of $1 as a Proposer and responding 
to every possible proposal as a Responder. Subjects are randomly paired and assigned 
a role after all decisions are made. Although the prediction of the game is that a self-
interested “Proposer” gives the smallest amount of money to the “Responder” and the 
“Responder” accepts any amount because even the smallest amount is better than 
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nothing, low offers in the ultimatum game were frequently rejected (Camerer & 
Thaler, 1995; Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, & Zamir, 1991). Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) modeled this seemingly irrational behaviour and defined fairness as inequality 
aversion and incorporated the idea that some people experience disutility from unequal 
distribution of payoffs. We derived individual inequality aversion parameters 
following Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s two-player model for inequality aversion as 
follows: 
𝑈𝑖(𝑚) = 𝑚𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑚𝑗 − 𝑚𝑖 , 0� − 𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑚𝑖 − 𝑚𝑗 , 0�, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 
where 𝑚 is the amount of money received. The responses as a Proposer in the 
ultimatum game identify the coefficient 𝛼𝑖, which represents the degree of utility loss 
from disadvantageous inequality.  
Measurement of Preference for Competition 
We used the psychological survey developed by Smither & Houston (1992) 
and Houston et al. (2002). Subjects completed a five-point Likert-scale survey 
instrument on attitudes toward competition (Table 1.4), with nine questions yielding 
an index of enjoyment of competition in the range of 9 to 45 (most enjoyment) and 
five questions forming an index of contentiousness from 5 to 25 (most contentious). 
We used this survey instead of other commonly used surveys for competitiveness such 
as Work and Family Orientation Questionnaire (Helmreich & Spence, 1978) because 
our interests are not competition in a specific context such as work or self-
achievement but in general attitude toward competition. 
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Procedures  
The experiment took place at Policy Simulation Laboratory at University of 
Rhode Island during the semesters of fall 2011 and spring 2012. Each session lasted 
approximately two hours with twelve participants, who were recruited through 
undergraduate economics classes. In total nine sessions were conducted, which 
produced a sample of 107 subjects (one subject did not complete the experiment). 
Subjects were paid a $5 appearance fee, plus earnings from three random fishing 
games, one random lottery, and the ultimatum game. Subjects started with the 
ultimatum game using pencils and paper, and then played the two-stage fishing game 
over a local computer network facilitated by a Java based software (Figure 1.1). After 
the tenth round of the fishing game the survey for competition was conducted in a 
paper-based format, and the rest of the game resumed. Finally the lottery choice was 
administered through VeconLab (http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/introduction.php). 
The Appendix contains the written instructions for the two-stage fishing game.  
 
1.3 Data analysis 
Figure 1.5 shows the frequency of subjects' choosing IQ rises from half in the first two 
seasons (mean = 51.9%; SE = 3.4%) to over 80 percent of subjects in the last two 
seasons (mean = 83.3%; SE = 2.5%). More than 40 percent of the subjects consistently 
chose IQ during later seasons (mean = 43.5%; SE = 4.8% for seasons 11-20). A small 
portion of the subjects, less than 5 percent, never tried the CP management and 
remained in IQ throughout the session (mean = 4.6%; SE = 2.0% for all seasons). 
About 14 percent of the subjects persistently—twice or more in the last five seasons—
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chose CP even at the end of the sessions (mean = 13.9%; SE = 3.3% for seasons 16-
20).  
Subjects employ different fishing strategies based on their own management 
group (two-tailed Mann-Whitney z = -24.690, P = 1.37e-134), and the number of 
subjects choosing CP, consistent with equilibrium predictions (Figure 1.2). Mixed-
effects model for predicting mean effort level in IQ suggests that subjects smooth out 
effort throughout the season from 2.21 days at week 1 to 1.86 days at the last week 
when all subjects are in IQ (11 or 12 subjects picked IQ in 23 of 90 seasons) (Table 
1.5). The dependent variable, ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖, is mean effort level in management choice i, week 
t, season k, session j. Included in regression are a week trend variable, a binary 
variable to indicate whether the CP fishery is open at week t, and a binary variable that 
takes 1 if the number of subjects in IQ is 10 and greater or 0 otherwise.  
 
?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖0 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖2𝐶𝑃_𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖3𝐼𝐼_𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖4𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖× 𝐶𝑃_𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖5𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖 × 𝐼𝐼_𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖6𝐼𝐼_𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑖× 𝐶𝑃_𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖7𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖 × 𝐼𝐼_𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑖 × 𝐶𝑃_𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗+ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖 
 
The same model for CP shows that when subjects choose CP, they fish intensively, but 
the derby is less intense than the 7 days predicted, and thus CP closure is 2-3 weeks 
later than predicted (Table 1.5).  IQ subjects respond to the CP derby by holding back 
effort, increasing by 1.66 days after CP closure.   
Subjects’ movement toward IQ follows significantly higher profits (Figure 1.5, 
right axis) (Mann-Whitney test, z = -13.773, P = 3.705e-43, two-tailed), with IQ 
subjects earning more (mean = $71,092; SE = 181) than CP subjects (mean = $61,218; 
SE = 875). Regardless of the number of subjects that choose CP, average profits in IQ 
 23 
are higher (Figure 1.3). CP subjects earned less on average but with a greater 
variability. We estimated profits and standard deviation of profits using mixed effects 
model with heteroskedastic errors (Table 1.6). The dependent variables, 𝑃𝑠𝑜𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖, are subject i’s profit earned in session k, season t and standard deviation of 
profits in session k, season t, respectively. Included in regression are a season trend 
variable, a binary variable to indicate whether a subject is in IQ at season t, and the 
number of subjects in CP excluding oneself at season t. The model is allowed to 
produce systematically different error variance between CP and IQ. 
 
𝑃𝑠𝑜𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽3𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖× 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖 × 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑃_𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽7𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝑃_𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽3𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 × 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽5𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 × 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖2 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 × 𝐶𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖+ 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖 
 
The results indicate an additional subject choosing CP reduces CP subject 
profits by $1,390, and increases IQ subject profits by $1,230 (Table 1.6). This controls 
for the number of CP subjects, and a significant effect of experience, wherein average 
profits increase linearly over time by $1,150 per season. However, profits in CP range 
from considerably less than in IQ, to considerably more (Figure 1.3). CP subjects have 
significantly greater within-season profit variance, with a standard deviation $17,267 
higher than IQ (Table 1.6). The median difference between season top and bottom CP 
profits during the last 10 seasons is $17,185 whereas in IQ is $11,383. In the same 
period, 42 percent (38 out of 90 seasons) of the top season earnings was by CP 
subjects, and 15 different individuals contributed to this high earnings in CP. Among 
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90 season top earnings, the median in 38 CP profits is $91,400 and in 52 IQ profits is 
$77,633. 
 The choice of management groups (1 if IQ; 0 if CP) is modeled with a random 
effects logit model. Explanatory variables include the coefficient of constant relative 
risk aversion (CRRA) from the lottery choice game; the parameter of inequality 
aversion from the ultimatum game; two psychological competitiveness indices; the 
profit the subject received last time she fished in IQ minus the profit last time she 
fished in CP (substituting the mean for inexperienced subjects); the number of subjects 
in CP in the previous season excluding oneself; and binary catch, which is coded 1 if 
in the previous season the subject was in CP and caught more than her 3000lb IQ 
quota, or 0 otherwise (Tables 1.7-1.8).   
 
𝑃𝑠(𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼)= 𝐹�𝛽0 + 𝛽𝜔1𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝜔2𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝜔3𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝜔4𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝜔5𝐶𝑃_𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1) + 𝛽𝜔6𝑐𝑚𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1)+ 𝛽𝜔7𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1) + 𝑢𝑖𝑖� 
 
The dependent variable, 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖 is subject i’s choice of management system in 
session k, season t and takes 1 if choosing IQ or 0 if CP.  
Each independent variable is interacted with both an increasing and a 
decreasing sigmoid function of season number (with estimated switchover point) to 
capture the evolution of the role of the explanatory variables as subjects gain 
experience in each management institution (Myagkov & Plott, 1997).  
Sigmoid function: 𝜔 = 1 �1 + 𝑒(𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝛽)∗𝛼�⁄  
The parameter 𝛼 takes an arbitrary value 1 for the decreasing function and −𝛼 for the 
increasing function. The parameter 𝛽 determines the slope of the curve and thus the 
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switchover point of the two curves. The model estimation for different values of 𝛽 is 
shown in Table 1.9. Figure 1.4 shows the final form of the Sigmoid function. 
This model identifies the factors that are most explanatory of management 
choice (Table 1.10, Figure 1.6). The difference between the subjects’ most recently 
experienced profit in each system is the only variable significant across seasons at 
conventional levels: a marginal increase in difference between IQ and CP profits 
increases the probability of choosing IQ by 2.1% in early seasons. This increase 
reaches 4.7% as subjects gain experience and experiment less over time. The only 
other explanatory variable that is significant among experienced subjects is the 
Enjoyment of Competition index, where a marginal increase in the Enjoyment of 
Competition subscale decreases the probability of choosing IQ by 5.4%.  
This also resonates with the fact that those who opted into CP still raced to fish 
even when no one else was in CP. When there is only one subject in CP, it is 
practically the same as everyone being in IQ; yet, a good number of the subjects in CP 
when they are the only one in the group exerted their effort differently from the rest of 
the subjects who opted into IQ (two-tailed Mann-Whitney z = -6.049, P = 1.457e-9). 
Forty two percent of the subjects in CP when everyone else is in IQ finished their 
quota by the week of 20, which implies that their harvesting strategies closely 
followed the Nash equilibrium in CP that results in a closure of the fishery in the week 
of 15. 
Other variables are not significant drivers of long-run preferences for IQ.  In 
early seasons when subjects are experimenting, inequality aversion is low-level 
significant—and shows more inequality averse people choosing the more unequal 
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CP—but the effect is insignificant after the early experimentation phase. Despite a 
clear mean-variance tradeoff, CRRA is nominally small and does not significantly 
explain choice.  The quantity of catch is insignificant, reflecting that subjects are likely 
focusing on profit rather than quantity in their decision.  The number of (other) CP 
subjects in the previous season shifts from increasing the chance of choosing CP by 
six percent—following a herd into CP—in the early seasons, to decreasing it by six 
percent as subjects find small CPs more profitable, but is insignificant throughout. 
 
1.4 Discussion 
Although subjects could have chosen inefficient collective use of a resource 
appropriation right, an overwhelming majority of subjects moved systematically 
toward the institution with stronger property rights, individual quotas. This modified 
their harvesting strategy and moved the aggregate harvest pattern close to the optimal 
pattern that would be pursued by a sole owner, which increased prices received, 
harvester profitability, and efficiency. Rhode Island fluke sector pilot program, the 
motivating case of this manuscript, also went through a similar change during its 
three-year existence. The pilot program began with eight boat owners occupying 
11.53% of the state’s allocation, and the membership size grew to 13 receiving 15.7% 
of the allocation as more boat owners decided to join after witnessing higher profits 
and more flexible operation by the members (Scheld, Anderson, & Uchida, 2012; 
Wilson, 2012).  
However, a persistent minority of subjects remained in the common pool, 
earning lower profits, and the Rhode Island fluke fishermen who did not join the 
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sector continued to opt to operate under the conventional regulatory scheme.  These 
subjects did so intentionally, knowingly foregoing the higher profits they—
individually—earned in seasons when they chose an individual allocation of quota.  
This behavior is explicable as an expression of a taste for competition, as captured by 
the Enjoyment of Competition index in the Houston et al. instrument. 
That fishermen have a preference for competition is not new, and regret at the 
loss of a competitive element is sometimes expressed following rationalization; it is no 
surprise that competitive people would select into derby fishing as an occupation.  
Even under the management system such as revenue sharing arrangement, in which 
competition is disincentivised, anecdotal evidence suggests that fishers still like to 
compete under such system (Gaspart & Seki, 2003; Platteau & Seki, 2001; Manuscript 
2 in this dissertation). This may be an important insight into how or why complete 
individual allocation is difficult to implement in its totality in many fisheries, despite a 
track record of higher incomes. The combination of people unsure about the system 
(96% of subjects tried the common pool at some point) and those who derive utility 
from the inefficient aspects of the old system may prevent implementation as a final 
measure.  However, a catch share system where groups receive allocations they can 
manage in any way they choose allows those willing to give up some income for other 
aspects of the job or lifestyle to affiliate and do so. It also provides easy, non-
regulatory reversibility; if it turns out an individual does not find a legacy management 
group to their liking, they can switch to another group with a different management 
system.   
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Thus, the outcome observed from the catch share system moved strongly 
toward, but not all the way to, the sole owner solution. However, since not all 
harvesters had to adopt the individual quota, the catch share provided an additional 
degree of Pareto safety—preserving the element of competition for those harvesters 
who value it over marginal income—and made implementation and significant 
aggregate welfare gains possible. To agencies whose objectives encompass outcomes 
to populations beyond harvesters, the persistence of inefficiencies attributable to utility 
maximization of harvesters who prefer inefficient systems can be worrisome. 
However, the pattern that this persistence diminishes—without regulatory 
intervention—as the catch share system matures may provide solace.  
More broadly, the present experiment suggests effort spend articulating and 
implementing many details of management systems is unnecessary; in cases where 
building consensus or political majorities around these details delays or prevents 
reform, it is destructive. Rather, management institutions continue to evolve when the 
managed parties have sufficient flexibility in the use of the right, even a right they can 
transfer.  
This is the self-governance literature’s fundamental insight, viewed through a 
different lens; under the right conditions, users of a resource can develop governance 
systems that support sustainable rent generation. However, many of the case studies 
emphasize the community, taking the properties of the resource as exogenous. Some 
of the key enabling resource properties can be functionally implemented with a right; 
even collective quotas provide well-defined boundaries of both the resource and the 
user group. Their role in Ostrom’s framework is to facilitate consensus about who can 
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access the resource, predicate to establishing consensus around use levels. With the 
aggregate level of extraction determined, and thus the sustainability problem resolved, 
other community factors can then be brought to bear on harvesting the resource for 
rent maximization. This does not conflict with the self-governance, but rather shows 
how the benefits of self-governance can work in a broader set of cases, cases much 
more typical of commercial fishery resource users worldwide. 
Given current tensions in the social science of resource management literature, 
it would be a terrific irony if the key to implementing community-based self-
governance was a weak individual property right, along with sufficient autonomy to 
determine how it is exercised.  While it was the preferred institution in the limited 
choice set available in this experiment, this is not to argue that strong individual 
property rights are the solution for the sector-based management. Cooperatives that 
pool or collectively manage individual allocations are common; Chignik was designed 
to facilitate cost-reducing coordination among the collective allocations, and in the 
West Coast US groundfish fishery, large heterogeneous groups of harvesters initially 
allocated individual transferable rights have pooled some of them to manage choke 
species (Holland and Jannot 2012), and some smaller groups have fully pooled quota, 
adopting cost minimizing coordinated harvest strategies (e.g., Ilwaco Fishermen 
Marketing Cooperative). To implement collective catch shares more effectively, 
however, we need theory and research to understand the conditions under which 
sectors managed by catch shares initially adopt one management system rather than 
another, and how those systems evolve as users gain experience with their chosen 
system, and observe outcomes under others. 
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Table 1.1 Parameters for continuous fishing game. 
Number of subjects N 12 
Maximum effort level 𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚 7 
Number of weeks 𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑚 52 
Individual Quota (lbs) 𝑞� 3,000 
Collective Quota (lbs) 𝑚𝑞� 𝑚 is number of CP subjects  
Cost function 𝑐(∙) 500 ∗ 𝑒𝑖𝑖 
Harvest function ℎ(∙) 30 ∗ 𝑒𝑖𝑖 
Parameters 𝛼  50  
𝛽 0.012 
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Table 1.2 Nash equilibrium in the 
continuous fishing subgame, 
conditioned on the outcome of 
management choice. The parameters 
used are specified in Table 1.1. The 
strategy for IQ specifies mixed 
strategy because of multiple pure 
strategy equilibria. Resulting profits 
are derived by pure strategy. When 
there are 11 subjects in IQ and 1 
subject in CP, it is strategically the 
same as all subjects in IQ and thus 
combined together. *This indicates 
the mean of the profits derived by 
pure strategy Nash equilibria. 
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Table 1.3 Lottery choice  
 
 
Source: Holt & Laury (2002), p. 1645. 
 
Table 1.4 Competitiveness index. *This indicates reverse scored. 
 
 
Source: Houston et al. (2002) 
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Table 1.5 Mixed-effects model estimation of weekly mean effort level. In parenthesis 
are z score. The data used include the observations from the last half of the sessions, 
season 11 to 20. The first and last three weeks of each season are excluded in 
regression. 
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Table 1.6 Heteroskadastic mixed-effects model estimation. In parenthesis are z score. 
 
 
Table 1.7 Summary statistics. Infinity for inequality aversion parameter is replaced 
with linear extrapolation. For profit difference, missing value until you experience 
both choices is replaced with the mean profit of the group in the season. 
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Table 1.8 Correlation matrix of explanatory variables. 
 
 
Table 1.9 Selection of the parameter for the Sigmoid function. The model is the same 
as Table 1.10. N=Obs used in calculating BIC. 
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Table 1.10 Random Effects Logit Model of Choice of IQ. All variables are 
standardized except for binary catch. In parenthesis are z score. AME denotes average 
marginal effects. 
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Figure 1.1 Flow of experiment. 
  
Participants come 
into lab 
Read written 
instructions for the 
ultimatum game 
One-shot ultimatum 
game 
Read written 
instructions for 
continuous fishing 
game 
One practice round 
with CP management 
Continuous fishing 
game for 10 rounds 
Answer the survey 
Continuous fishing 
game for 10 rounds  
Read instructions for 
lottery choice  
Lottery choice 
Receive cash based 
on performance 
Leave lab 
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Figure 1.2 Choice of management group, and corresponding profits, over time. 
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A. 
 
B.  
 
Figure 1.3 Comparison between Predictions and Observations. The data used include 
the observations from the last half of the sessions, season 11 to 20. Blue colour stands 
for IQ and red for CP. Shaded areas are observations and lines are predictions. (A) 
Shown is the mean of days per week across the two outcomes: all subjects in IQ and 
10 subjects in IQ (2 subjects in CP). (B) Shown is the mean of days per week across 
the three outcomes: 9 subjects in IQ (3 in CP), 8 subjects in IQ (2 in CP), and 7 
subjects in IQ (5 in CP). 
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Figure 1.4 Distribution of profits by each management outcome. The data used include 
the observations from the last half of the sessions, season 11 to 20.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Weight for the two estimates when 𝛽 = 10. 
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Figure 1.6 Average Marginal Effect. Shown is average change in the probability of 
choosing IQ, caused by a marginal increase in the named independent variable. All 
explanatory variables except for the binary catch are X-standardized and, for time-
varying variables, standardized by standard deviation at the corresponding time.  
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Appendix 1.1 Additional Analysis 
 
Estimating Group Choice 
How risk attitudes influence choice is uncertain throughout the session (Table 1.10). 
Choosing CP can accompany opportunity of earning tremendous profits that are not 
usually possible in IQ. Maximum profit earned in CP is twice as great as the mean of 
profits in IQ during the last ten seasons. This may drive risk seeking subjects towards 
CP. Risk attitudes can act on when subjects see such a chance in CP by experiencing 
greater standard deviation in CP relative to IQ. To further investigate, we estimated 
the same random-effects logit model but with two subcategories for risk attitudes 
instead of a single coefficient: risk seeking subjects and risk averse subjects both 
interacted with the original coefficient and the level of relative dispersion of profits in 
the previous season (Tables 1.11, 1.12). The level of relative dispersion of profits is 
defined as difference between estimation of standard deviation of CP and IQ profits 
across all sessions in the previous season. This longer model is expected to capture 
different responses from risk seekers and averters on different levels of profit 
dispersion. However, we did not find any evidence of risk attitudes influencing choice 
(Table 1.12). 
Although it is significant for early seasons, the implication of the 
disadvantageous inequality aversion variable is puzzling. Marginal increase in the 
coefficient decreases the probability of choosing IQ by 4.1 percent at the beginning of 
the sessions, all things equal. As fishing in CP results in a wider profit distribution, 
more inequality averse subjects are expected to select IQ to avoid such inequality. 
However, the estimation suggests the opposite during early seasons. The less averse 
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subjects are to disadvantageous inequality, the more likely they are to choose IQ. If it 
in fact captures the level of aversion to disadvantageous inequality, this coefficient 
should be in play when subjects earn fewer profits than their expectation.  
The degree of inequality aversion may matter as more inequality averse 
subjects may respond differently from less inequality averse subjects. The coefficient 
of inequality aversion takes six values (0, 0.125, 0.334, 0.75, 2, infinity) with the 
percent of each value (2.8%, 12%, 2.8%, 13.9%, 34.3%, 34.3%). Non-parametric test 
suggests that the coefficient of 2 and greater make distinct choice from others (Mann-
Whitney test, z = 5.140, P = 2.747e-07, two-tailed). In addition, differentiating a kind 
of inequality subjects experienced can improve the estimation, and subjects at 
different degrees of inequality aversion can react distinctly to various kinds of 
inequality. We divided inequality aversion into two categories: advantageous 
inequality and disadvantageous inequality. Advantageous inequality is defined as a 
difference of experienced profit minus estimated profit if experienced profit is greater 
than estimation and 0 otherwise. Similarly disadvantageous inequality is defined as a 
difference of estimated profit minus experienced profit if estimated profit is greater 
than own experience and 0 otherwise. We created the two variables each in CP and IQ 
(Table 1.11). Finally we interacted the parameter of inequality aversion with two 
binary variables indicating the degree of inequality aversion and four kinds of 
inequality in all combinations, yielding eight variables in total (Table 1.12). 
We estimated the same random-effects logit model, breaking down a single 
coefficient into subcategories based on whether or not a subject is more inequality 
averse and whether or not a subject experienced disadvantageous (or advantageous) 
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inequality of profits in IQ (or CP) in the previous season (Table 1.12). According to 
this model significance during initial seasons is attributable to the behaviour when 
more inequality averse subjects face disadvantageous inequality in CP. The experience 
of having been taken advantage of in CP can make more inequality averse subjects 
emotional, which drives them into the seemingly irrational choice (Koenigs & Tranel, 
2007). More inequality averse subjects, who rejected low offers in the ultimatum 
game, were identified as possessing higher testosterone levels, suggesting that they are 
more aggressive, emotional, and dominant (Burnham, 2007). The results suggest that 
emotion plays an important role in economic decision-making as discussed in Camerer 
(2003) and Sanfey et al. (2003).  
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Table 1.11. Summary statistics for additional variables. The subscript n represents 
session and j season. 
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Table 1.12. Comparison of Random Effects Logit Models for Choice of IQ. All 
variables are standardized except for binary variables. In parenthesis are z score. 
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Abstract 
We empirically decompose the effects on management outcomes in common-pool 
resource management into three: the direct effect of management systems, the direct 
effect of social capital, and the indirect effect of management systems and social 
capital interacting each other to influence the outcomes. In particular, we focus on 
revenue sharing arrangement as a possible management tool in a fishery, in which a 
group of harvesters shares catch and/or revenue among the members of a fishery 
cooperative. In addition to each of revenue sharing and social capital influencing a 
fishery independently we hypothesize the synergy between revenue sharing and social 
capital. Social capital potentially affects the efficiency that revenue sharing brings 
while revenue sharing can foster social capital, which eventually leads to better 
management outcomes. An important intermediary between the two factors and the 
outcomes is collective efforts performed as a group often in a community-managed 
fishery. This paper provides the first rigorous analysis to measure the effect of revenue 
sharing and social capital and to identify the mechanism, through which revenue 
sharing and social capital affect the outcomes of a fishery. We quantified social capital 
using controlled economic experiments with fisherman subjects as well as surveys. 
Using the data collected from ten Japanese fishery groups and wild cluster bootstrap 
for small sample inference, we find evidence of the indirect effect of both revenue 
sharing and social capital interacting to affect the fishery in information network. . 
However, we find no robust evidence of the direct effect of revenue sharing improving 
an outcome in a fishery. The results also show that fishery groups achieving economic 
success are comprised of fishers with higher general trusting attitudes and fishery 
groups achieving better stock conditions consists of fishers having similar information 
network size. 
 
Key words: community-based management, partnership, fishery cooperatives, social 
capital 
JEL: C23, C93, Q22  
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2.1 Introduction 
The importance of community-based management has been long recognized for 
successful governance of common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990, 2002). Contrary to 
Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons (1968) or Olson’s Logic of Collective Action 
(1965), empirical research has found many successfully self-governing communities 
through extensive case study (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1989). 
This is no exception in fisheries (Pinkerton, 1994). Fishery cooperatives, where 
fishermen collectively manage the fishery, has been garnering much attention from 
both regulators and academics as a way to complement and/or supplement existing 
management systems such as rights-based management (Deacon, 2012; Townsend, 
Shotton, & Uchida, 2008). In fact, Northeast multispecies groundfish fishery in US 
has implemented a sector management system, in which voluntarily formed sub-
groups of harvesters may manage their collective total share of the harvest as a group 
right (Pinto da Silva & Kitts, 2006). Thus, understanding how and why fishery 
cooperatives succeed is not only important but also timely in terms of policy 
relevance. 
Revenue sharing arrangement is a type of management rule in a fishery, in 
which harvesters share catch and divide equally the resulting revenue among the 
members of a fishery cooperative, regardless of how much each harvester contributed. 
Employment of such arrangement is a collective action that a group of harvesters 
takes. The role of revenue sharing in fisheries management has been examined in the 
literature (e.g. Gaspart & Seki, 2003; Platteau & Seki, 2001; Uchida & Baba, 2008), 
but less studied are the quantitative effect of revenue sharing and its mechanism, 
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through which revenue sharing arrangement attains success. In this paper we 
hypothesize the interaction between revenue sharing and social capital; revenue 
sharing augments social capital in a community and among fishers, and social capital 
also influences various incentives possibly induced under revenue sharing and the 
efficiency that such arrangement brings.  
This paper provides the first rigorous analysis on measuring the direct effects 
of revenue sharing and social capital in a community-managed fishery, and identifies 
the indirect effects resulting from the interaction between revenue sharing and social 
capital. An important intermediary between the two factors, revenue sharing 
arrangement and social capital, and the outcomes of a fishery is collective efforts 
defined as any efforts performed as a group to increase harvesting performance of a 
fishery. The efforts include stock enhancement, rotation of fishing grounds, collective 
search for schools of fish, exchange of information, and collective use of fishing boats 
and/or fishing gear. Revenue sharing arrangement and social capital enhance the effect 
of the collective efforts, which leads to efficient and sustainable use of resources in the 
long run. Contribution to the group efforts aligns with self-interest when a group of 
harvesters shares revenue and harvesters are devoted to collective value due to social 
capital in a community.  
Social capital is a concept that attributes such as trust, cooperation, and 
reciprocity among people, and norms and networks in a community are important in 
improving economic life (Fukuyama, 1996; Putnam, 2001). Consensus has been 
established as to importance and influence of social capital in economic analysis 
(Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2001) although some skepticism as an analytical concept—
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how social capital should be incorporated in an economic model—has been expressed 
(Arrow, 2001; Solow, 2001). In particular, the role of social capital in a community 
that self-governs a community resource has been highlighted (Ahn & Ostrom, 2008; 
Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Gutiérrez, Hilborn, & Defeo, 2011; Pretty, 2003). In fact, 
Carpenter and Seki (2011) showed a strong correlation between fishermen’s 
propensity to cooperate and fishing productivity. Social capital is also found to be 
empirically associated with economic productivity in other workplace (e.g. Barr & 
Serneels, 2009; Bouma, Bulte, & van Soest, 2008; Carter & Castillo, 2002; Karlan, 
2005; Knack & Keefer, 1997). 
Revenue sharing arrangement induces conflicting incentives within a fisher: 
free-riding on others’ fishing effort and maximizing collective value (Kandel & 
Lazear, 1992). Theoretically free-riding on other’s fishing efforts dominates one’s 
incentive in a sufficiently large organization because marginal return from free-riding 
is usually greater than its cost. However, shirking behaviors (to become lazy by 
sharing revenue and not exert excessive effort) in a commons tragedy situation can 
increase efficiency. As to why revenue sharing arrangement may not induce 
disproportionate shirking, Gaspart & Seki (2003) attributed to status seeking among 
fishermen, which counteracted against excessive shirking in fishing effort. 
Heintzelman et al. (2009) balanced an individual incentive to free ride in own effort 
and intra-group competition, which prevented excess harvesting and increased 
efficiency.  
Empirical findings identified the important roles of the collective efforts in 
revenue sharing groups. The collective efforts are a source of efficiency that can be 
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brought by revenue sharing because they are expected to generate synergies, which is 
key in a partnership structure such as revenue sharing arrangement (Sherstyuk, 1998). 
By aligning self-interest with a group interest revenue sharing supports an incentive to 
contribute to the collective efforts, which bring synergies and lead to successful 
management of a fishery. Platteau and Seki (2001) emphasized importance of the 
collective efforts such as synchronization of fishing effort, collective net repair, and 
exchange of information in Japanese grass-shrimp fishery with revenue sharing. 
Another revenue sharing group in Japanese small pink shrimp fishery identified joint 
marketing and harvest control as a significant motive of sharing revenue as well as 
major contribution to increased efficiency (Uchida & Baba, 2008).  
Social capital can sustain individual fishers’ contribution to the collective 
efforts. Assuming that all fishery groups engage in some form of the collective efforts, 
how much time and effort each group and each individual within a group put for these 
collective efforts can vary. Among many aspects of social capital the focus in this 
paper is on cooperation, trust, and information network. Cooperative relationships 
fishers have in a fishery group can make a difference in the level of contribution 
because fishers can be inherently cooperative to each other or can be more cooperative 
knowing that other fishers are also cooperative. Similarly general trusting nature of 
fishers can affect the level of contribution because they may trust others for 
contributing as well. Having greater information networks in a community in density 
and in scale may also increase the level of contribution because fishers may know 
each other’s harvesting behaviors, which may enable them to contribute in such a way 
that the benefits from contributing can accrue to themselves. 
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Importance of social capital and more broadly immaterial motivation in 
economic decision-making has been stressed in the literature, especially in behavioral 
economics. Behavioral response to monetary incentives sometimes does not align with 
regulator’s intention as referred as crowding out (Cardenas et al., 2000). In the worst 
case economic incentives may undermine individual voluntary motivation to 
contribute to a better world (Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman, 2012). These studies 
suggest that immaterial incentives, in addition to economic factors such as production 
technology as shown in Kaya and Vereshchagina (2014), can play an important role in 
ensuring success of revenue sharing. For example, each harvester may contribute to 
the collective efforts rather than free-ride because of moral or reputation among 
fishers, which has been shown to overcome moral hazard (e.g. Bénabou & Tirole, 
2006; Brekke et al., 2003; Gaspart & Seki, 2003). Trust or reciprocity among 
members, or social norms can support individual motivation to make sincere 
commitment to a group interest. 
Not only do these two factors, revenue sharing and social capital, support an 
incentive to contribute to the collective efforts separately, but also through the 
interaction with social capital revenue sharing further enhances the effect of the 
collective efforts, and through the interaction with revenue sharing social capital 
strengthens a team for the collective efforts. The collective efforts motivated by 
revenue sharing and social capital bring synergies in fishing, which reinforces the 
indirect effect of both of revenue sharing and social capital. In other words, greater 
social capital among fishers financially bound by revenue sharing can strengthen the 
effect of the collective efforts, which generates the indirect effect of revenue sharing 
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and social capital. For example, revenue sharing fishers can be encouraged to share 
more information on hot-spots to increase the productivity of fishing as a group. 
Fishery groups may collectively decide to remove predators for a targeting species; 
fishery groups with more cooperative fishers may spend more time for this collective 
task and they may do so more likely if they share revenue. Fishery groups with higher 
levels of general trust may collectively repair fishing gears more often without 
revenue sharing arrangement, but with revenue arrangement and trusting nature of 
fishers fishery groups may even collectively use fishing gear let alone repair them. In 
all these examples revenue sharing and social capital can directly affect the outcomes 
in a fishery but also they can influence them indirectly by enhancing the effect of each 
other. 
This paper formally tests the effect of revenue sharing and social capital 
separately on the four measurements of the outcomes in a fishery: ex-vessel price per 
kilogram (economic outcome), resource stock density measured per squared meter 
(biological outcome), economic success perceived by fishers, and resource conditions 
perceived by fishers. In addition, this paper also tests the pathway, through which 
revenue sharing and social capital interact each other to affect the outcomes indirectly. 
Together this paper provides the first rigorous analysis to measure the effects of 
different management systems and different levels of social capital in a community-
managed fishery and to identify how economic systems and social aspects of a 
community affect the outcomes of a fishery. The collective efforts performed as a 
group in a fishery mediates between the outcomes in a fishery and the two factors, 
revenue sharing arrangement and social capital.  
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Utilizing both numeric data and perceived scales for measurement of the 
outcomes this paper achieves comprehensive analysis of management outcomes. The 
data were collected in Japan, which is one of the countries that have a long history of 
community-based fisheries management (Yamamoto, 1995) as well as ample cases of 
revenue sharing. Many Japanese fisheries operating under revenue sharing have been 
successfully managing the resources as well as generating resource rents (Carpenter & 
Seki, 2011; Platteau & Seki, 2001; Uchida & Baba, 2008). To quantify cooperation 
controlled economic experiments with fisherman subjects were conducted. As for trust 
and information network indices are constructed from survey responses of the same 
fisherman subjects. Using wild cluster bootstrapped p-values for small sample 
inference, we rigorously quantify the effect of revenue sharing and social capital in a 
reduced form. In addition, we explore the mechanism, through which those factors 
interact with each other and affect the outcomes in a fishery. 
 
2.2. Conceptual Framework 
A fishery possesses various externalities inflicted by individual harvesting decisions. 
Theoretical studies incorporated them as stock and crowding externalities, and 
demonstrated how these externalities can cause rent dissipation in fisheries (e.g. Clark, 
1980; Smith, 1969). In a static common pool resource environment, equilibrium is 
achieved where average revenue from exploitation equals to its average cost because a 
harvester can establish the right over the resource only by exploiting it (common 
property externality) (Walker, Gardner, & Ostrom, 1990). In a dynamic fishery 
environment, spatial, contemporaneous, and temporal production externalities need to 
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be incorporated (Clark, 1980; Homans & Wilen, 2005; Smith, 1969). Harvesting adult 
fish in the current period can alter reproductive ability of the fish population for the 
following year while harvesting young fish may not be profitable (stock externality). 
Heterogeneous returns to effort across fishing locations may drive harvesters to fish 
more in some locations than others, but harvesters do not consider the cost of their 
participation in a particular location to others when choosing their fishing site 
(crowding externality). Similarly, the return to effort at a particular time may vary 
depending on the total amount of output produced at that time (contemporaneous 
externality) (Anderson & Uchida, 2014; Huang & Smith, 2014; Scheld, Anderson, & 
Uchida, 2012). 
There is no single all-round remedy that can solve the externalities in fisheries 
all at once. A catch share system or an individual transferable quota (ITQ), spreading 
over the US fisheries as a promising management tool, has been shown that it can 
fully internalize the common property externality by setting the price of a quota at 
shadow value of a fishery (Arnason, 1990; Danielsson, 2000; Grafton, 1996). It is 
uncertain, however, how ITQs can address the other types of externalities (Boyce, 
1992; Copes, 1986).  
Revenue sharing arrangement in this study features a group of harvesters who 
share revenue equally regardless of how much each harvester contributes but not the 
costs of fishing operations including the cost of the collective efforts (Gaspart & Seki, 
2003). This arrangement is different from a sole owner-like arrangement as in the one 
implemented in Chignik Salmon Cooperative (Knapp, 2008). Thus, the arrangement 
itself does not guarantee social optimum. The assumption that individual harvesters 
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incur costs of fishing operations is consistent with many Japanese fisheries under 
revenue sharing, and it will be relevant and realistic to other fisheries. Fishermen will 
start sharing revenue with others with a fishing boat and gear of a different size, 
horsepower, and age, and thus different fuel efficiency. This difference may continue 
to exist even after implementation of revenue sharing because of the other fisheries 
that the members engage separately.  
Harvesters’ incentives under revenue sharing arrangement can be different 
from open-access fisheries in three ways. First, the common-property externality can 
be overcome because individual harvesters are no longer motivated to rush to fish to 
claim the right to own the fish; all the landings in a fishery regardless of who caught 
them are pooled across all the members. Second, the stock externality can be 
mitigated. Individual and thus aggregate fishing effort under revenue sharing is less 
than when in open-access fisheries because the marginal cost per unit of effort under 
revenue sharing is N (= the number of members) times greater than an open-access 
fishery. Third, the crowding or spatial externality can be internalized to some degree 
because the productivity of fishing as a group is relevant under revenue sharing, not an 
individual performance. A revenue sharing harvester exerts his effort in such a way to 
maximize the marginal productivity of all the members because an individual 
harvester can maximize his profits by increasing group productivity given the number 
of harvesters. The same logic applies to temporal externality, in which different prices 
are expected depending on the timing of landing. What is important for a revenue 
sharing harvester is collective performance, whether temporal or spatial.  
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2.3 Japanese surf clam fishing in Hokkaido Prefecture 
Any entities that conduct commercial fishing in Japan’s coastal waters must belong to 
a local Fishery Cooperative Association (FCA). These FCAs not only enforce national 
and prefectural regulations but also self-regulate the resources tailored to local 
conditions. Within an FCA many groups of fishers are formed mainly based on the 
species they target and/or the fishing gear they use. Each group has their own rules of 
regulation and management and can decide whether to share revenue. No member can 
fish independently; every member must operate as a member of the group. 
Fishers in Japan do not employ revenue sharing arrangement as insurance 
against risk of income fluctuations; most of the FCAs in Japan provide their members 
formal insurance partly subsidized by the national government, which assures no 
reason for any fishers in Japan to pool revenue as a risk hedge. Platteau and Seki 
(2001) presented anecdotal evidence for this argument based on the interview 
conducted with fishermen under revenue sharing arrangement. 
Based on the data provided by Uchida and Wilen (2007), many of the revenue-
sharing groups are concentrated in the northeastern Japan, target sedentary species, 
and use small-scale trawl or gillnets. The coastal fisheries in southern Japan are 
characterized with fishing many species with the same fishing technology, which 
complicates the process to share revenue. Many sedentary species fisheries are 
required to employ small-scale trawl and gillnets by regulation, which results in 
relatively smaller heterogeneity in fishing skills and outcomes compared to other 
migratory species or other fishing technology such as fishing bonito. According to 
Fishery Census of Japan, the fishing groups that share revenue accounted for 11 
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percent of all groups in 1988 and the percentage increased to 17 percent until 1998 
until consistent data are available.1  
There are several reasons for choosing Japanese/Sakhalin surf clam 
(Pseudocardium sachalinensis) fishery, known as Hokkigai in Hokkaido Prefecture, 
for this study. A sufficient number of groups engage in this fishery in the same 
Hokkaido Prefecture. These groups have adequate variation in with or without revenue 
sharing while relatively homogeneous in other operational rules including engagement 
of the collective efforts. Focusing on a particular region and carefully selecting groups 
based on the preliminary data, but without consulting the outcomes, enables us to 
control many observed and possibly unobserved characteristics at the time of 
sampling.  
Harvesting technology is one factor controlled at the time of sampling. Both 
simple and advanced technologies are found in Hokkaido: dredges, jet dredges, 
spearfishing,2 and digging. Jet dredges are by far the most common and the most 
advanced technology for harvesting the surf clams. This technology was introduced to 
some FCAs as early as in 1970s in Hokkaido and has gradually spread all over 
Hokkaido. It is known to mitigate the damages to shells. Employment of this 
technology is often accompanied by a great reduction in the number of active boats 
because of its high initial costs. 
The Hokkaido government requires their FCAs using the jet dredges to impose 
a minimum catch size of 7.5 cm and closure of fisheries for certain months during the                                                         
1 In 2003 the ratio of revenue sharing among all groups dropped to 12 percent partly because the 
definition of fishing groups was changed. In later censuses no comparable information has been 
provided. 
2 There are five fishery groups in Hokkaido that spearfish the clams as of 2013. Spearfishing the clams 
involves spears with craws at the tip to pick up the clams.  
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spawning season. In addition, many FCAs in Hokkaido self-impose voluntary Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC) restriction,3 landing volume control, and stock enhancement. 
Individual skippers are required to cooperate for self-regulation including the 
collective efforts for stock enhancement.  
The way the FCAs in Hokkaido organize their shellfish fishery is practically 
identical. It involves (1) stock assessment conducted by the staff members at Fisheries 
Extension Offices located all over coastal Hokkaido in collaboration with local 
skippers and FCAs, either prior to or after every fishing season; (2) all skippers are 
called to gather for a pre-season meeting to hear the results of the stock assessment 
from the local Fisheries Extension Office, to decide a seasonal TAC, and to review 
operational rules and policy for the season; and (3) during the season a leader and sub-
leaders closely watch the market prices (mostly by directly talking with the 
middlemen) and decide whether to go fishing on the day and if so how much to land 
subject to the seasonal TAC. Each group usually has an elected leader and multiple 
sub-leaders for the groups of a significant size.4 Finally, (4) during and/or after the 
season whether they share revenue or not all skippers in all FCAs are required to 
contribute to the collective efforts to make the fishery favorable for growth of the 
Japanese surf clams although how much to contribute can vary across the FCAs. 
These efforts include cultivating ocean beds, removing predators, and transplanting 
                                                        
3 As far as fishermen and FCAs can remember the Japanese surf clam fishery has been enforcing self-
imposed TAC, which can range from a few to 20 percent of total estimated stock. According to personal 
communication with Professor Izumi Sakurai who was a former scientist at Hokkaido Central Fisheries 
Experimental Station recommended ten percent of a TAC as it was a natural increase of the Japanese 
surf clams (Sakurai, 2014).  
4 Individual skippers can decide whether or not to fish on the day the leader decides to go fishing, but 
they cannot go fishing when the leader decides not to go. On the other hand, when a group shares 
revenue, skippers must follow a leader’s decision; all skippers fish or do not fish altogether.  
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clams.5 Many FCAs also buy juvenile clams from the other fishery groups and release 
them in their waters. 
The surf clam prices do not fluctuate as other migratory species and leaders in 
any fishery groups have a very good understanding of how much to harvest to 
maintain the prices. Regardless of the management systems the groups set daily 
volume restriction in addition to a seasonal TAC. In some groups without revenue 
sharing arrangement the daily volume restriction can be pre-determined at the 
beginning of the season, in which case a leader only decides whether to open up the 
fishery on that day. In all revenue sharing groups and the other non-revenue sharing 
groups a leader decides how much to land on each fishing day, paying attention to the 
market prices.  
The prices not only depend on supply and demand, but also they can vary with 
shell colors and sizes. The markets generally give higher prices per kilogram for larger 
sizes. They also value black shells more than brown shells for their beauty although 
they are an identical species and should taste the same.6 Difference in colors results 
                                                        
5 It is believed in some fishermen and FCAs that it creates a better environment for the Japanese surf 
clams to stir at the bottom of oceans. In fact it can make the ocean beds softer and thus easier for the 
clams to dig and go deeper in the ocean ground, which turns their shells more black (Sakurai, 2014). 
Yet, how successful this effort is in making the ocean beds softer depends on geographical conditions 
and can be minimal in some places. Transplanting is a more direct way to improve growth of the surf 
clams. High density of the clam population is one of the factors that can limit their growth (Sakurai, 
2014).  
6 In 2012, the FCA E in the Table 2.1 received the average premium of 22 percent for black shells. The 
FCA E landed black shells and brown shells at different months. The months when black shells were 
landed received on average lower prices at the overall market in Hokkaido. Thus, 22 percent premium 
may not be true, and yet it can be confidently inferred that fishermen received at least considerable 
premium on black shells in 2012. Interviews with fishermen in all FCAs reveal that fishermen are aware 
of this premium. 
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from the characteristics of habitats, muddy or sandy, and a choice of the habitats is 
partly correlated with age.7 
This market structure of the clams makes the collective efforts for stock 
enhancement even more important. Stock enhancement can take a form of directly 
stocking seeds of clams purchased from other FCAs or transplanting younger clams to 
be harvested in few years later within the same FCA. The purpose and effect of 
transplanting can be multifaceted; it can simply save traveling time by transporting all 
at once from distant fishing grounds to the ones closer to the port; it can increase 
marginal productivity of a fishery by transplanting from densely populated patches to 
less populated patches; and it can increase marginal revenue of a fishery by changing a 
composition of black and brown shells. Different types of ocean grounds, specifically 
whether sandy gravel or mud, create the two colors of the shells. In some FCAs, in 
which the fishery is composed of different types of ocean grounds, transplanting the 
clams from sandy sea floor to muddy one can increase value of the clams by turning 
their shells black. 
What fishermen can do to catch higher valued clams is to choose a fishing 
ground with more abundance in larger, black-shelled clams. This can create a race to 
fish for larger, black-shelled clams even when a daily quota in addition to a seasonal 
one is imposed. The survey responses by fishermen reveal importance of location 
choice in the surf clam fishery. The important information that fishermen most 
                                                        
7 Shell colors of the Japanese surf clams result from their natural habitats; muddy sediments turn their 
shells black while sandy and gravel sediments keep them brown. The ocean grounds on the Pacific 
Ocean side are muddier whereas the Sea of Japan side tend to have a characteristic of rocky, sandy 
sediments (Sakurai, 2014). Difference in the market values by color is particularly important in the 
sampled fishery groups because all of them are on the Pacific Ocean side.  
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exchanged with the other fishermen during the 2012 season was about specific hot-
spots.   
Well-managed groups can maintain higher prices per kilogram in the long run 
by coordinating harvesting strategies in accordance to the transplanting effort. 
Location choice in harvesting strategies becomes even more important when the 
collective efforts for stock enhancement are in place. The cost of stock enhancement 
needs to be incorporated in a fisher’s decision making in selecting a specific fishing 
location in order to maximize social benefits as a group. For instance, harvesting the 
clams before their shells turn black ruins the transplanting effort. Thus, harvesting in 
coordination with the transplanting effort in addition to choosing a location with 
highest marginal revenue is important.  
While social capital can unite fishers and incline them for a group interest 
without financially binding them, revenue sharing arrangement can provide a financial 
incentive for collective fishing (Platteau & Seki, 2001). The fishers under revenue 
sharing are financially motivated to coordinate effort allocation; the non-revenue 
sharing fishers do not have such an incentive because their profits solely depend on 
their own catch and the benefits of effort allocation may not accrue to all the fishers 
equally. All fishers, regardless of management systems, depart from their ports at the 
sunrise (regulation set by the government), but only revenue sharing fishers return to 
the ports all together at the same time. Some revenue sharing fishers designate 
themselves to specific fishing grounds prior to departure and communicate over the 
radio on the sea about who catch how much in where, further adjusting effort 
allocation on the sea.  
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In addition, the degree of effort coordination and devotion to the collective 
efforts can vary within revenue sharing groups and difference within the revenue-
sharing groups may be attributable to different levels of social capital. Some groups 
may allocate the efforts roughly (e.g. designate areas for fishing) while others may 
coordinate with a great precision (e.g. designate a boat to a specific fishing location), 
which can make a difference in the outcomes even among the same revenue sharing 
groups. Similarly, some revenue-sharing groups may devote more to the collective 
efforts than other revenue-sharing groups. The more fishers contribute to the efforts 
the greater the effect per unit of effort can be to the point where the effect of these 
collective efforts exhibits increasing returns to scale. For example, transplanting a 
negligible amount of the clams may fail to bring the density of the clams down to the 
level desired for their growth although the ones transplanted can benefit.  
How revenue sharing can affect the resource conditions can appear in deciding 
a self-imposed TAC and how strictly a group enforces the TAC, which is voluntarily 
set and not required by the bylaws to be a specific amount or in a specific range. All 
sampled fishery groups in this study have been conducting stock assessment for the 
entire sampling period. The results of the stock assessment have been used to assist the 
FCAs and the fishermen to determine a seasonal TAC for the coming season.  
Revenue sharing arrangement and social capital can also affect the resource 
stock through the collective efforts. Directly stocking seeds of the clams can increase 
the stock size; transplanting can enhance growth of the clams; removing predators can 
help more clams to survive and live longer. The effects of all these collective efforts 
can be closely related to an incentive under revenue sharing and the level of social 
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capital as discussed above. The stock assessment reports also provide detailed 
information on density and age composition of the clams for each fishing plot. This is 
not the only source of information fishers can have (fishers know about the fishing 
grounds from their fishing experience) but is certainly helpful to plan stock 
enhancement and effort coordination.  
Our hypotheses can be rephrased in the specific context of this Japanese surf 
clam fishery in Hokkaido. The first hypothesis is that revenue sharing arrangement 
improves ex-vessel prices as well as perceived income and conserves the resource 
stock better through coordinating the fishing efforts and the collective efforts for the 
stock enhancement more efficiently (Figure 2.1). The second hypothesis is that social 
capital—cooperation, trust, and information network—improves the same outcomes 
through uniting fishers without any economic incentives. These are the direct effects 
of the two factors. The third hypothesis is that the interactions between revenue 
sharing and social capital lead to better outcomes. The hypothesis can be divided into 
three sub-hypotheses for each social capital element to be examined. The first sub-
hypothesis is that revenue sharing fosters cooperation among fishers and the 
cooperation augmented by revenue sharing further reinforces coordination in a fishery 
and results in improvements in the outcomes. The second sub-hypothesis is that 
general trusting attitudes in a community lead to revenue sharing, which further 
assures coordination in fishing and better outcomes. The third sub-hypothesis is that 
revenue sharing develops information sharing networks among fishers, which affects 
efficiency of coordination in a fishery and improves the outcomes. The differences in 
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the causal directions in the three sub-hypotheses will become more plausible when 
exact definitions of each parameter are introduced below.  
 
2.4 Methods 
 
Sampled Groups 
Parallel to pre-processing in large-N studies (Ho et al., 2007), carefully selecting cases 
at the time of sampling is crucial in small-N studies so as to remove any relevant 
factors that can take away the degree of freedom in regression (George & Bennett, 
2005; King, Keohane, & Verba, 2001). Thus, sampled fishery groups were selected 
based on the observed characteristics. The data from Uchida and Wilen (2007) 
contained such information as of 2005 for 91 fishery groups in Japan, 53 of which 
operated under revenue sharing arrangement. In addition, the data provided location of 
a fishery, a year established, a type of fishing technology, a type of self-regulation, 
and a type of collective fishing efforts.  
The sample consists of ten fishery groups, five of which are under revenue 
sharing and the other five are not and have never been under such arrangement. They 
all engage in a small-scale trawl fishery, targeting the Japanese surf clams8 and are 
located in Hokkaido prefecture (eight of them are in Kushiro/Nemuro region, eastern 
Hokkaido), which means facing the same market, biological conditions, and historical 
backgrounds. All the groups self-manage the resources of the Japanese surf clams as                                                         
8 Fishers can incidentally catch other shellfish species such as Northern great tellins (Megangulus 
venulosus) and sunray surf clams (Mactra chinensis). Although in some FCAs the value of these 
bycatch shellfish can weigh more than the Japanese surf clams, importance of those bycatch species in 
the fishery groups in this study is not greater than 30 percent of all the landings, and it is safe to say that 
fishers in this study target the Japanese surf clams.  
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detailed above. The groups are only different in a decision to employ revenue sharing 
arrangement accompanied by collective fishing operation in major characteristics and 
management/operational rules, but the degree of self-regulation can also differ across 
the FCAs (Table 2.1).  
The sampling distribution of the ten groups can approximate the population 
distribution of small-scale trawl fisheries targeting the Japanese surf clams. First, the 
Hokkaido prefecture accounts for 76 percent of the Japanese surf clam landings in 
Japan, making it by far the biggest producer as of 2006.9 Second, the sampled ten surf 
clam groups are a typical surf clam fishery in Hokkaido. As of 2011, 70 percent of the 
surf clam groups in Hokkaido employ jet dredges, which are the technology all the 
sampled fishery groups have been using for many years.10 Among them the sampled 
groups account for about 30 percent of total catch volume and value in Hokkaido. The 
average value of all the surf clam fishery groups using the jet dredges was 37.39 
million yen in 2011 while the average value of the sampled groups was 58.40 million 
yen. These two distributions are statistically significantly different (Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon test). However, after excluding the groups that were worth less than 10 
million yen the sampling distribution is not statistically different at a conventional 
level from the population distribution in terms of catch value, catch volume, and the 
number of skippers (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). Thus, the results from analyzing 
                                                        
9 Since 2007 the fishery census has only reported combined value of the Japanese surf clams with other 
shellfish.  
10 According to the data collected by Hokkaido Fisheries Extension Offices, 54 out of 77 groups 
employed the jet dredges as of 2011. After excluding the biggest producer, Tomakomai FCA, the 
sampled fishery groups produce 40 percent of the surf clams by value and volume. We intentionally 
avoid including the Tomakomai FCA in the sample because, in addition to being the biggest producer, 
the Tomakomai city also promotes the surf clams as a symbol of the city and the surf clams from the 
FCA seems to have some branding power at the market, which is not the effect we intend to capture in 
this study.   
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the sampled groups can be inferred to the other surf clam fishery groups that have 
some importance in value. 
 
Data 
We collected this unique dataset containing group information from the ten fishery 
groups in a panel format from 1990 to 2012 and individual information on 79 skippers 
belonging to the ten groups in a cross-sectional format. Our outcome variables are 
measured at a group level as well as an individual level. For the group outcome 
variables our data are in a panel format, and we regress the outcomes on group 
management decisions and group social capital parameters. For the individual 
outcome variables our data are in a cross-sectional format, and we regress the 
outcomes on group management decisions and individual social capital parameters. In 
what follows we describe construction of four outcome variables—two at a group 
level and two at an individual level—followed by social capital parameters.  
We approximate the group economic outcome in a fishery with yearly average 
ex-vessel prices per kilogram with shell-on.11 Thus, fishermen’s profit maximization 
is approximated as revenue maximization by catching higher valued clams. Catch 
volume is not a good indicator of management in this fishery because all the groups 
self-impose a TAC in consideration for their resource conditions. The other important 
aspect of fishery management is the biological outcome in a fishery, which is 
approximated with resource stock density measured as volume in grams per squared 
meters of fishing grounds.                                                         
11 The prices in this study are the average prices of the group, that is, yearly total value divided by 
yearly total landings. 
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In addition to these numerical measures for the group outcomes, fishers’ 
subjective perceptions towards management outcomes will be used to further 
understand the effects of management systems. These individual outcome variables 
are constructed from the survey responses; one question deals with an environmental 
outcome of fishery management while the other question addresses economic 
performance of fishery management. Specifically these questions are “Resource 
management in your FCA is successful in increasing and/or maintaining shellfish 
resources” and “Fishery management in your FCA is successful in increasing and/or 
maintaining profits from shellfish fishing” respectively. The fishermen responded on a 
five-point Likert scale from 1: strongly disagree to 5: strongly agree. Summary 
statistics of the responses to the two questions are presented in Table 2.2.   
The variables for perceptions towards the outcomes and social capital were 
collected by the survey and the experiment with individual skippers. The social capital 
parameters are cross-sectional data measured in either 2013 or 2014, and are 
aggregated to the group level and assumed to be constant over time when they are 
regressed on the ex-vessel prices and resource stock density in a panel format, which 
were collected at a group level along with other fishing operation data.  The prices and 
stock information are time-series cross-sectional data from 1990 to 2012 with some 
random missing observations in early years, except for two observations of one group 
that voluntarily closed the fishery for two years because of concern for the resource. 
Table 2.3 shows summary statistics of the two group outcome variables.  
Two of the five revenue sharing groups switched from non-revenue sharing to 
revenue sharing during the period of the panel analysis. All other groups have been 
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under the same management systems. In addition, all the groups have been performing 
other relevant fishing practices such as stock assessment, a TAC, and 
transplanting/stocking for the entire period.  
Controlled economic experiments with fishermen subjects were conducted 
from fall 2013 to spring 2014. Participants also completed a survey for demographics 
and answered questions on perceptions towards management outcomes, trusting 
attitudes, and information network among fishermen such as the number of other 
fishermen they exchange information with. Table 2.4 shows summary statistics of 
participants. One to 16 skippers, ranging from 15 to 100 percent of all member 
skippers, participated in a session. An average skipper in the sample has been in the 
surf clam fishery for 24 years as far as the panel analysis covers.  
In addition, demographic difference between revenue sharing groups and non-
revenue sharing groups is significant in age and household size (both p value < 0.05, 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). Revenue sharing skippers in the sample are 
significantly younger and have a greater household than those who do not share 
revenue. But we did not find a significant difference in shellfish fishing experience, 
possibly one of the most important factors that can affect social capital.  
 
Cooperation parameters 
Although social capital involves various attributes, the focus in this study is on 
cooperation measured by controlled economic experiments and trust and information 
network measured by the survey. The parameters for cooperation are estimated from 
the observations of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM). The indices for 
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trust and information network are constructed from the survey responses. They are 
then aggregated into group variables as mean and standard deviation of group 
members, which are used in main regression to measure their effects on the outcomes.   
To measure cooperation among fishermen the standard, repeated VCM was 
conducted (Camerer & Fehr, 2004; Carpenter, 2002). Participants were recruited 
through the FCAs, and many of them held some executive positions in the fishery 
groups at the time of recruitment. A flyer was provided with the FCAs to make 
general calls for the experiments and the surveys, and the flyer indicated that the 
volunteers would be asked to participate in economic experiment (play a simple game) 
in addition to a survey on fishing operation and they would be paid in cash fixed 
participation fees plus the earnings from the experiment.  
Before the experiment begins participants were randomly divided into groups 
of four persons that were sustained for an entire session. The participants were not told 
whom they were playing with.12 The participants were given 3,000 yen (roughly 
US$30) worth of coins as an endowment every round and asked how much to 
contribute to a public good from his endowment. Once all the participants made their 
decision the total contribution of each group was calculated, doubled by the 
experimenter, and then distributed equally among the group members. The amount not 
contributed to a public good was kept to each participant. The participants earn a sum 
of the dividends from a public good, regardless of their own contribution to a public 
good, and the money kept to themselves for a round. The dominant strategy in the 
game is to contribute nothing because marginal return from a public good is smaller                                                         
12 In case that the number of participants was not multiple of four, which happened at most sessions, the 
contribution amounts of some participants were counted twice in multiple groups to avoid the effect of 
varying group size as in Carpenter and Williams (2010). 
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than the one from a private account regardless of total group contribution. The game 
was repeated ten times with the exception of one session.13 At the end of the 
experiment two of the ten rounds were randomly drawn as a binding round, and the 
participants were paid the average of the payoffs from the two rounds plus a 
participation fee of 3,000 yen.14  
 A total of 80 subjects participated in the experiment; two subjects were 
excluded from the analysis.15 All the sessions took place at a conference room at the 
FCA or at the community center nearby. The participants were seated facing the wall, 
and in between the participants portable blinds were constructed (Figure 2.2). At the 
beginning of every round the participants were given three boxes in different colors. In 
a yellow box were 3000 yen worth of coins—real money—as an endowment, a red 
box was intended for a private account, and a green box was for public good 
contribution. The participants were asked to move all the coins from the yellow box to 
either the red box (to keep) or the green box (to contribute), which made it difficult to 
guess what other participants were doing based on the amount of the noise made from                                                         
13 The last five rounds were conducted with social disapproval treatment introduced by Carpenter and 
Seki (2011). However, in this study we do not consider the parameters obtained by this treatment 
although the observations during these rounds are used for estimation. The session at one FCA repeated 
the standard VCM for six times with another version of social disapproval for the last two rounds. 
14 A participation fee was set high in this experiment to mitigate concern expressed by many FCA staffs 
for performance-based payment. The session accommodated two more games for different research and 
thus lasted in total between 2.5 hours and 3 hours. The VCM lasted less than 1.5 hours and the average 
earning from this game was 4,700 yen.  
15 One subject was a FCA staff and did not face the same incentive as other subjects. He did not expect 
to receive any compensation during the experiment and planned to surrender it to his supervisor. He 
was needed in the session because only four fishers showed up, which would identify exactly whom 
they were playing the game with. Difference in the degree of anonymity potentially alters the incentives 
because the participants know each other. The other subject was an elderly skipper who contributed all 
of his endowment throughout the session. At the end of the session he gave his earnings to his grandson 
who worked at the FCA. It is apparent that he did not take a series of decisions seriously. The average 
contribution made by the other three members in the group with the FCA staff was smaller than the rest 
of the participants and the average contribution in the group with the elderly skipper was greater, and 
these two groups (excluding the FCA staff and the skipper) are significantly different from the rest of 
the participants at p value < 0.01 respectively.  
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moving coins. Once the decision was made the experimenters collected all the boxes 
and calculated the total contribution of each group and the dividends from a public 
good. These results were written down on a sheet of paper and distributed to the 
participants with the three boxes and the coins for the next round. 
 The mean contribution of all participants is 1,635 yen (55% of endowment) 
with individual contribution ranging from zero to 3,000 yen (0-100% of endowment). 
Revenue sharing fishers on average contributed 1,600 yen (53%) to a public good, 
compared with the average non-revenue sharing fisher contributing 1,762 yen (59%). 
The difference is statistically significant at p value = 0.004 (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon 
test). For comparison the same experiment by Carpenter and Seki (2011) with 
fisherman subjects yielded the overall average contribution of 49% (N = 27) with 
revenue sharing fishers contributing 51% and non-revenue sharing fishers contributing 
46%. This suggests that the fishermen in our study contributed slightly more overall 
regardless of management systems and the difference in contribution between revenue 
sharing fishers and non-revenue sharing fishers went in the opposite direction. 
However, this does not necessarily imply that revenue sharing fishers in this study 
cooperate less because they are statistically significantly younger than non-revenue 
sharing fishers, which is a very important demographic characteristic that can affect 
how much to contribute (Aswani, Gurney, Mulville, Matera, & Gurven, 2013). In fact, 
significant difference between the two groups disappears after controlling for age.16                                                           
16 The OLS without controlling for age (Contributeijt = 𝛼 + Rev.Sharingj + eijt; Adjusted R2 for the 
model is 0.009) implies that revenue sharing skippers contribute on average 202 yen less than the 
average non-revenue sharing skipper at p value=0.006 while the OLS controlling for age (Contributeijt = 
𝛼 + Rev.Sharingj + agei + eijt; Adjusted R2 for the model is 0.040) does not find significant difference 
between the two groups (p value=0.204). Multilevel modeling incorporating random effects of 
individuals nested within sessions also yields similar results; revenue sharing is not a significant factor 
(p value=0.431) when age is controlled for (Wald statistics for the model is 6.73). 
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The observed amount contributed to a public good, y, is censored between zero 
and 3,000 and is related to a latent variable, y*, as follows. 
𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � 0      if  𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 0           𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖∗      if 0 < 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ < 30003000   if  𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 3000 . 
The amount contributed to a public good, y, is regressed on a sum of contribution 
made by other members in the previous round, 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1). The model needs to allow 
individual variation for this coefficient for the reason to be apparent later and thus 
accommodates a random parameter for 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1). In addition, it is likely to be 
correlated within the same subject nested within the same session and thus the two 
random effects for subjects and for sessions are also estimated.  
We estimated this model using Generalized Latent Variable Model (Skrondal 
& Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). This model is very flexible that it estimates multi-level 
random effects as well as one random parameter while allowing the Tobit 
specification simultaneously. The model is estimated with the following specification. 
Γ�𝐸�𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ |𝑿,𝒖�� = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1)  +  𝑢𝑖1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖3 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1),  
 
where 𝛽𝟎 and 𝛽1 are parameters to be estimated, 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1) is a vector of a sum of 
contribution made by other members in the previous round, 𝑢𝑖1 and 𝑢𝑖𝑖1  are random 
effects for sessions and subjects, 𝑢𝑖𝑖3  is a random parameter, Γ(∙) is a link function (the 
identity or the probit function), and 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  is distributed as Gaussian or Bernoulli. We 
assume  
𝐸�𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ |𝒖� = Γ−1�𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1)  +  𝑢𝑖1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖3 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1)�. 
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Table 2.5 shows estimation results of the model. An average participant 
contributes 1,272 yen and an individual variation is in a range of 998 yen standard 
deviation, which is both economically and statistically significant. An average 
participant contributes 0.06 yen (the average marginal effect on the observed 
distribution) more to a public good after observing a marginal increase in the 
contribution by the other members, which is statistically significant but not 
economically significant. This varies across individuals in a 0.08 yen standard 
deviation at a statistically insignificant level.  
The results suggest that the participants care about what the others’ 
contribution is and do respond to it cooperatively. The positive coefficient for 𝛽1 
implies that they do not shirk and cooperate more when the others cooperate more. 
However, a dominant part of their strategies is their own contribution level determined 
outside of what the others did in the previous round. The participants are a group of 
people who interact daily or at least regularly in a fishery regardless of management 
systems. It is possible that they decide their contribution based on the relationship they 
have in a daily life rather than on what the other participants did in this experiment. 
This is captured in 𝛽0 and its variation across individuals as 𝑢𝑖𝑖2 .  
The two parameters for cooperation are created: conditional cooperation and 
unconditional cooperation (Carpenter & Williams, 2010; Carpenter & Seki, 2011). 
The conditional cooperation parameter takes a value of 𝑢𝑖𝑖3  and measures how 
cooperative a person is in response to observed cooperativeness of the other members. 
A greater value of this parameter indicates that a person is willing to cooperate more 
after knowing the others’ cooperation than an average subject in the sample. The 
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unconditional cooperation parameter takes a value of 𝑢𝑖𝑖2  and measures general 
cooperativeness of a person after taking into account conditional cooperation. The 
greater the value of this parameter, the more cooperative a person is independently 
from what the others are doing. Table 2.6 shows summary statistics of the two 
parameters, which are normally distributed by assumption.  
 
Information network indices 
Based on the work by Holland et al. (2010) and Holland et al. (2013) we constructed 
the measures of information network a skipper has in the shellfish fishery (Table 2.7). 
The size of information network is constructed by the survey responses to the question 
asking the number of shellfish fishermen with whom to share important information 
that potentially affected own profits from shellfish fishing during the fishing season in 
2012. An average skipper in these fishery groups shared such information with ten 
skippers. Normalizing the size by the possible number of relationships (the size of a 
fishery group) yields density of information network. An average density was about 30 
percent, ranging from 0 to 100 percent. This indicates, for example, in the case of the 
fishery group comprised of ten fishermen an average fisherman would have shared 
important information with three other fishermen. 
After listing five names of fishermen with whom a person has most important 
relationships subjects were asked what kinds of information he shared with each of the 
relationships.17 Based on the information provided by FCA staffs six kinds of 
information were identified as relevant to the surf clam fishery: market, buyer                                                         
17 Some skippers refused to provide the names of other skippers because they feel that they would leak 
personal information of others, which resulted in a lower response rate for the subsequent questions on 
varieties of information and frequency of sharing the information than the other questions.  
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information, specific hot-spots, market for bycatch and its hot-spots, high gear density 
areas, and boat and gear. Taking the average of the number of kinds of information a 
person shared with the listed relationships produces an index for varieties of 
information. An average skipper shared about two types of information. Among the 
six kinds the information on specific hot-spots was shared most (61% of the 
relationships), followed by market information (56%). This suggests that decisions of 
where to fish are one of the most important drivers in a successful catch in these 
fisheries. As discussed in section 2, these survey responses reemphasize the 
importance of knowing a change in the markets as the market information is placed as 
the second type of information mostly shared. Information on boat and gear is also 
important (37%) in these fisheries as reflected by the rule of many FCAs that more 
than one skipper18 are required to fish in one boat. These fishermen regard other 
fishermen as being close friends (49%) and having common in boat and gear (33%).  
Frequency of sharing the six types of information listed above during a 2012 
season was asked for each relationship in a scale of one to seven: 1 as frequent as 
everyday, 2 as every few days, 3 as once per week, 4 as once every two weeks, 5 as 
once per month, 6 as every two months, 7 as once during the season. An average 
skipper shared the important information with other skippers at least once a week 
during the season. To avoid confusion, the reverse coded index will be used for main 
estimation for frequency. 
 
Trust indices                                                         
18 A term ‘skipper’ used in this study means a fisher who is independent and not hired for a fixed 
remuneration by a captain. Therefore a skipper may jointly own a boat or pay a fixed charter fees to an 
owner. 
 81 
Trusting attitudes of skippers were measured based on the literature (Glaeser, Laibson, 
Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). The two questions from General Social Survey 
(GSS)19 were adopted and asked how strongly a person agrees or disagrees with the 
following statements: 1. These days you can't count on strangers, and 2. In dealing 
with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they have provided evidence that 
they are trustworthy. Subjects responded on a five-point Likert scale from 1: strongly 
disagree to 5: strongly agree. Summary statistics of the two trusting measures are 
presented in Table 2.8. To avoid confusion, the reverse coded index will be used for 
main estimation. 
Measuring trust using Trust game20 is unsuitable in this study because the only 
reliable parameter to be obtained by the trust game is trustworthiness, which was 
found to be correlated with the GSS survey responses as shown by Glaeser et al. 
(2000). Glaeser et al. (2000) compared different methods of measuing trust and found 
that the responses to the questions from the GSS were correlated with trustworthiness 
measured by the Trust game. This result suggests that general attitudinal questions can 
measure some aspect of trust although what the questions actually capture is different 
from what they were intended to capture. Adding two questions in the survey instead 
of conducting even a one-shot Trust game greatly saves time needed for completion of 
all the experiments including the surveys, which makes it easier for more fishermen to 
                                                        
19 General Social Survey is an established survey, a longest-running project by NORC at University of 
Chicago, that has been asking an American population about demographic, behavioural, and attitudinal 
questions since 1972. International Social Survey Program, established by the NORC, has been 
conducting the same survey internationally and a Japanese version also exists.  
20 In the trust game introduced by Berg et al. (1995) Investor has endowment of S and makes a transfer 
y between 0 and S to Trustee. Trustee receives 3y and can send back any amount x between 0 and 3y to 
Investor. Investor earns S – y + x. Trustee earns 3y – x. An amount sent back by Trustee, x, measures 
positive reciprocity (Camerer & Fehr, 2004), which is referred as trustworthiness in Glaeser et al. 
(2000). 
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cooperate for the experiment. Furthurmore, trusting behaviours measured by the Trust 
game were shown to be a poor indicator of trust and more correlated with risk attitudes 
(Karlan, 2005). 
 
Empirical estimation  
A careful sampling of groups based on observed characteristics has already helped us 
to construct a sample of revenue sharing fishery groups and the groups with similar 
traits but without revenue sharing.  
Relative importance of the incomes from the Japanese surf clam fisheries may 
affect a decision to pool revenue and the outcomes and therefore may cause 
endogeneity. When the surf clams are not a primary source of income, a fisher may 
disregard the situation of the fishery or how to manage and fish the resources. We 
approximate importance of the surf clam fishery as shellfish shares in each FCA (total 
shellfish value/FCA value). The greater the shellfish share of a FCA is, the more likely 
not only the group member fishers but also the FCA managers may be to take the 
management seriously. The surf clam fishery in revenue sharing FCAs accounts for on 
average 2.8 percent of all species, ranging from 0.6 to 6.2 percent while in non-
revenue sharing FCAs the surf clams value on average 1.9 percent with the minimum 
share of 0.9 and the maximum of 3.1 (Table 1.1). A nonparametric test with the 
alternative hypothesis (𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑛−𝑟𝑟𝑟 > 𝜃𝑟𝑟𝑟) shows that these two groups are not 
significantly different at p value = 0.65 in terms of the shellfish share (Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon test, distribution adjusted for small sample inference).  
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The absolute value of the FCAs, which each fishery group belongs to, may be 
important. The greater the FCA, the more resources may be available to the groups. 
The FCAs to which revenue sharing groups belong value on average 2,636 million yen 
as of 2012, compared with 2,884 million yen of non-revenue sharing FCAs (Table 
1.1), although the difference is not statistically significant (p value = 0.65, Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon test with Ha: 𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑛−𝑟𝑟𝑟 > 𝜃𝑟𝑟𝑟, adjusted for small sample 
inference).  
Many surf clam skippers engage in other fisheries when the surf clam fishery is 
closed and the income from the surf clams is not the largest contributor for many 
skippers. Konbu seaweed or kelp is a big fishing industry in eastern Hokkaido, where 
most sampled fishery groups are located and most of the surf clam skippers, six (three 
in revenue sharing) of the ten fishery groups, engage in kelp fisheries (Table 1.1). The 
other fisheries the other groups engage in are salmon, shishamo, and gillnets targeting 
groundfish. No revenue sharing shellfish skipper has revenue sharing arrangement in 
the other fisheries.  
Length of the surf clam fishing seasons can influence a decision to share 
revenue and the outcomes. In fact, an average revenue sharing group fished for a 
significantly shorter season from 1990 to 2012 (p value < 0.001, Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon test). While longer fishing seasons can make it difficult for fishermen to 
coordinate and fish together as a group, they may have more flexibility to time the 
landings of the surf clams, which can affect the prices. On the other hand, revenue 
sharing arrangement may make it harder for the group to extend the fishing season, 
which can be more attributable to the size of the group.   
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In addition to the factors controlled at the time of sampling such as location, 
targeting species, and fishing technology, these observations lead us to believe that 
there is no significant or systematic difference in assignment of the treated groups 
(revenue sharing) based on observed characteristics that can affect the outcome and a 
decision to employ revenue sharing except for the season length.  
OLS estimators are not appropriate as identification strategy; first, 
heterogeneity discussed above and endogeneity between the variables of interests and 
the outcomes can bias the OLS estimates; second, the small sample problem of ten 
groups can understate the standard deviation of the estimators. To address a part of the 
problems random-effects model with clustered standard errors is used for estimation.  
𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑿𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽 + 𝒁𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾 + 𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖 +  𝜖𝑖𝑖, 
where i indexes groups and t years. Each group i contains 𝑇𝑖 observations, which sum 
to N. 𝑦𝑖𝑖 is an outcome of interest, either the prices per kilogram or the resource stock 
density in grams. X contains the variables of interest, a rarely changing revenue 
sharing indicator and time-invariant social capital parameters. The two variables of 
interest can be put together in the same model if the assumption that there is no causal 
relationship between the two is appropriate. Nonetheless the two will be put together 
in one model to examine the indirect effects of the two as similarly used in Maccini 
and Yang (2009). Z contains control variables that are different for each outcome. 𝑢𝑖 
is the random, time-invariant heterogeneity specific to the ith group and 𝛼 is the mean 
of 𝑢𝑖. The panel structure of the sample is important because focus is on the average 
change in the outcome not on the absolute value of the outcome in some year. When 
the outcome variable is one of the subjective measures from the survey responses, the 
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data become cross-sectional with no subscript t. For this estimation we use the OLS 
estimator with clustered standard errors, as there is no benefit of using the GLS.  
Control variables in the model for the prices include log of the number of 
months during a fishing season, the landings in kilograms in the other surf clam 
fisheries in Hokkaido, log of time trend, and a binary variable if the fishery has not 
switched to jet dredges.21 Control variables in the model for the resource stock are log 
of time trend and a binary variable for the FCAs I and J for the years before the area of 
the fishery changed due to port construction.22 Control variables with the subjective 
measures as a dependent variable include log of the number of years in shellfish 
fishing and log of the number of months of the fishing season in 2012.  
One drawback of relying on the random-effects model instead of the fixed-
effects model is that the model imposes a stronger assumption on the data at hand.23 
The GLS estimator is most appropriate when the unobserved heterogeneity is 
distributed normally (𝑢𝑖~𝑁(𝛼,𝜎𝑢2)) and is uncorrelated with other explanatory 
variables (𝐸[𝑢𝑖|𝑿) = 0). While the fixed-effects model is not feasible to estimate the 
coefficients for the time-invariant variables of interest in this study, it can be justified 
to choose the random-effects model over the fixed-effects model conditioned that                                                         
21 Most fishery groups have been using jet dredges during the entire sampling period except for the 
FCA H, which started to use them in 1995.  
22 The FCAs I and J share the same fishing grounds and act as one in a number of decisions especially 
in terms of how to use the fishing grounds (a decision to go fishing, season length and more) and how to 
sustain the resources (catch limit, stock assessment, a TAC and more).  
23 Plümper & Troeger (2007) introduced an interesting estimator called fixed effects vector 
decomposition, which enables estimating the coefficients of time-invariant variables the fixed-effects 
model fails to estimate and further brings efficiency in estimation of the coefficients. Later Greene 
(2011a; 2011b) provided formal analysis for this estimator along with Breusch et al. (2011) and for 
efficiency Chatelain & Ralf (2010). To improve the model what is needed in this study is to relax the 
strong assumption of the random-effects model. This new estimator only relaxes the assumption of 
correlation between time-varying variables and the unobserved heterogeneity but not between time-
invariant variables and the heterogeneity, which is a concern in this study (Greene, 2011; Plümper & 
Troeger, 2007).  
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selection at the time of sampling and controls in a regression remove most if not all 
observed heterogeneity that can capture unobserved heterogeneity. However, this 
assumption is not testable, which can be scrutinized only qualitatively. 
One could argue that the estimates suffer from endogeneity. While revenue 
sharing and social capital parameters (cooperation, trust, information network) can 
affect the prices and the stock, higher prices and stock abundance could influence the 
decision to adopt revenue sharing and its stability, and the levels of cooperation, trust, 
and information network. First, as regards to individual fisher’s decision to select into 
a fishery group under revenue sharing Carpenter and Seki (2011) discussed that 
selection bias for revenue sharing as an individual decision is not a significant problem 
in Japanese fisheries because each fisher did not self-select into the system. While 
individual decisions to adopt revenue sharing may not possess selection bias observed 
in selecting into job training, adoption of revenue sharing arrangement is possibly 
nonrandom. Preferences, value, and experience of individual fishers have been likely 
to affect the group decision to adopt revenue sharing. Suenaga (2008) emphasized the 
importance of involving fishers in the decision making process in Sandfish fishery in 
Japan. All the fishers surveyed in the Japanese surf clam fishery who gave valid 
response (64% of the respondents) suggested some involvement in the process for a 
change in operational rules in the fishery.  
Furthermore, there may exist a mechanism that can affect the outcomes while 
being correlated with decisions to implement revenue sharing as well as the levels of 
social capital. One possible scenario is a catastrophic event in the shellfish fishery 
such as depletion of the resource due to overfishing, disease, weather, or all combined. 
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First, we asked in the survey whether they have seen the shellfish resource depleted or 
drastically decreased. After dropping 13 individuals who have been in the fishery for 
less than 10 years, the percentage of the respondents who reported “yes” ranges from 
50 to 100 with a mean of 71. Seventy-one percent of revenue sharing fishers answered 
“yes” to the question while 72 percent of non-revenue sharing fishers did, which is not 
a statistically significant difference (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, p value = 0.63, 
Table 2.1). We also examined a more objective measure of resource stock density over 
the last 20 years. The mean density of revenue sharing groups was 0.59 kilograms per 
squared meter of a fishery and the mean density of non-revenue sharing groups was 
0.54. We found these distributions between the two groups not statistically 
significantly different (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, p value = 0.61). This can be 
also supported by the fact that all the fishery groups, regardless of management 
systems, have been self-imposing a TAC for the last 20 years at least. Examination of 
these observations suggests that a possible catastrophic event like depletion of the 
resource is less likely to be associated with implementation of revenue sharing 
arrangement. However, a moderate variation across the groups is found on how many 
members shares a sense of crisis on their resource conditions. Together with no 
randomness of occurrence of revenue sharing arrangement, this calls for controlling 
heterogeneity, observed or unobserved, in the fishery groups that are correlated with 
implementation of revenue sharing arrangement as well as the levels of social capital. 
Causal inference of the estimates crucially depends on how well unobserved 
heterogeneity is controlled based on the above discussion. The sampled fishery groups 
have been controlled on some important observables at the time of sampling; some 
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relevant characteristics of the group operation will be controlled in a regression in 
addition to time-invariant unobserved characteristics by exploiting a panel structure. 
Unobservables consist of in part that is correlated with observables and in part that is 
uncorrelated. The estimates are unbiased to the degree of how closely related the 
observables are to the unobservables and thus how well these observables capture 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
Attention should be paid to another possible causal relationship that revenue 
sharing arrangement may affect development of social capital and conversely social 
capital induces employment of such arrangement. Specifically, revenue sharing 
arrangement possibly encourages cooperation and information network due to 
collective fishing operation accompanied by revenue sharing. On the other hand, trust 
in a community can affect a decision to employ revenue sharing because of the way 
the parameters are constructed specifically. When revenue sharing and social capital 
are an outcome of each other or even partly, the coefficients of the two variables need 
to be estimated separately (Angrist & Pischke, 2008); X must be a vector of only one 
variable at a time. The estimated coefficient contains not only the effect of revenue 
sharing but also the effect of social capital (trust) through revenue sharing when X is a 
vector of the revenue sharing indicator. Similarly, the coefficient of social capital 
estimated independently of revenue sharing includes a direct effect of social capital 
plus an indirect effect of revenue sharing through interacting with greater social 
capital (cooperation and information network). In addition, the two variables of 
interest together in the same model tests specification of an indirect effect, that is the 
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mechanism, through which revenue sharing and social capital interact each other and 
enhance the synergy of each effect, as similarly used in Maccini and Yang (2009).  
Concerns for standard errors still remain. The literature has been casting 
doubts on inference based on cluster-robust standard errors when they are applied to 
the data containing a few clusters and the invariant variables of interest within a 
cluster (Angrist & Lavy, 2009; Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004; Donald & 
Lang, 2007). Asymptotic justification of cluster-robust standard errors relies on the 
assumption that the number of clusters goes to infinity. Clearly, the data with ten 
clusters (groups) do not meet this assumption.  
Although several solutions have been proposed, the wild cluster bootstrap 
analyzed in Cameron et al. (2008) is the most appropriate in this study; the wild 
cluster bootstrap can overcome the problems with having a few clusters and invariant 
variables within a cluster. The wild cluster bootstrap is different from a standard 
bootstrap method with cluster option commonly implemented by statistical software 
such as Stata or SAS. The wild cluster bootstrap forms pseudo-samples based on the 
residuals and uses “asymptotically pivotal” statistic. While the standard bootstrap 
directly evaluates the distribution of the OLS estimates, the wild cluster bootstrap 
forms the Wald statistics for every pseudo-sample and evaluates the distribution of 
these Wald statistics, which is “asymptotically pivotal”. A statistic is said to be 
asymptotically pivotal if its asymptotic distribution does not depend on any unknown 
parameters. With a few clusters this feature is crucial.  
Another method, bias-reduced linearization (BRL) originally proposed by Bell 
and McCaffrey (2002) and applied by Angrist and Lavy (2009), can also achieve 
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asymptotic refinement. However, it is not suitable with the data in this study as 
underlying heteroskadasticity is expected to be severe due to the nature of unbalanced 
panels. Monte Carlo simulations in Cameron et al. (2008) show that when there is 
heteroskadsticity, BRL no longer improves inference whereas the wild cluster 
bootstrap still does.  
The wild cluster bootstrap also solves the issue with invariant or rarely 
changing variables within a cluster. Forming pseudo-samples the wild cluster 
bootstrap based on pairs of a dependent variable and explanatory variables has a good 
chance of replicating the same pseudo-samples if explanatory variables do not vary 
within a cluster. The wild cluster bootstrap can avoid this by sampling based on 
residuals.  
We extend the wild cluster bootstrap method detailed by Cameron et al. (2008) 
to the GLS estimator24 and will present bootstrapped p-value using the wild cluster 
bootstrap-t method to guide us for better inference. Cameron et al. (2008) recommend 
to use it with the null hypothesis imposed. Instead of using two-point distribution 
originally applied by Cameron et al. (2008), Webb (2014) proposes to use six-point 
distribution, which is recommended especially for the data with a very few clusters 
less than ten clusters. This can greatly increase the number of possible values of the 
estimated Wald statistics from pseudo-samples. 
 
  
                                                        
24 Cameron et al. (2008) note that this sampling method is applicable to any regression models with 
additive error. 
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2.5 Results  
Although the overall direct effect of revenue sharing arrangement on either the 
economic outcome or the biological outcome is not evident, the indirect effect of 
revenue sharing affecting the perceived economic outcome through information 
network seems to exist. This suggests that merely sharing revenue does not necessarily 
result in a better economic outcome. However, revenue sharing arrangement can 
augment denser information network, which then affects the economic outcome in 
fisheries management. In addition, the overall effect of social capital on the outcomes 
is mixed, and the results highlight important characteristics of a community that is 
important to success in fisheries management. Tables 2.9 to 2.12 show selected results 
for objective measures of the ex-vessel prices and the resource stock density. Tables 
2.13 to 2.15 show selected results for subjective measures of the perceived outcomes. 
Complete results are attached in Appendix. 
 
Outcomes: prices and resource stocks 
The results from estimation of cooperation suggest that unconditional cooperation 
plays a more important role than conditional cooperation in the Japanese surf clam 
fisheries. The groups with fishers who are more unconditionally cooperative are likely 
to receive higher prices through greater contribution to the collective efforts. A 
marginal increase in unconditional cooperation among fishers is expected to result in 
43 yen higher prices while 21 yen higher prices are expected in conditional 
cooperation (Column 6, Table 2.9). However, this results is not robust across different 
specifications.  
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In contrast to the effect on the economic outcome, unconditional cooperation 
seems to negatively affect the biological outcome. The groups with fishers who are 
more unconditionally cooperative are likely to result in a less stock density in the long 
run. The marginal effect is 336 grams per m2, which is more than 50 percent of the 
average stock density of 562 grams and thus significant in volume. However, after 
correcting for the small sample inference this effect becomes no longer significant (p-
value = 0.11).  
Estimation of the effects of trusting attitudes suggest that trust is more 
important to the economic outcome than to the biological outcome. According to the 
Table 2.10 the groups with fishers who are more trusting result in higher prices. A 
marginal increase in trusting attitudes among fishers raises the surf clam prices by 40 
yen. This effect remains significant even with the wild cluster bootstrap (p-value = 
0.07).  
Comparing Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.10, we did not find existence of the 
indirect effect of fishers’ trusting attitudes on the outcome through encouraging 
employment of revenue sharing arrangement. Value of the coefficient of trust is 
unchanged (or slightly increased) after adding revenue sharing in regression. This 
suggests that the direct effect of trust is the only effect and there is no indirect effect of 
trust affecting revenue sharing.  
The effect of information network is estimated in four aspects: information 
size, network density, varieties of information shared, and frequency of sharing such 
information. Among the four, the network size is suggested to have some influence on 
the prices with some ambiguity and the network density is strongly suggested to have 
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a great impact on the resource stock (Table 2.11). A marginal increase in network size 
increases the average prices of the surf clams by 26 yen. With the small sample 
correction implemented, however, the estimated coefficient is no longer significant at 
a conventional level (p-value = 0.11).  
Another important result from information network is that greater standard 
deviation of the network density decreases the resource stock. This suggests that 
cohesion of a group as having similar network density among the members improves 
the resource stock density by 136 grams per m2 at the margin, which remains barely 
significant with the wild cluster bootstrap (p-value = 0.10). Although the absolute 
level of the network density becomes important when it is explaining the outcome 
together with its standard deviation, the effect of cohesiveness of the information 
network is greater than the overall level of information network. Again, the effect of 
the network density seems to be a sole effect and does not include the indirect effect of 
revenue sharing interacting with the network density. Whether sharing revenue or not 
a cohesive network density in a fishery is important in improving the biological 
outcome.  
Among the significant effects identified, trusting attitudes affect the prices 
most, which is robust in any specifications (Table 2.12). Different specifications in 
estimation of the resource stock reveal some ambiguity on the standard deviation of 
the network density. 
 
Perceived outcomes 
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The results suggest that a higher level of cooperation does not necessarily lead to 
better perceptions of economic or biological outcomes; neither unconditional nor 
conditional cooperation shows explanatory power for any outcomes (Table 2.13). 
While trust seems to matter in the economic outcome, it doesn’t influence the 
biological outcome (Table 2.14). Fishers with higher trusting attitudes are more likely 
to feel that their income has been increasing or at least remaining at a certain level. 
However, this estimated effect is no longer significant after being corrected for small 
sample inference (p-value = 0.11).  
 Among the four aspects of information network, the varieties of information 
shared and frequency of sharing such information seem to influence the management 
outcomes. First, more varieties of information shared among fishers lead to a better 
economic outcome, and this effect seems to be interacted with revenue sharing 
(Columns 3 and 4, Table 2.14). The magnitude of the effect of varieties of information 
shared decreases but with gain in significance for the effect of revenue sharing while 
the explanatory power of the model increases. This suggests that fishers are more 
likely to consider their profits as increasing or at least remaining at a certain level not 
only when they share more varieties of information—direct effect of information 
sharing—but also when they pool revenue and exchange more information—indirect 
effect of revenue sharing through information sharing. These effects remain significant 
even with small sample inference (all p value < 0.1). Frequency of sharing information 
also increases fishers’ profits, but there seems to be no indirect effect of revenue 
sharing. Among all the effects at work the frequency of sharing information has the 
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most explanatory power although it loses statistical significance with small sample 
inference (upper Column 7 of Table 2.14). 
 Although revenue sharing, cooperation, or trust seems to have no effect on the 
perceived biological outcome, the only effect that is suspected to hold some influence 
is the varieties of information shared. When fishers share more types of information, 
they are more likely to feel that their resource stock conditions have been improving 
or at least maintaining at a certain level. However, more information is not necessarily 
related to more information on the stock and in fact this effect is no longer significant 
after implementing small sample inference (p value = 0.13).  
 Breaking down what types of information being shared, we identified 
information on specific hot-spots and high gear density areas is the types of 
information that affects the economic outcome (Table 2.15). These two are not 
severely correlated (correlation = 0.23). Revenue sharing arrangement encourages 
both types of information in such a way that it improves the perceived economic 
outcome. However, information on high gear density areas is suspected to have little 
more explanatory power than specific hot-spots. The same estimation with the 
biological outcome finds no significant effect on any types of information except in 
buyer information, which confirms no reasonable association of the varieties of 
information with the biological outcome. 
 
2.6 Discussion 
The results of the data analysis provide us insights into how management outcomes in 
a fishery can be improved. The first lesson is that implementing revenue sharing 
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arrangement does not necessarily generate synergies in harvesting efforts and other 
collective efforts for the stock enhancement. Theoretically revenue sharing 
arrangement can improve economic and biological outcomes in a fishery and in 
particular the Japanese surf clam fisheries in Hokkaido can do so by generating 
synergies because revenue sharing supports their group incentives. However, the data 
and the results of the analysis did not support this prediction overall; no direct effect of 
revenue sharing was found. Especially for the effect on the biological outcome it may 
be suggested that a self-imposed TAC that has been already in place in all fishery 
groups for many years suffices to ensure the health of the resource stocks. However, 
this result does not necessarily suggest that revenue sharing arrangement should never 
be employed; revenue sharing can achieve economic efficiency through other 
mechanisms such as cost reduction.  
Second, indirect effect of revenue sharing and social capital variables was 
found in the varieties of information shared. Revenue sharing partly contributes to the 
effect of the varieties of information; the fishers who share revenue are found to 
exchange more varieties of information, which jointly contributes to the better 
perceived economic outcome. This is particularly so in exchanging information on 
specific hot-spots and high gear density areas. However, the effect of the varieties of 
information is not robust in all specifications; it loses significance when the two 
effects of the varieties of information and frequency of exchanging information are in 
the same model. The effect of sharing information more frequently dominates the 
effect of sharing more varieties of information, but the effect of frequency is not 
associated with employment of revenue sharing in such a way to affect the perceived 
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outcomes. Although it is smaller than the effect of sharing information more 
frequently, the effect of sharing more types of information can be enhanced by 
revenue sharing arrangement meaningfully. This can be important policy implication 
for the fisheries that suffer from inefficiency due to a lack of information sharing 
among fishers.  
Third, among the various aspects of social capital examined in this study the 
following two lessons are noteworthy; fostering general trust in a community, not 
necessarily directed towards fellow fishers, is key in economic success and 
information sharing among fishers is critical in a fishery in both economic and 
biological terms. The comprehensive analysis using different measures of 
management outcomes demonstrates a consistent importance of information sharing 
while different measures of the outcomes highlight different aspects of information 
sharing (the network size matters for the prices, the network density for the resource 
stock, the varieties of information and frequency for the perceived outcomes). 
The results of the analysis of the prices as well as the perceived economic 
success support importance of trust although the estimated effect with fishers’ 
perceptions was not consistently robust. This implies that trust in a community in 
general can create good teamwork in a fishery group and enhance the effect of 
collective efforts, which eventually yields better prices and increases income.  
While the network size and the density have a positive impact on the outcomes 
measured with the prices and the resource stock density, the varieties of information 
shared and the frequency of exchanging such information affect the outcomes 
measured as the perceptions of fishers. A positive effect of the information network 
 98 
implies that information is key in economic success of a fishery however it is 
measured. As discussed earlier revenue sharing arrangement can strengthen some 
aspects of the information network meaningfully to improve the perceived economic 
outcomes. These results suggest that revenue sharing arrangement can be an effective 
policy tool to reinforce the information network in a fishery, which generates 
synergies in fishing operation and leads to better management outcomes. 
Implementation of this arrangement may need to assure that free-riding is costly. In 
the case of the Japanese surf clam fisheries in Hokkaido all the revenue sharing groups 
have collective fishing operation, which makes it easy to monitor the efforts of other 
members. 
As fishers exchange information from more diverse fishers, on average as a 
group they can fish better possibly because the information enables them to make a 
better decision on where to fish and how to utilize the stock enhancement in 
coordination with harvesting effort. The fact that the absolute size of network matters 
more than the density also implies that more sources of information are more 
beneficial regardless of how comprehensive a network is within a fishing group. This 
can be true because a network that an individual member has needs not to be 
comprehensive to spread information across the group. In fact, the most efficient 
network should be structured in such a way that an individual needs to have a minimal 
size of the network to spread information across the group. However, a caution needs 
to be exercised to infer the estimated effect of the network size due to a moderate 
linear correlation between the information size reported by the fishers and a possible 
size of information network in their corresponding groups (correlation = 0.64).  
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An interesting aspect of the effect of the network density on the stock is that 
when some fishers in a group exchange information with more fishers than other 
fishers in the same group do, it deteriorates the resource conditions. Thus, a group 
with more cohesion in terms of how dense the information network is across its 
members can achieve better resource conditions over time. More cohesion in terms of 
the network density can imply more efficient structures of information networks. This 
implies that with good organization of information network the fishery groups can 
spread relevant information evenly across the group, which enables the group to more 
successfully coordinate harvesting efforts or/and stock enhancement efforts as a group. 
This feature seems to be more important for the health of the stock than the prices. 
On average fishers in this sample shared two types of information during the 
2012 season, and a type of information shared most involved specific hot-spots of the 
clams (61% of the relationships25), followed by market information. The result from 
Table 2.14 suggests that, for example, the fishers who share three types of 
information, boat and gear in addition to hot-spots and market, are more likely to 
experience better outcomes in both economic and biological terms than the fishers 
who share two types of information, hot-spots and market. Among the types of 
information shared, specific hot-spots and high gear density areas are the information 
that actually affected the economic outcome. These types of information that are 
related to location choice in fishing can affect fishing outcomes more considerably 
than buyer or market information in a sense that sharing buyer or market information 
does not strategically alter the way fishers fish.  
                                                        
25 Multiple answers are allowed. 
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The information was discussed on average once per week, and the fishers who 
share such information more frequently are more likely to perceive a better economic 
outcome. Thus, similar to the network size exchanging more types of information and 
exchanging information more frequently can help fishers to fish more collectively and 
thus efficiently.  
While cooperation whether unconditional or conditional does not influence the 
outcomes measured subjectively, estimation for the prices and the resource stocks 
shows some influence of unconditional cooperation although the estimates are not 
robust with small sample inference. It is especially puzzling that fishers with more 
cooperative nature leads to deterioration in the stock conditions. Although this may be 
the case through some unknown mechanism, the estimates may be suffering from 
endogeneity. If the stock conditions have not been favorable historically, fishers may 
have been working collectively over time, which could have resulted in more 
cooperation measured in 2013. If this is the case, the estimate from the model is biased 
and is not a true effect of cooperation on the resource stock. On the other hand, the 
trust indices are less likely to suffer from endogeneity because the survey questions 
relate to more general attitudes not necessarily directed towards other fishers.  
The results from cooperation parameters also suggest that conditional 
cooperation does not play any role in the outcomes of a fishery while some role of 
unconditional cooperation is suspected. This may imply that the VCM did not elicit a 
great difference in fishers’ responses to what others did in the game. Although fishers 
did respond at a statistically significant level, the magnitude of response was 
insignificant in an economic sense, and the model was not able to capture a significant 
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individual variation in the response (Table 2.5). Thus, construction of conditional 
cooperation relied on the variation estimated insignificantly while construction of 
unconditional cooperation was based on the variation estimated significantly. 
One final note to our results is that the results from ten fishery groups may 
suffer from a small sample problem. Unless the outcomes are consistently, 
significantly different in the two groups the model may not be able to capture a subtle 
difference between the two if any with five groups in each. We provided asymptotic 
refinement with the wild cluster bootstrap to increase confidence in our estimates, but 
this does not necessarily minimize the variance. This leaves some room for future 
study to refine the estimates with even a greater, better sample.  
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 Table 2.1. Summary Statistics of Sampled Fishery Groups 
FCA 
(1) 
Shellfish 
fishing 
started 
(2) 
Revenue 
sharing 
started 
(3) 
Shellfish 
group 
size 
(4) 
Surf clam 
value 
(million 
yen) 
(5) 
FCA value 
(million 
yen) 
(6) 
Shellfish 
share  
(4) /(5) 
(7) 
Other 
fishery
* 
(8) 
# of 
partici
pants 
(9) 
Median 
age 
(10) Have 
seen 
resource 
depleted 
(%) ** 
A Pre-
1950 
1983-8 32 84.1 1,729 4% Gillnet 7 53 57 
B Pre- 
1956 
1967 90 71.8 3,000 6% Kelp 17 52 78 
C Pre-
1962 
2002 24 26.6 5,016 2% Kelp 8 53 71 
D 1976 1990 6 18.0 2,267 1% Kelp 6 49.5 60 
E 1964 1994 47 93.0 1,166 2% Salmon 8 51.5 88 
Treatment Groups Mean 40 59 2,636 3% Kelp 9 52 71 
F Pre-1960 75 95.2 3,080 3% Gillnet  9 56 50 
G Pre-1949 10 27.2 4,136 2% Kelp 9 59 75 
H 1940 
 
73 69.7 4,572 2% Kelp 11 57 64 
I 1931 6 41.6 1,327 1% Shisha
mo 
1 60 
100*** 
J 1954-70 5 26.4 1,305 2% Kelp 3 36 
Control Groups Mean 34 52 2,884 2% Kelp 7 54 72 
Note: As of 2012.   
* The column (7) lists major fishery, in which many, if not all, shellfish fishermen in each group engage when the surf clam fisheries are closed. The 
letters are bold if monetary value of the other fishery is greater than the surf clams. ** The column (10) lists the percentage of the respondents who 
reported to have seen the resource depleted or drastically decreased after dropping the individuals who haven been in the fishery for less than ten 
years. *** The FCAs I and J collectively manage the same resource stock.  
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics of perceptions towards the fishery 
 
 
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Perceptions towards resource 
conditions 
77 3.40 0.86 2 5 
Perceptions towards economic 
performance 
77 3.30 0.86 1 5 
Note: Not all subjects completed all the questions in the survey. 
 
 
Table 2.3 Summary statistics of the outcome variables 
 
 
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ex-vessel prices (yen per kg) 225 464.05 168.86 153.30 858.30 
Stock density (grams per m2) 193 562.35 374.38 51.09 1,633.40 
Note: Ex-vessel prices are real prices (base year 2010).  
 
 
Table 2.4 Summary Statistics of Participants 
 
 
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 78 53.24 10.21 26 79 
Education (1: Junior high school 
        - 6: Graduate degree) 
78 1.73 0.60 1 4 
Household size (persons) 77 2.77 1.72 0 6 
Shellfish fishing experience  
(years) 
73 23.93 13.87 1 55 
Note: Not all participants who participated in the experiment completed all the 
questions in the survey. 
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Table 2.5 Estimating Cooperation Parameters 
 
Dependent variable: Amount contributed by i in session j at round t 
𝛽0: Constant 1,272.57*** 
(0.00) 
𝛽1: Total group contribution excluding oneself in 
the previous round 
0.08** 
(0.01) 
Variance of 𝑢𝑖1 (Random intercept for sessions) 45,915.791 
(0.58) 
Variance of 𝑢𝑖𝑖2  (Random intercept for individuals) 996,737.9** 
(0.05) 
Variance of 𝑢𝑖𝑖3  (Random slope for individual 𝛽1) 0.007 
(0.63) 
Observations 666 
Log-likelihood -4,222.41 
Notes: P-value in parentheses. Multilevel Tobit Regression. 
 
 
Table 2.6 Summary Statistics of Cooperation Parameters 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Conditional cooperation 78 0.00 0.02 -0.05 0.08 
Unconditional cooperation 78 0 844 -1,500 2,495 
Note: Eighty subjects participated, two of whom were dropped from the analysis. 
 
 
Table 2.7 Summary Statistics of Information Network Indices 
 
 
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Network size (persons) 78 10.58 15.03 0 90 
Network density (%) 78 31.08 34.50 0 100 
Varieties of info (1-6 types) 60 2.05 1.27 1 5 
Frequency (1: Everyday -  
   7: Once in season) 
63 2.71 1.93 1 7 
Notes: Not all subjects completed all the questions in the survey. The last two rows 
have a particularly lower response rate because these questions are part of the section 
that requires personal information. 
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Table 2.8 Summary Statistics of Trust Indices 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Trust 1 (These days you can't count 
on strangers) 
78 3.06 0.67 1 4 
Trust 2 (In dealing with strangers one 
is better off to be cautious until they 
have provided evidence that they are 
trustworthy) 
77 3.71 0.87 1 5 
Notes: Subjects responded on a five-point scale from 1: strongly disagree to 5: 
strongly agree. Not all subjects completed all the questions in the survey. 
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Table 2.9 Estimated Effect of Cooperation on Price/Stock 
 
Dependent Variable: Real price (yen per kg)   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Revenue sharing 2.8 
 
2.2 
 
17.3  
 
(0.88) 
 
(0.91) 
 
(0.20)  
Conditional (mean) 
 
9.3 9.4 
  
20.8*** 
  
(0.24) (0.23) 
  
(0.00) 
  [0.05] 
Unconditional (mean) 
   
35.7*** 36.5*** 42.6*** 
   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    [0.15] [0.14] [0.08] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 225 225 225 225 225 225 
Number of groups 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Wald chi2 14333 14529 27665 2597 3035 13325 
Dependent Variable: Stock density (grams per m2)   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Revenue sharing 38.6 
 
38.8 
 
31.9  
 
(0.67) 
 
(0.68) 
 
(0.72)  
Conditional (mean) 
 
133.6 138.5 
  
74.3 
  
(0.24) (0.25) 
  
(0.38) 
Unconditional (mean) 
    
-335.6*** -336.0*** -316.2*** 
   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    
[0.11] [0.15] [0.18] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192 
Number of groups 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Wald chi2 509425 82098 137844 695139 683981 770148 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: GLS estimates. Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and bootstrapped p-value in 
square brackets. All cooperation parameters are standardized. For the estimation of the 
stock the FCAs I and J in the table 2.1 share their stock variable because they manage 
and harvest in the same fishing grounds. 
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Table 2.10 Estimated Effect of Trust on Price/Stock 
 
Dependent Variable: Real price (yen per kg)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Revenue sharing  14.5  21.6  
  
(0.27)  (0.14)  
Trust (mean) 40.1*** 40.8***   26.8** 
 
(0.00) (0.00)   (0.05) 
 [0.07] [0.07]   [0.64] 
Trust (stdev)   35.3*** 38.3*** 15.0 
   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.12) 
   [0.25] [0.18]  
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 225 225 205 205 205 
Number of groups 10 10 9 9 9 
Wald chi2 6201 6411 18714 4930 1997 
Dependent Variable: Stock density (grams per m2)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Revenue sharing  39.5  38.1 
  
(0.66)  (0.67) 
Trust (mean) -153.6 -152.9   
 
(0.13) (0.16)   Trust (stdev)   -109.2 -104.7    (0.11) (0.14) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 192 192 192 192 
Number of groups 9 9 9 9 
Wald chi2 
3.708e+0
6 
1.020e+0
7 
3.525e+0
6 
6.820e+0
6 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: GLS estimates. Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and bootstrapped p-
value in square brackets. All trust parameters are Trust 2 from the table 2.8 and 
are standardized. The standard deviation from one FCA is missing in the upper 
part because only one skipper participated from that FCA in the joint experiment 
with another FCA. For the estimation of the stock the FCAs I and J in the table 
2.1 share their stock variable because they manage and harvest in the same 
fishing grounds. 
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Table 2.11 Estimated Effect of Information Network on Price/Stock 
 
Dependent Variable: Real price (yen per kg) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Revenue sharing 
 
-5.8 
 
-3.5  
  
(0.77) 
 
(0.82)  
Network size (mean) 25.8** 27.0* 
  
22.5 
 
(0.04) (0.10) 
  
(0.24) 
 
[0.11] [0.24] 
  
 
Network size (stdev) 
  
20.0 21.0 2.8 
   
(0.24) (0.23) (0.90) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 225 225 205 205 205 
Number of groups 10 10 9 9 9 
Wald chi2 15856 39896 24413 3901 49744 
Dependent Variable: Stock density (grams per m2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Revenue sharing  38.9  43.2  
  
(0.67)  (0.64)  
Network density (mean) 15.9 12.5   259.1*** 
 
(0.88) (0.91)   (0.00) 
     [0.06] 
Network density (stdev)   -135.6** -142.1** -309.5*** 
   
(0.04) (0.04) (0.00) 
   [0.10] [0.09] [0.03] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 
Number of groups 9 9 9 9 9 
Wald chi2 938026 
1.287e+
06 510392 528358 1.871e+06 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: GLS estimates. Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and bootstrapped p-
value in square brackets. All information network parameters are standardized. The 
standard deviation from one FCA is missing in the upper part because only one 
skipper participated from that FCA in the joint experiment with another FCA. For 
the estimation of the stock the FCAs I and J in the table 2.1 share their stock 
variable because they manage and harvest in the same fishing grounds. 
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Table 2.12 Estimated Effect of Social Capital on Price/Stock 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Dependent Variable:      Real price (yen per kg) Stock density (grams per m2) 
Unconditional 
(mean) 
11.9 33.8***  -390.5*** -320.6***  
(0.37) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  
  [0.02]  [0.15] [0.13]  
Trust (mean) 31.8** 
 
38.7*** 215.6***  -158.9** 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.00) (0.01)  (0.03) 
 [0.04] [0.10] [0.20]  [0.39] 
Network size 
(mean)  
23.8*** 1.9    
 
(0.00) (0.87)    
 [0.03]     
Network density 
(stdev) 
    -111.8*** -139.6* 
    (0.00) (0.06) 
     [0.10] [0.17] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 225 225 225 192 192 192 
Number of panel 10 10 10 9 9 9 
Wald chi2 8243 1909 7959 
7.061e+0
6 
6.666e+0
6 
3.241e+0
6 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: GLS estimates. Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and bootstrapped p-value 
in square brackets. All social capital parameters are standardized. All trust parameters 
are Trust 2 from the table 2.8 except in column (4) with Trust 1. For the estimation of 
the stock the FCAs I and J in the table 2.1 share their stock variable because they 
manage and harvest in the same fishing grounds. 
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Table 2.13 Estimated Effect of Rev. Sharing/Cooperation on Perceived Outcomes 
 
Dependent Variable: Perceptions towards economic outcome 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Revenue Sharing 0.18 
 
0.32 
 
0.28 
 
(0.39) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.15) 
Unconditional  0.24 0.24   
 
Conditional  
(0.12) (0.12) 
  
   
-0.15 -0.14 
    (0.15) (0.19) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 77 71 71 71 71 
F 0.979 2.715 4.132 2.219 3.591 
Root MSE 0.857 0.846 0.838 0.862 0.858 
Dependent Variable: Perceptions towards biological outcome 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Revenue Sharing -0.02 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.02 
 
(0.94) 
 
(1.00) 
 
(0.93) 
Unconditional 
  
0.05 0.05 
  
 
(0.60) (0.61) 
  Conditional    -0.13 -0.13 
    
(0.33) (0.32) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 77 71 71 71 71 
F 0.730 0.608 0.789 2.122 7.168 
Root MSE 0.868 0.892 0.899 0.884 0.891 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: OLS estimates. Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and 
bootstrapped p-value in square brackets. All cooperation parameters are 
standardized. Control variables, all in logarithm, are the number of years 
in shellfish fishing and the number of months in 2012 season except in 
model 1 with the number of months only.   
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Table 2.14 Estimated Effect of Trust/Information Network on Perceived 
Outcomes 
 
Dependent Variable: Perceptions towards economic outcome 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Rev. Sharing 
 
0.24 
 
0.45** 
 
0.23 0.18 
  
(0.24) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.26) (0.44) 
    
[0.04] 
   Trust 0.17* 0.17 
    
0.09 
 
(0.09) (0.11) 
    
(0.34) 
 
[0.11] [0.14] 
     Varieties of 
info shared   
0.26** 0.22* 
  
0.12 
  
(0.03) (0.05) 
  
(0.23) 
 [0.04] [0.06]  
Frequency     0.38** 0.33** 0.26* 
     (0.01) (0.03) (0.08) 
     [0.01] [0.03] [0.14] 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70 70 54 54 58 58 53 
F 3.700 5.392 3.175 4.886 5.380 5.205 5.482 
Root MSE 0.842 0.840 0.872 0.851 0.810 0.811 0.824 
Dependent Variable: Perceptions towards biological outcome 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Rev. Sharing 
 
-0.05 
 
0.10 
 
-0.08 0.00 
  
(0.84) 
 
(0.73) 
 
(0.77) (0.99) 
Trust -0.07 -0.07 
     
 
(0.65) (0.65) 
     Varieties of 
info shared   
0.32* 0.31* 
  
0.28* 
  
(0.07) (0.08) 
  
(0.10) 
   
[0.13] [0.16] 
  
[0.18] 
Frequency 
    
0.19 0.21** 0.11 
 (0.13) (0.05) (0.25) 
      [0.07]  
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70 70 54 54 58 58 54 
F 0.468 0.476 6.779 4.362 1.485 3.776 3.461 
Root MSE 0.877 0.884 0.881 0.889 0.915 0.922 0.893 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: OLS estimates. Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and bootstrapped p-
value in square brackets. The trust parameters are Trust 1 from the table 2.8. All 
social capital parameters are standardized. Control variables, all in logarithm, are 
the number of years in shellfish fishing and the number of months in 2012 
season.  
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Table 2.15 Estimated Effect of Varieties of Information on Perceived Outcomes 
 
  Dependent Variable: Perceptions towards economic outcome 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Revenue sharing 
 
0.59** 
 
0.62**  0.63** 
  
(0.03) 
 
(0.02)  (0.01) 
  [0.04]  [0.02]  [0.02] 
Specific hot-spots 0.19* 0.21* 
  
0.17 0.18* 
 
(0.09) (0.07) 
  
(0.12) (0.09) 
 [0.09] [0.09]    [0.11] 
High gear density 
areas   
0.18** 0.21** 0.17** 0.20** 
  
(0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) 
   [0.10] [0.09] [0.12] [0.11] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54 
F 2.227 3.181 4.044 9.621 3.760 9.614 
Root MSE 0.894 0.853 0.891 0.845 0.888 0.838 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: OLS estimates. Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and bootstrapped p-
value in square brackets. Control variables are the number of existing 
relationships, log of the number of years in shellfish fishing, and log of the 
number of months in 2012 season. 
 
  
 119 
Figure 2.1 Hypotheses 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Setup of the Experiment 
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Appendix 2.1 Wild Cluster Bootstrap 
  
Steps to conduct the wild cluster bootstrap with the null hypothesis imposed and six-
point distribution are detailed in this appendix. These steps follow Cameron et al. 
(2008). Cameron and Miller (2015) is a reference for implementation.  
 Consider a model 𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖 with G clusters and each cluster consists 
of ng, 𝑖 = 1,⋯ ,𝑛𝑖,𝑔 = 1,⋯ ,𝐺 observations with 𝐸�𝑢𝑖� = 0, 𝐸�𝑢𝑖𝑢𝑖′ � = Σ𝑖, and 
𝐸�𝑢𝑖𝑢ℎ
′ � = 0 for cluster ℎ ≠ 𝑔. Then the cluster-robust variance estimator is 
𝑉��?̂?� = �∑ 𝑋𝑖′𝑋𝑖𝐺𝑖=1 �−1 � 𝐺𝐺−1∑ �𝑋𝑖′ 𝑢�𝑖��𝑢�𝑖′ 𝑋𝑖�𝐺𝑖=1 � �∑ 𝑋𝑖′𝑋𝑖𝐺𝑖=1 �−1. 
1. Determine the null hypothesis H0: 𝛽𝑘 − 𝛽𝑘0. From the original sample, form Wald 
statistics, 𝑤 = �?̂?𝑘 − 𝛽𝑘0� 𝑠𝛽�𝑘�  using 𝑉��?̂?�. 
Also, obtain the restricted OLS estimator ?̂?𝑅 that imposes the null hypothesis, and 
the associated restricted OLS residuals {𝑢�1𝑅 ,⋯ ,𝑢�𝐺𝑅}. 
2. Do B iterations. On the bth iteration, 
a. Form a sample of G clusters {(𝑦1∗,𝑋1∗),⋯ , (𝑦𝐺∗ ,𝑋𝐺∗)}. For each cluster 
𝑔 = 1,⋯ ,𝐺, form  
𝑢�𝑖
𝑅∗ = −�3
2
𝑢�𝑖
𝑅 with 𝑝 = 1
6
, 
𝑢�𝑖
𝑅∗ = −�2
2
𝑢�𝑖
𝑅 with 𝑝 = 1
6
, 
𝑢�𝑖
𝑅∗ = −�1
2
𝑢�𝑖
𝑅 with 𝑝 = 1
6
, 
𝑢�𝑖
𝑅∗ = �1
2
𝑢�𝑖
𝑅 with 𝑝 = 1
6
, 
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𝑢�𝑖
𝑅∗ = �2
2
𝑢�𝑖
𝑅  with 𝑝 = 1
6
, 
𝑢�𝑖
𝑅∗ = −�3
2
𝑢�𝑖
𝑅 with 𝑝 = 1
6
, 
and then form 𝑦�𝑖∗ = 𝑋𝑖′ ?̂?𝑅 + 𝑢�𝑖𝑅∗,𝑔 = 1,⋯ ,𝐺. 
b. Calculate the Wald statistics, 𝑤𝑏∗ = �?̂?𝑘,𝑏∗ − 𝛽𝑘0� 𝑠𝛽�𝑘,𝑏∗� , where ?̂?𝑘,𝑏∗  and 𝑠𝛽�𝑘,𝑏∗  
are obtained from unrestricted OLS estimation using the bth pseudo-sample, 
with 𝑠𝛽�𝑘,𝑏∗  computed as in step 1. 
3. Reject H0 at level 𝛼 iff 𝑤 < 𝑤[𝛼 2⁄ ]∗  or 𝑤 < 𝑤[1−(𝛼 2⁄ )]∗ , where 𝑤[𝑞]∗  denote the qth   
    quantile of 𝑤1∗,⋯ ,𝑤𝐵∗ . 
For GLS estimation, replace all the OLS estimators with the GLS estimator. 
  
 
Appendix 2.2 Complete Results 
 
Table 2.16 Estimated Effects of Cooperation on Price (Complete) 
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Table 2.17 Estimated Effects of Cooperation on Stock (Complete) 
 
   
123 
Table 2.18 Estimated Effects of Trust on Price (Complete) 
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Table 2.19 Estimated Effects of Trust on Stock (Complete) 
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Table 2.20 Estimated Effects of Information Network (Density and Size) on Price (Complete) 
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Table 2.21 Estimated Effects of Information Network (Varieties and Frequency) on Price (Complete) 
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Table 2.22 Estimated Effects of Information Network (Density and Size) on Stock (Complete) 
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Table 2.23 Estimated Effects of Information Network (Varieties and Frequency) on Stock (Complete) 
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Table 2.24 Estimated Effects of Various Social Capital Parameters on Price/Stock (Complete) 
 
A.                B.  
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Table 2.25 Estimated Effects of Trust/Cooperation on Perceived Economic Outcome (Complete) 
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Table 2.26 Estimated Effects of Information Network on Perceived Economic Outcome (Complete) 
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Table 2.27 Estimated Effects of Cooperation/Trust on Perceived Biological Outcome (Complete) 
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Table 2.28 Estimated Effects of Information Network on Perceived Biological Outcome (Complete) 
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Table 2.29 Estimated Effects of Types of Information Shared on Perceived Economic Outcome (Complete) 
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Abstract 
We empirically examine the social effect of management systems. We focus on a 
particular management practice employed in self-governed coastal fisheries in Japan—
revenue sharing arrangement. We hypothesize that management systems affect 
cooperative relationships and information network in a community; broadly termed as 
social capital. We quantified social capital using controlled economic experiments 
with fisherman subjects as well as surveys. Using wild cluster bootstrap for small 
sample inference, we find evidence of the positive effect of revenue sharing on 
information network possibly because revenue sharing arrangement provides 
disincentives to compete and accompanies synchronized collective fishing operation. 
Interestingly, revenue sharing fishers are no more likely to cooperate unconditionally 
(i.e., unilaterally) and furthermore they are less likely to cooperate conditionally (i.e., 
only if others cooperate).  
 
Keywords: information network, cooperation, partnership, fishery cooperatives 
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3.1 Introduction 
While the primary assumption in economics is that every agent is motivated by self-
interest, importance of immaterial motivations such as moral, reputation, and values in 
economic decision-making has been recognized for a long time. From Adam Smith to 
Amartya Sen, the vast literature stressing importance of immaterial, unselfish 
motivations (e.g., so-called ‘warm-glow’) exists. In fact, many attempts to incorporate 
immaterial motives in an economic model have been made (e.g., Andreoni, 1989; 
Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Gaspart & Seki, 2003). In 
what follows, we examine the possibility of nurturing such motivations in a form of 
social capital. In particular, we focus on understanding how social capital can be 
fostered in a commons dilemma, a typical example of market failure when the costs 
and/or the prices do not convey all information. Its understanding is not only 
important but also relevant in policy discussion to help us achieve ultimately better 
economic outcomes.  
More recent studies on environmental policies highlight the reasons why more 
attention should be paid to immaterial motives when designing a policy. Behavioral 
response to monetary incentives sometimes does not align with regulator’s intention as 
referred as crowding out (Cardenas, Stranlund, & Willis, 2000). In the worst-case 
scenario, economic incentives induced by an institutional setup may undermine 
individual voluntary motivation to contribute to a better world that would have 
prevailed otherwise (Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012; Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman, 
2012). In particular, in a social dilemma situation such as a fishery each harvester may 
contribute to the group interest because of moral or reputation among harvesters (e.g. 
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Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Brekke, Kverndokk, & Nyborg, 2003; Gaspart & Seki, 
2003). Trust or reciprocity among members, or social norms can support individual 
motivation to make sincere commitment to a group interest in a closed society. These 
studies suggest that non-monetary incentives can play an important role in ensuring 
success of implementing a policy.  
Non-monetary incentives discussed above comprise many aspects of social 
capital. Social capital is a concept that attributes such as trust, cooperation, and 
reciprocity among people, and norms and networks in a community are important in 
improving economic life (Fukuyama, 1996; Putnam, 2001). A stream of the literature 
on the commons has highlighted important roles of social capital in a community that 
self-governs a community resource (e.g. Ahn & Ostrom, 2008; Bowles & Gintis, 
2002; Gutiérrez, Hilborn, & Defeo, 2011; Pretty, 2003).  
Formal economic institutions—markets and property rights—have been 
recognized as fundamental in determining organizational as well as national economic 
success (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005; North, 1973, 2005; Williamson, 
1975). As Acemoglu et al. (2005, p. 397) state: “differences in economic institutions 
are the fundamental cause of different patterns of economic growth.” Different 
economic institutions induce various incentives for people to innovate, to invest, to 
save for the future, and to provide public goods, which results in differences in 
economic success. They not only determine the size of a pie but also how a pie should 
be distributed.  
Needless to say the same argument applies to management of the commons. 
Institutional arrangements inside and outside of the commons influence how 
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successfully resource users can manage the resource and thus benefit from their own 
resource use (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1989). Whether or not 
access to the resource is restricted to a limited number of users can alter the incentives 
for conservation and thus the resulting economic outcomes. Similarly establishment of 
any types of property rights for resource usage can mitigate some of the externality 
causing rent dissipation in the commons and improve economic efficiency.  
 Another stream of the literature suggests that economic institutions do more 
than changing economic incentives and distributing goods and services; they also 
affect the accumulation of social capital. Bowles (1998, p. 75) argues that they “also 
influence the evolution of values, tastes, and personalities” based on cases drawn from 
experimental economics, history, and other social sciences. Bowles (1998) also points 
out that moral, ethics, or personality matters especially in the cases of incomplete 
contracting and asymmetric information, which are prevalent in the real world 
including many commons situations.  
The hypothesis that economic institutions affect social capital can provide 
important policy implications, because the level of social capital has been shown to be 
associated with economic performance. In fact, Carpenter and Seki (2011) showed a 
strong correlation between fishermen’s propensity to cooperate (one aspect of social 
capital) and fishing productivity. Social capital is also found to be empirically 
associated with economic productivity in other workplace (e.g. Barr & Serneels, 2009; 
Bouma, Bulte, & van Soest, 2008; Carter & Castillo, 2002; Karlan, 2005; Knack & 
Keefer, 1997). 
In this paper we empirically test the hypothesis that social capital can be 
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fostered by formal economic institutions. In other words, differences in the levels of 
social capital in a fishing community can be explained by differences in management 
systems governing fisheries. In so doing we rigorously quantify the effect of 
management systems on accumulation of social capital.  
To test the hypothesis, we focus on a particular management system employed 
in a fishery—revenue sharing arrangement—as our empirical case study. Revenue 
sharing arrangement is a type of management rule in a fishery, in which harvesters 
share catch and/or profits among the members of a fishery cooperative. Employment 
of such arrangement is a collective action that a group of harvesters takes. The 
economic roles of revenue sharing in fishery management have been examined in the 
literature (e.g. Gaspart & Seki, 2003; Platteau & Seki, 2001; Uchida & Baba, 2008). 
To our knowledge this study is the first to investigate the consequence of revenue 
sharing arrangement on social aspect of a community and empirically quantify the 
effects.  
This paper provides the quantitative effect of management systems—whether 
the group has employed revenue sharing or not—on the social aspect of a community 
(social capital). In particular, this paper asks whether a difference in management 
systems can result in different cooperative relationships and different information 
networks in a community. This paper provides the first rigorous analysis to measure 
the effect of different management systems on social capital and provides insights into 
an effective policy that can be employed for development of social capital. 
The data were collected from Japanese fisheries, many of whom operating 
under revenue sharing have been successfully managing the resources as well as 
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generating resource rents (Platteau & Seki, 2001; Uchida & Baba, 2008). For the 
purpose of this paper, social capital is narrowly defined as cooperation and 
information network, as these are most relevant to fishing operation as a community. 
To quantify cooperation, controlled economic experiments with fishermen subjects 
were conducted. As for information network, indices are constructed from survey 
responses of the same fisherman subjects. Wild cluster bootstrapped p-value method 
for small sample inference was then used to rigorously quantify the effect of revenue 
sharing.  
Revenue sharing arrangement can be an alternative management practice to 
solve problems in common-pool resource management that cannot be resolved by 
other emerging management tools such as Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ). While 
it can mitigate the externality in a fishery resulting from the common property nature, 
the ITQ, which was first suggested by Christy (1973), often fails to overcome 
excessive competition across spaces and times, let alone political difficulty in 
implementation (Boyce, 1992; Copes, 1986). Revenue sharing arrangement can be one 
of a few systems to foster cooperation and information sharing in a fishery; it can 
provide cause for a group and can encourage a cooperative environment for fishing 
rather than competitively fishing only for self-interests.  
 
3.2 Japanese surf clam fishing in Hokkaido Prefecture 
Any entities that conduct commercial fishing in Japan’s coastal waters must belong to 
a local Fishery Cooperative Association (FCA). These FCAs not only enforce national 
and prefectural regulations but also self-regulate the resources tailored to local 
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conditions. Within an FCA many groups of fishers are formed mainly based on the 
species they target and/or the fishing gear they use. Each group has their own rules of 
regulation and management and can decide whether to share revenue.  
Based on the data provided by Uchida and Wilen (2007), many of the revenue-
sharing groups are concentrated in the northeastern Japan, target sedentary species, 
and use small-scale trawl or gillnets. The coastal fisheries in southern Japan are 
characterized with fishing many species with the same fishing technology, which 
complicates the process to share revenue. Many sedentary species fisheries are 
required to employ small-scale trawl and gillnets by regulation, which results in 
relatively smaller heterogeneity in fishing skills and outcomes compared to other 
migratory species or other fishing technology such as fishing bonito. According to 
Fishery Census of Japan, the fishing groups that share revenue accounted for 11 
percent of all groups in Japan in 1988 and the percentage increased to 17 percent until 
1998, in which consistent data are available.1  
We chose the Japanese/Sakhalin surf clam (Pseudocardium sachalinensis) 
fishery, known as Hokkigai in Hokkaido Prefecture, for this study for several reasons. 
There are a sufficient number of groups engaged in this fishery in the same Hokkaido 
Prefecture. There are also sufficient variations in with or without revenue sharing 
while relatively homogeneous in other operational rules.  
Focusing on a particular region and carefully selecting groups based on the 
data from Uchida and Wilen (2007), but without controlling the outcomes, enables us 
to control many observed and possibly unobserved characteristics at the time of 
                                                          
1 In 2003 the ratio of revenue sharing among all groups dropped to 12% partly because the definition of 
fishing groups was changed. In later censuses no comparable information has been provided. 
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sampling. Harvesting technology is another factor controlled at the time of sampling. 
For many years all sampled fishery groups employ the jet dredges, by far the most 
common and the most advanced technology for harvesting the surf clams.   
The way the FCAs in Hokkaido organize their shellfish fishery is practically 
identical. It involves (1) stock assessment conducted by the staff members at Fisheries 
Extension Offices located all over Hokkaido in collaboration with the local skippers 
and FCAs, either prior to or after every fishing season; (2) all skippers are called to 
gather for a pre-season meeting to hear the results of the stock assessment from the 
local Fisheries Extension Office, to decide a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for the 
coming season, and to review operational rules and policy for the season; and (3) 
during the season a leader and sub-leaders closely watch the market prices (mostly by 
directly talking with the middlemen) and decide whether to go fishing on the day and 
if so how much to land subject to the seasonal TAC.2  Each group usually has an 
elected leader and multiple sub-leaders for the groups of a significant size. Finally, (4) 
during and/or after the season whether they share revenue or not all skippers in all 
FCAs are required to contribute to the collective efforts to make the fishery favorable 
for growth of the Japanese surf clams although how much to contribute can vary 
across the FCAs. These efforts include cultivating ocean beds, removing predators, 
and transplanting clams. Many FCAs also buy juvenile clams from other fisheries and 
release them in their waters. 
The sample consists of ten fishery groups, five of which are under revenue 
sharing and the other five are not and have never been under such arrangement. They 
                                                          
2 Individual skippers can decide whether or not to fish on the day a leader decides to go fishing, but they 
cannot go fishing when the leader decides not to go. On the other hand, when a group shares revenue, 
skippers must follow a leader’s decision; all skippers fish or do not fish altogether.  
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all engage in a small-scale trawl fishery, targeting the Japanese surf clams, and are 
located in Hokkaido prefecture (eight of them are in Kushiro/Nemuro region, eastern 
Hokkaido), which means facing the same market, biological conditions, and historical 
backgrounds. All the groups self-manage the resources of the Japanese surf clams as 
detailed above; they voluntarily set a TAC based on the stock assessment; they 
perform the collective efforts for stock enhancement such as stocking and 
transplanting. All fishers, regardless of management systems, depart from their ports 
at the sunrise (regulation set by the government), but only revenue sharing fishers 
return to the ports all together at the same time. Some revenue sharing fishers 
designate themselves to specific fishing grounds prior to departure and communicate 
over the radio on the sea about who catch how much in where, further adjusting effort 
allocation on the sea. In other words, the sampled groups are only different in a 
decision to employ revenue sharing arrangement accompanied by collective fishing 
operation in major management/operational rules, but the degree of self-regulation can 
differ across the FCAs. 
The fishers under revenue sharing are financially motivated to coordinate 
allocation of fishing efforts in both spatial and temporal dimensions; collective fishing 
operation financially supported by revenue sharing arrangement can further facilitate 
development of social capital in a fishing community. On the other hand, the non-
revenue sharing fishers do not have such an incentive because their profits solely 
depend on their own catch and the benefits of effort allocation may not accrue to all 
the fishers equally. The non-revenue sharing fishers do still need to interact with each 
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other in fishing operation as a member of the FCA, but the interaction is not 
financially motivated.  
 
3.3 Methods 
We collected this unique dataset containing 79 observations from ten fishery groups in 
Japan. The dataset consists of individual social capital parameters, each of which will 
be regressed on a group management indicator—whether sharing revenue or not—and 
other individual demographic variables for controls.   
 Although social capital involves various attributes, the focus in this study is on 
cooperation measured by controlled economic experiments with fishermen subjects 
and information network measured by the survey. Use of experimental method to 
measure traditionally hard-to-measure variables such as social capital has been 
advocated in previous studies (Camerer & Fehr, 2004; Cardenas & Carpenter, 2005; 
Carpenter, 2002), and in fact many applications exist (e.g., Barr & Serneels, 2009; 
Bouma, Bulte, & van Soest, 2008; Carpenter, Bowles, Gintis, & Hwang, 2009; 
Carpenter & Seki, 2011; Carter & Castillo, 2002; Karlan, 2005). Glaeser et al. (2000) 
carefully compared the experimental method with the survey method and concluded 
that experiments could be combined with surveys to supplement to each other.  
 First we detail construction of cooperation parameters with the experiment and 
then construction of information network indices with the survey. Then, we introduce 
empirical strategy to estimate the outcome variables (social capital parameters) with 
our variable of interest (a group management variable). 
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Cooperation parameters 
To measure cooperation among fishermen the standard, repeated Voluntary 
Contribution Mechanism (VCM) was conducted (Camerer & Fehr, 2004; Carpenter, 
2002). Participants were recruited through the FCAs, and many of them held some 
executive positions in the fishery groups at the time of recruitment. A flyer was 
provided with the FCAs to make general calls for the experiments and the surveys, and 
the flyer indicated that the volunteers would be asked to participate in economic 
experiment (play a simple game) in addition to a survey on fishing operation and they 
would be paid in cash fixed participation fees plus the earnings from the experiment.  
Before the experiment began participants were randomly divided into groups 
of four persons that were sustained for an entire session. The participants were not told 
whom they were playing with.3 The participants were given 3,000 yen (roughly 
US$30) worth of coins as an endowment every round and asked how much to 
contribute to a public good from his endowment. Once all the participants made their 
decision the total contribution of each group was calculated, doubled by the 
experimenter, and then distributed equally among the group members. The amount not 
contributed to a public good was kept to the participants. The participants earn a sum 
of the dividends from a public good, regardless of their own contribution to a public 
good, and the money kept to themselves for a round. The dominant strategy in the 
game is to contribute nothing because marginal return from a public good is smaller 
than the one from a private account regardless of total group contribution. The game 
                                                          
3 In case that the number of participants was not multiple of four, which happened at most sessions, the 
contribution amounts of some participants were counted twice in multiple groups to avoid the effect of 
varying group size as in Carpenter and Williams  (2010). 
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was repeated ten times with the exception of one session.4 At the end of the 
experiment two of the ten rounds were randomly drawn as a binding round and the 
participants were paid the average of the payoffs from the two rounds plus a 
participation fee of 3,000 yen.5  
 All the sessions took place in a conference room at the FCA or at the 
community center nearby. The participants were seated facing the wall, and in 
between the participants portable blinds were constructed (Figure 3.1). At the 
beginning of every round the participants were given three boxes in different colors. In 
a yellow box were 3,000 yen worth of coins—real money—as an endowment, a red 
box was intended for a private account, and a green box was for public good 
contribution. The participants were asked to move all the coins from the yellow box to 
either the red box (to keep) or the green box (to contribute), which made it difficult to 
guess what other participants were doing based on the amount of the noise made from 
moving coins. Once all the participants made their decision the experimenters 
collected all the boxes and calculated the total contribution of each group and the 
dividends from a public good. These results were written down on a sheet of paper and 
distributed to the participants with the three boxes and the coins for the next round. 
                                                          
4 The last five rounds were conducted with social disapproval treatment introduced by Carpenter and 
Seki (2011). However, in this study we do not consider the parameters obtained by this treatment 
although the observations during these rounds are used for estimation. The session at one FCA repeated 
the standard VCM for six times with another version of social disapproval for the last two rounds. 
5 A participation fee was set high in this experiment to mitigate concern expressed by many FCA staffs 
for performance-based payment. The experiment accommodated two more games for different research 
and thus the session lasted between 2.5 hours and 3 hours. The voluntary contribution mechanism lasted 
less than 1.5 hours and the average earning from this game was 4,700 yen. 
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 A total of 80 fishermen participated in the experiment; two subjects were 
excluded from the analysis.6 Table 3.1 shows summary statistics of participants. One7 
to 16 skippers from each FCA that ranges from 12 to 100 percent of all member 
skippers participated in a session (Table 3.2). As expected, the smaller the FCAs are 
the more comprehensive the sampled participants are. How representative the sample 
is uncertain because of unavailability of information on non-participants in the same 
FCA. The FCAs greater than ten targeted the skippers who held some positions in the 
group at the time of the experiments in addition to general calls directed towards all 
members because these skippers would feel more obligated to cooperate for research. 
The bottom line is that selection of the participants was done similarly across the 
FCAs of a lower participation rate. 
The mean contribution of all participants is 1,635 yen (55% of endowment) 
with individual contribution ranging from zero to 3,000 yen (0-100% of endowment). 
Revenue sharing fishers on average contributed 1,600 yen (53%) to a public good, 
compared with the average contribution by non-revenue sharing fishers of 1,762 yen 
(59%). The difference is statistically significant at p-value = 0.004 (Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon test). However, this does not necessarily imply that revenue sharing-fishers 
cooperate less because in the sample they are statistically significantly younger than 
                                                          
6 One subject was a FCA staff and did not face the same incentive as other subjects. He did not expect 
to receive any compensation during the experiment and planned to surrender it to his supervisor. He 
was needed in the session because only four fishers showed up, which would identify exactly whom 
they were playing the game with. Difference in the degree of anonymity potentially alters the incentives 
because the participants know each other. The other subject was an elderly skipper who contributed all 
of his endowment throughout the session. At the end of the session he gave his earnings to his grandson 
who worked at the FCA. It is apparent that he did not take a series of decisions seriously. The average 
contribution made by the other three members in the group with the FCA staff was smaller than the rest 
of the participants and the average contribution in the group with the elderly skipper was greater, and 
these two groups (excluding the FCA staff and the skipper) are significantly different from the rest of 
the participants at p value < 0.01 respectively. 
7 One participant from one FCA attended the joint session with another FCA. 
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non-revenue sharing fishers, which is a very important demographic characteristic that 
can affect how much to contribute (Aswani, Gurney, Mulville, Matera, & Gurven, 
2013). In fact, significant difference between the two groups disappears after 
controlling for age.8 For comparison, the same experiment by Carpenter and Seki 
(2011) with fisherman subjects yielded the overall average contribution of 49% (N = 
27) with revenue sharing fishers contributing 51% and non-revenue sharing fishers 
contributing 46%. This suggests that the fishermen in our study contributed slightly 
more overall regardless of management systems and the difference in contribution 
between revenue sharing fishers and non-revenue sharing fishers went in the opposite 
direction. 
The observed amount contributed to a public good, y, in round t by subject i in 
session j is censored between zero and 3,000 and is related to a latent variable, y*, as 
follows. 
𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � 0      if  𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 0           𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖∗      if 0 < 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ < 30003000   if  𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 3000 . 
The amount contributed to a public good, y, is regressed on a sum of contribution 
made by other members in the previous round, 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1). The model needs to allow 
individual variation for this coefficient for the reason to be apparent later and thus 
accommodates a random parameter for 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1). In addition, it is likely to be 
                                                          
8 The OLS without controlling for age (Contributeijt = 𝛼 + Rev.Sharingj + eijt; Adjusted R2 for the model 
is 0.009) implies that revenue sharing skippers contribute on average 202 yen less than the average non-
revenue sharing skipper at p value=0.006 while the OLS controlling for age (Contributeijt = 𝛼 + 
Rev.Sharingj + agei + eijt; Adjusted R2 for the model is 0.040) does not find significant difference 
between the two groups (p value=0.204). Multilevel modeling incorporating random effects of 
individuals nested within sessions also yields similar results; revenue sharing is not a significant factor 
(p value=0.431) when age is controlled for (Wald statistics for the model is 6.73).  
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correlated within the same subject nested within the same session and thus the two 
random effects for subjects and for sessions are also estimated.  
We estimated this model using Generalized Latent Variable Model (Skrondal 
& Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). This model is very flexible that it estimates multi-level 
random effects as well as one random parameter while allowing the Tobit 
specification simultaneously. The model is estimated with the following specification. 
Γ�𝐸�𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑿,𝒖�� = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1)  +  𝑢𝑖1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖3 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1),  
where 𝛽𝟎 and 𝛽1 are parameters to be estimated, 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1) is a vector of a sum of 
contribution made by other members in the previous round, 𝑢𝑖1 and 𝑢𝑖𝑖1  are random 
effects for sessions and subjects, 𝑢𝑖𝑖3  is a random parameter, Γ(∙) is a link function (the 
identity or the probit function), and 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  is distributed as Gaussian or Bernoulli. We 
assume  
𝐸�𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝒖� = Γ−1�𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1)  +  𝑢𝑖1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖3 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1)�. 
Table 3.3 shows estimation results of the model. An average participant 
contributes 1,272 yen and an individual variation is in a range of 998 yen standard 
deviation, which is both economically and statistically significant. An average 
participant contributes 0.06 yen (the average marginal effect on the observed 
distribution) more to a public good after observing a marginal increase in the 
contribution by the other members, which is statistically significant but not 
economically significant. This varies across individuals in a 0.08 yen standard 
deviation at a statistically insignificant level.  
The results suggest that the participants care about what the others’ 
contribution is and do respond to it cooperatively. The positive coefficient for 𝛽1 
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implies that they do not shirk and cooperate more when the others cooperate more. 
However, a dominant part of their strategies is their own contribution level determined 
outside of what the others did in the previous round. The participants are a group of 
people who interact daily or at least regularly in a fishery regardless of their 
management systems. It is possible that they decide their contribution based on the 
relationship they have in a daily life rather than on what the other participants did in 
this experiment. This is captured in 𝛽0 and its variation across individuals as 𝑢𝑖𝑖2 .  
The two parameters for cooperation are created: conditional cooperation and 
unconditional cooperation (Carpenter & Williams, 2010; Carpenter & Seki, 2011). 
The conditional cooperation parameter takes a value of 𝑢𝑖𝑖3  and measures how 
cooperative a person is in response to observed cooperativeness of the other members. 
A greater value of this parameter indicates that a person is willing to cooperate more 
after knowing the others’ cooperation than an average subject in the sample. The 
unconditional cooperation parameter takes a value of 𝑢𝑖𝑖2  and measures general 
cooperativeness of a person after taking into account conditional cooperation. The 
greater the value of this parameter, the more cooperative a person is independently 
from what the others are doing. Table 3.4 shows summary statistics of the two 
parameters that are normally distributed by assumption.  
 
Information network indices 
Participants completed a survey for demographics and answered questions on 
information network among fishermen such as the number of other fishermen they 
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exchange information with. The indices for information network are constructed from 
these survey responses. 
Based on the work by Holland et al. (2010) and Holland et al. (2013), we 
construct the measures of information network a skipper has in the shellfish fishery 
(Table 3.5). The size of information network is constructed by the survey response to 
the question asking the number of shellfish fishermen with whom to have shared 
important information that potentially affected own profits from shellfish fishing 
during the fishing season in 2012. An average skipper in these fishery groups shared 
such information with ten skippers. Normalizing the size by the possible number of 
relationships (the size of a fishery group) yields density of information network. An 
average density was about 30 percent, ranging from 0 to 100 percent. This indicates, 
for example, in the case of the fishery group comprised of ten fishermen an average 
fisherman would have shared important information with three other fishermen.  
After listing five names of fishermen with whom a person has most important 
relationships, participants were asked what kinds of information they shared with each 
of the relationships.9 Based on the information provided by FCA staff, six kinds of 
information were identified as relevant to the surf clam fishery: market, buyer 
information, specific hot-spots, market for bycatch and its hot-spots, high gear density 
areas, and boat and gear. Taking the average of the number of kinds of information a 
person shared with the listed relationships produces an index for varieties of 
information exchanged. An average fisher shared about two types of information. 
Among the six kinds the information on specific hot-spots was shared most, followed 
                                                          
9 Some skippers refused to provide the names of other skippers because they feel that they would leak 
personal information of others, which resulted in a lower response rate for the subsequent questions on 
varieties of information and frequency of sharing the information than the other questions.  
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by market information (Figure 3.2). Information on boat and gear is also important in 
these fisheries as reflected by the rule of many FCAs that more than one skipper10 are 
required to fish in one boat. These fishermen regard other fishermen as being close 
friends (49%) and having common in boat and gear (33%).  
Frequency of sharing the six types of information listed above during a 2012 
season was asked for each relationship in a scale of one to seven: 1 as frequent as 
everyday, 2 as every few days, 3 as once per week, 4 as once every two weeks, 5 as 
once per month, 6 as every two months, 7 as once during the season. An average 
skipper shared the important information with other skippers at least once a week 
during the season. To avoid confusion, the reverse coded index will be used for main 
estimation for frequency. 
 
Empirical estimation 
We are interested in estimating the effect of revenue sharing on each parameter/index 
for social capital defined above. Estimation will provide empirical evidence of how 
management systems affect social aspect of a fishing community. It will also clarify 
what aspect of a fishing community management system can and cannot influence.  
Each parameter of social capital is taken as a dependent variable in a separate 
OLS regression. In all regression models, standard errors are estimated with cluster 
robust variance estimator and then are bootstrapped with the wild cluster bootstrap 
(Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 2008). The variable of interest is a binary variable 
taking 1 if a fisher is under revenue sharing and 0 otherwise. Other variables for 
                                                          
10 A term ‘skipper’ used in this study means a fisher who is independent and not hired for a fixed 
remuneration by a captain. Therefore a skipper may jointly own a boat or pay a fixed charter fees to an 
owner. 
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controls in the model include demographic information of fishers: log of age, the 
number of persons in the household, education levels, and log of the number of years 
in shellfish fishing.11  
One may argue that the OLS estimates suffer from selection bias. While 
revenue sharing can affect social capital parameters, social capital could influence the 
decision for a fisher to select into a revenue sharing group. Carpenter and Seki (2011) 
discussed that the selection bias for revenue sharing as an individual decision is not a 
significant problem in Japanese fisheries because each fisher did not self-select into 
the system. While individual decisions to adopt revenue sharing may not possess 
selection bias observed in selecting into job training, adoption of revenue sharing 
arrangement is possibly nonrandom. Preferences, value, and experience of individual 
fishers have been likely to affect the group decision to adopt revenue sharing. Suenaga 
(2008) emphasized the importance of involving fishers in the decision making process 
in Sandfish fishery in Japan. All the fishers surveyed in the Japanese surf clam fishery 
who gave valid response (64% of the respondents) suggested some involvement in the 
process for a change in operational rules in the fishery. 
One may also argue that the OLS estimates are biased due to endogeneity. 
There may exist another mechanism that can influence the decision to employ revenue 
sharing while correlated with unobservables captured in the error term. One possible 
scenario is a catastrophic event in a shellfish fishery such as depletion of the resource 
due to overfishing, disease, weather, or all combined. Careful examination of 
background information suggests that this is not the case. First, we asked in the survey 
                                                          
11 Correlation between these variables is not a concern. Age and shellfish experience are most correlated 
and their correlation coefficient is 0.57.  
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whether they have seen the shellfish resources depleted or drastically decreased. After 
dropping 13 individuals who have been in the fishery for less than 10 years, we found 
71 percent of revenue sharing fishers answered “yes” to the question while 72 percent 
of non-revenue sharing fishers did, which is not a statistically significant difference 
(Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, p value = 0.63). We also examined a numerical 
measure of resource stock density over the last 20 years or so (Figure 3.3). The mean 
density of revenue sharing groups was 0.59 kilograms per squared meter of fishing 
grounds and the mean density of non-revenue sharing groups was 0.54. We found 
these distributions between the two groups not statistically significantly different 
(Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, p value = 0.61). This can be also supported by the fact 
that all the fishery groups, regardless of management systems, have been self-
imposing a TAC for the last 20 years at least.  
Causal inference of the estimates crucially depends on how well unobserved 
heterogeneity is controlled because occurrence of revenue sharing arrangement is 
possibly nonrandom. The sampled fishery groups have been controlled on some 
important observables at the time of sampling; some relevant characteristics of 
individual fishers will be controlled in a regression. Unobservables consist of a part 
that is correlated with observables and a part that is uncorrelated. The estimates are 
valid to the degree of how closely related the observables are to the unobservables and 
thus how well these observables capture unobserved heterogeneity.  
Concerns for standard errors still remain. The small sample problem of ten 
fishery groups can understate the standard deviation of the OLS estimators. The 
literature has been casting doubts on inference based on cluster-robust standard errors 
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when they are applied to the data containing a few clusters and the invariant variables 
of interest within a cluster (Angrist & Lavy, 2009; Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 
2004; Donald & Lang, 2007). Asymptotic justification of cluster-robust standard 
errors relies on the assumption that the number of clusters goes to infinity. Clearly, the 
data with ten clusters (groups) do not meet this assumption.  
Although several solutions have been proposed, the wild cluster bootstrap 
analyzed in Cameron et al. (2008) is the most appropriate in this study. The wild 
cluster bootstrap is different from the standard bootstrap method with cluster option 
commonly implemented by statistical software such as Stata or SAS. The wild cluster 
bootstrap can overcome the problems with having a few clusters and invariant 
variables within a cluster by forming pseudo-samples based on the residuals and using 
“asymptotically pivotal” statistic. A statistic is said to be asymptotically pivotal if its 
asymptotic distribution does not depend on any unknown parameters. With a few 
clusters this feature is crucial. While the standard bootstrap directly evaluates the 
distribution of the OLS estimates, the wild cluster bootstrap forms the Wald statistics 
for every pseudo-sample and evaluates the distribution of these Wald statistics, which 
is asymptotically pivotal.  
The wild cluster bootstrap also solves the issue with invariant variables within 
a cluster, which can be an issue with the standard bootstrap with cluster option. In 
forming pseudo-samples the wild cluster bootstrap does this based on residuals not on 
pairs of a dependent variable and explanatory variables, which have a good chance of 
replicating the same pseudo-samples if explanatory variables do not vary within a 
cluster.  
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Cameron et al. (2008) recommend to implement the wild cluster bootstrap with 
the null hypothesis imposed. Instead of using two-point distribution originally applied 
by Cameron et al. (2008), Webb (2014) proposes to use six-point distribution, which is 
recommended especially for the data with a very few clusters, say less than 10 
clusters. This can greatly increase the number of possible values of the estimated Wald 
statistics from pseudo-samples. 
Another method, bias-reduced linearization (BRL) originally proposed by Bell 
and McCaffrey (2002) and applied by Angrist and Lavy (2009), can also achieve 
asymptotic refinement. However, it is not suitable with the data in this study as 
underlying heteroskedasticity is likely to be severe due to unbalanced clusters. Monte 
Carlo simulations in Cameron et al. (2008) show that when there is heteroskadsticity, 
BRL no longer improves inference whereas the wild cluster bootstrap still does.  
 
3.4 Results 
Overall we find that the implementation of revenue sharing affects formation of some 
aspects of social capital (Table 3.6). In particular, revenue sharing arrangement has a 
negative impact on conditional cooperation while it has a positive impact on 
information sharing among fishers.  
 First, we hypothesized that revenue sharing arrangement enhances cooperative 
relationship among fishers; the relationship fishers face in daily fishing operation, 
which can significantly depend on whether fishers are under revenue sharing 
arrangement, may force the fishers to be unconditionally and conditionally cooperate 
with each other. Interestingly, the results show that revenue sharing arrangement does 
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not influence unconditional cooperation among fishers but does influence conditional 
cooperation negatively (Table 3.6). This implies that revenue sharing fishers are no 
more likely to cooperate unconditionally although revenue sharing arrangement seems 
to require greater cooperation among fishers. In addition, the negative sign of 
conditional cooperation among revenue sharing fishers suggests that the fishers under 
revenue sharing are not only uncooperative to the group but also they are less likely to 
cooperate even when they see the others contributing to the group. In addition, the 
degree of uncooperativeness in conditional cooperation (the conditional average 
difference in conditional cooperation between revenue sharing fishers and non-
revenue sharing fishers) is significant considering the range of the estimated variance 
of the parameter. However, it should be noted that an overall explanatory power of 
conditional cooperation was found to be trivial from the earlier examination in Section 
5.3.  
 Second, we find evidence of the effect of revenue sharing on information 
network (Table3.6). Although revenue sharing does not necessarily increase or 
decrease network density and network size, it does increase the varieties of 
information shared and frequency of sharing such information. The fishers under 
revenue sharing share on average 0.6 more varieties of information than non-revenue 
sharing fishers and they share such information much more frequently. The estimated 
effect of 2.02 in a scale of frequency can be interpreted as an increase in frequency 
from every two weeks (-4) to every two days (-2). An average fisher in the sample 
shares two kinds of information about a fishery with information on specific hot-spots 
being most likely and the market information the second most likely. In addition to 
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these two kinds of information an average revenue sharing fisher is more likely to 
share the information on boat and gear while non-revenue sharing fisher on average 
shares two kinds out of these varieties. This may reflect the fact that revenue sharing 
fishers operate fishing together as a group, which can require more detailed 
information about what other group members are doing being shared amongst them. 
The collective daily fishing operation, contribution to which can be aligned with self-
interest under revenue sharing arrangement, can motivate fishers to communicate 
more frequently with each other and to share more information. Interestingly, revenue 
sharing arrangement does not seem to affect the absolute size of information network 
or the normalized size of the network.  
 The wild cluster bootstrap yields the same significance level of the estimates as 
the cluster robust standard error p value. Thus, the inference of significance of the 
estimates remains the same even after correcting for the small sample. These results 
are consistent with the results obtained by BRL, which was discussed as another 
method to address with small sample inference. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
Economic institutions can influence what social relationships people in a community 
have beyond their realm of economic outcomes. In this paper we examine how 
different management systems in a fishery result in different levels of social capital in 
a community, focusing on revenue sharing arrangement and an individual fishing 
quota. The results suggest that revenue sharing arrangement leads to less conditional 
cooperation among fishers while no impact is found in unconditional cooperation. 
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Revenue sharing arrangement, accompanied by collective fishing operation, changes 
how fishers communicate with other fishers; revenue sharing fishers exchange more 
varieties of fishing information more frequently.  
The negative effect on conditional cooperation is somewhat contrary to the 
literature on the VCM (Carpenter, Bowles, Gintis, & Hwang, 2009), which suggested 
that strong reciprocity was a key in team production. The result in this study implies 
that a key in team production is not necessarily conditional cooperation or reciprocity 
at least in a context of revenue sharing arrangement in a fishery. The fishers under 
revenue sharing, who face the same incentive structure as the VCM, are not 
necessarily conditional cooperators but rather free-riders. Yet, these fishery groups 
have been successfully maintaining the revenue sharing arrangement for decades. This 
can suggest two things. First, the other factor may have been contributing to the 
maintenance of revenue sharing arrangement in these fishery groups. One possible 
factor is their operational rules that the fishery groups under revenue sharing 
arrangement self-impose. Every fishery group under revenue sharing arrangement 
operates together to ensure equal contribution of labor in days and hours among the 
member fishers. Contrary to anonymity in the VCM, contribution in fishing operation 
can be easily monitored in terms of landings at the port. Although the fishers have 
incentives to free-ride, they may still like to compete in fishing, which can counteract 
free-riding inclinations exhibited in the VCM. Gaspart and Seki (2003) emphasized 
fishers’ nature for competition as an important driver to maintain the revenue sharing 
arrangement. Anecdotal evidence also exists to support this claim; we heard from a 
leader fisherman that his fellow fishers still compete for landings even though they 
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have been under revenue sharing for decades. Second, another possibility is that the 
estimated coefficient of revenue sharing arrangement may be suffering from 
endogeneity. If these revenue sharing fishery groups had been particularly struggling 
with free-riding in collective efforts such as the efforts for the stock enhancement, the 
groups could have been in a way forced to employ revenue sharing to motivate these 
collective efforts. If this is the case, the estimate from the model is biased and is not a 
true effect of revenue sharing on conditional cooperation.  
 The effect of revenue sharing on information network can be attributable to 
collective fishing operation as well as revenue sharing arrangement. In daily fishing 
operation revenue sharing fishers fish together as a group and coordinate their fishing 
efforts and their stock enhancing activities. This way of operation in fishing requires 
revenue sharing fishers to communicate more information more frequently because 
information can help fishers to successfully cooperate in fishing, on which revenue 
can greatly hinge and fishers are financially bound together by revenue sharing 
arrangement.  
Insignificant estimated coefficients of the size of information network and the 
density of the network suggest that revenue sharing fishers do not necessarily share 
information with more people compared with non-revenue sharing fishers although 
they exchange more varieties of information more frequently. Revenue sharing 
arrangement can provide disincentive to hold back on sharing sensitive fishing 
information. For example, sharing information on specific hot-spots can decrease the 
return from fishing effort at the presence of congestion externality, and thus harvesters 
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may prefer to keep it private. However, it is in their interest for revenue sharing fishers 
to share such information to allocate their collective fishing effort most efficiently.   
This may also suggest that revenue sharing fishers have different structure of 
communication that do not necessarily change the size of the network. For example, 
hierarchical structure or centralized structure is more efficient in conveying 
information from one edge of a person to the other edge; the length of pass and/or 
diameter of the network can be different when the number of relationships an 
individual have is different. Investigation of difference in network structure between 
different management systems is left for future research. 
Formal economic institutions are important; not only they determine economic 
performance of those who are under them but also they affect social aspects of 
communities, trust, cooperation, other-regarding preferences, norms, and networks. 
This paper provides empirical evidence for this claim. Social impact of economic 
institutions can be particularly important in common-pool resource management 
because resource users in a community are often forced to rely on informal contracting 
and good governance can greatly depend on social capital (Bowles & Gintis, 2002). 
For stakeholders and policy makers in common-pool resource management these 
results can help to understand the effect of management systems currently in place and 
possibly help to design a policy that incorporates the social effects of management 
systems. 
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics of Participants 
 
 N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
1 if Revenue sharing, 0 otherwise 79 0.58 0.50 0 1 
Age 78 53.24 10.21 26 79 
Education (1: Junior high school 
                          - 6: Graduate degree) 
78 1.73 0.60 1 4 
Household size (persons) 77 2.77 1.72 0 6 
Shellfish fishing experience (years) 73 23.93 13.87 1 55 
Note: Not all participants who participated in the experiment completed all the 
questions in the survey. 
 
 
Table 3.2. Participants and FCA Size 
 
FCA Participants FCA Members Percent (%) 
Shiraoi 9 75 12 
Akkeshi 11 73 15 
Kushiro 1 6 17 
Bekkai 8 47 17 
Hamanaka 16 90 18 
Wanchu 7 32 22 
Ochiishi 8 24 33 
Tobu 3 5 60 
Hiroo 9 10 90 
Konbumori 6 6 100 
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Table 3.3. Estimating Cooperation Parameters 
 
Dependent variable: Amount contributed by i in session j at round t 
𝛽0: Constant 1,272.57*** 
(0.00) 
𝛽1: Total group contribution excluding oneself in 
the previous round 
0.08** 
(0.01) 
Variance of 𝑢𝑖1 (Random intercept for sessions) 45,915.791 
(0.58) 
Variance of 𝑢𝑖𝑖2  (Random intercept for individuals) 996,737.9** 
(0.05) 
Variance of 𝑢𝑖𝑖3  (Random slope for individual 𝛽1) 0.007 
(0.63) 
Observations 666 
Log-likelihood -4,222.41 
Notes: P-value in parentheses. Multilevel Tobit Regression. 
 
 
Table 3.4. Summary Statistics of Cooperation Parameters 
 
 N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Conditional cooperation 78 0.00 0.02 -0.05 0.08 
Unconditional cooperation 78 0 844 -1,500 2,495 
Note: Eighty subjects participated, two of whom were dropped from the analysis. 
 
 
Table 3.5. Summary Statistics of Information Network Indices 
 
 N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Network size (persons) 78 10.58 15.03 0 90 
Network density (%) 78 31.08 34.50 0 100 
Varieties of info (1-6 types) 60 2.05 1.27 1 5 
Frequency (1: Everyday -  
   7: Once in season) 
63 2.71 1.93 1 7 
Notes: Not all subjects completed all the questions in the survey. The last two rows 
have a particularly lower response rate because these questions are part of the 
section that requires personal information. 
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Table 3.6. Estimated Effects of Revenue Sharing on Social Capital  
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
(1)  
Un-
conditional 
(2) 
Conditional 
   1 if revenue sharing, 0 
otherwise 
195.87 -0.01** 
(0.36) (0.04) 
  
[0.02] 
   Control Yes Yes 
Observations 71 71 
F statistics 1.636 9.824*** 
Root MSE 812.3 0.0234 
 Dependent variable: 
  
(3)  
Network 
density 
(4)  
Network 
size 
(5)  
Varieties of 
info shared 
(6) 
Frequency 
     1 if revenue sharing, 0 
otherwise 
0.11 203.98 0.60* 2.02*** 
(0.36) (0.19) (0.07) (0.00) 
   
[0.06] [0.00] 
     Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 71 71 55 57 
F statistics 2.162 5.184** 19.43*** 6.650*** 
Root MSE 0.333 747.1 1.276 1.696 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and bootstrapped p-value in square 
brackets. BRL yields consistent results. 
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Figure 3.1. Setup of the Experiment 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Contents of Information Shared 
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Figure 3.3. Resource Stock Density over Time 
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CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation I investigated how co-management in a fishery can contribute 
to better management of the resource. The first manuscript examined how efficient 
management systems to govern common pool resources can evolve endogenously and 
demonstrated the importance of involving resource users in the governance process, 
which can ease a political hindrance of the transition of management systems. I 
examined this in a context of the Rhode Island Fluke Sector Pilot Program using a 
laboratory experiment. Through successive fishing seasons, the frequency of subjects' 
choosing the individual quota sector rises from half to over 80 percent of subjects. 
This suggests that the efficiencies associated with strong individual fishing rights may 
emerge endogenously from the sectorization process, even without imposing them 
through regulation. Interestingly, a taste for competition prohibits a complete 
transition into the individual quota sector. 
The second manuscript rigorously measured the direct effects of revenue sharing 
and social capital in a community-managed fishery in Japan and identified the indirect 
effects resulting from the interaction between revenue sharing and social capital. An 
important intermediary between the two factors, revenue sharing arrangement and 
social capital, and the management outcomes is collective efforts defined as any 
efforts performed as a group to increase harvesting performance of a fishery. Revenue 
sharing arrangement and social capital are hypothesized to enhance the effect of the 
collective efforts, which leads to efficient and sustainable use of resources in the long 
run. Contribution to the group efforts aligns with self-interest when a group of 
harvesters shares revenue and harvesters are devoted to collective value due to social 
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capital in a community. Using the data collected from 79 skippers belonging to ten 
Japanese fishery groups and wild cluster bootstrap for small sample inference, I find 
indirect effect of both revenue sharing and social capital interacting to affect the 
fishery. Revenue sharing arrangement fosters information network in terms of 
varieties of information shared, which improves the economic outcome perceived by 
fishers.  However, I find no robust evidence of the direct effect of revenue sharing 
improving an outcome in a fishery. In addition, I find evidence of the long-run 
positive effect of trust in a community on an economic outcome. The results also show 
that the fisheries with fishers having similar information network size achieve better 
stock conditions over time. These results highlight import roles of social capital in 
improving management outcomes.  
The third manuscript provided the quantitative effect of management systems—
whether the group has employed revenue sharing or not—on social capital to present 
insights into an effective policy that can be employed for development of social 
capital. In particular, this manuscript asks whether a difference in management 
systems can result in different cooperative relationships and different information 
networks in a community. Utilizing the same dataset of 79 skippers from ten fishery 
groups in Japan, I find evidence of the positive effect of revenue sharing on 
information network possibly because revenue sharing arrangement provides 
disincentives to compete and accompanies synchronized collective fishing operation. 
Interestingly, revenue sharing fishers are no more likely to cooperate unconditionally 
(i.e., unilaterally) and furthermore they are less likely to cooperate conditionally (i.e., 
only if others cooperate).  
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The results form the second and third manuscripts emphasize an important role of 
revenue sharing arrangement in augmenting social capital, particularly information 
network, which directly improves management outcomes. In other words, although 
revenue sharing arrangement may not directly improve management outcomes, it can 
indirectly do so through fostering social capital that has a direct link with the 
outcomes. Revenue sharing arrangement can be a management tool to improve a 
fishery, but it can be effective only when it augments social capital among fishers. As 
a policy intervention, revenue sharing arrangement should be implemented in such a 
way that it does not decay, rather foster social capital. In the Japanese surf clam 
fishery examined in the manuscripts all the fishery groups engage in the collective 
effort for the stock enhancement, which can be best motivated under revenue sharing 
arrangement. In addition, they collectively operate fishing on a day-to-day base, which 
can bring intense interactions and enable mutual monitoring among the fishers.  
Co-management can help our fisheries achieve better management outcomes. It 
can facilitate a transition to more efficient management systems to govern resources 
by involving resource users in the process. Revenue sharing arrangement in a 
community-managed fishery can encourage social capital, which leads to better 
outcomes in the fishery. These findings, although specifically embedded in the context 
of the Rhode Island groundfish fishery and the Japanese surf clam fishery, provide 
important policy implications to other coastal fisheries with similar traits and more 
broadly other community-governed natural resource management.  
  
 176 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A. Experimental Instrument 
 
The instructions for the experiment of Manuscript 1. 
Fishing Game 
In this game, we will play 20 rounds (seasons) of a fishing game. At the end of the 
today’s experiment, two of these games will be chosen at random for payment. We do 
this so that every round or season is independent of the past performance and 
important to you. Your experimental dollars in those two games will be converted to 
real dollars.  
 
The Fishery 
In today's experiment, you are the owner of a fishing operation that harvests Fish, 
along with all the other subjects in your group. The fishery in which you will 
participate is managed for sustainability by a management authority. The authority 
sets a Total Allowable Catch quota for each season so that the fish stock remains 
healthy.  The total catch of all participants will not be allowed to exceed this Total 
Allowable Catch quota. The total quota is 36,000 pounds, and 3,000 pounds 
(=36,000/12) are associated with each subject.  
 
How You Make Money 
Your task today is to choose how many days to go fishing in each week of the 52-
week fishing season. Each day you go fishing, you will land 30 pounds of fish. And 
each day you go fishing, it costs you 500 experimental dollars per day.  
 
The price you receive for your fish depends on the total pounds of fish landed by all 
subjects, regardless of which group they are in.  Price falls as more fish are landed in 
each week, according to the table below. 
 
Total 
Landings per 
Week 
Price 
per 
Pound 
0 $50.00 
400 $45.20 
800 $40.40 
1200 $35.60 
1600 $30.80 
2000 $26.00 
2400 $21.20 
2800 $16.40 
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This fishery is managed under two different systems: Individual Limit Fishing and 
Group Limit Fishing.   
 
Individual Limit Fishing 
Under Individual Limit Fishing, you will be able to harvest up to 3,000 pounds during 
the season. At 30 pounds a day, this means you can fish up to 100 days. You may fish 
at any time regardless of how much fish others in your group or in the other group 
have harvested, but when you reach your quota, you must stop fishing. You do not 
need to harvest all of your quota. You will not be charged for leaving your quota 
unused. 
 
Group Limit Fishing 
Under Group Limit Fishing, your 3,000 pounds will be added to the total quota of the 
Group Limit group. For example, if 6 persons are in the group, at 30 pounds a day a 
person, this means that the group can fish up to 600 days. Each subject in this group 
may catch as many fish as he or she wants, but once the total quota of the group is 
harvested by the members, all members of the Group Limit group must stop fishing. 
The group does not need to catch all of the quota. There is no charge associated with 
leaving quota unused. 
 
Fishing Software 
Attached is an example screen for an Individual Limit Fishing group.  The software 
proceeds through the 52 weeks of each season at a rate of one every 4 seconds.   
 
You choose the number of days you wish to fish by clicking the round dot below the 
number in the lower left corner of the screen. Your fishing decision automatically 
carries over from one week to the next, until you change it or the quota is exhausted. 
 
The software will switch you to zero days when the quota limit is reached.  In the 
week the quota runs out, you land your share of the available quota, but are charged 
for all days chosen, so it is a good idea to reduce your days in that week. 
 
Your Profit 
Next to your choice of days is information on the total number of days fished in the 
fishing group; your landings, price and costs for the current week; and your 
cumulative profit for the season.  The price for the previous week is displayed whether 
or not you harvested fish, so you can use this information to plan your fishing. 
 
At the top of the screen is a graph that tracks your profit (solid black line), the total 
quota remaining in your group (solid blue line), and the total quota remaining in the 
other group (dashed red line). 
 
Your Group 
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The Your Group box in the center of the screen provides important information on 
how much other members of your group are fishing, how much fish was landed by 
your group in the last week, and how much quota remains in your group.  You can use 
this information to plan your fishing. 
 
The Other Group Box 
The Other Group box next to the Your Group box allows you to see how members of 
the other group are using their quota. 
 
The You Box (only for the Individual Limit Fishing group) 
The You box will be added in the center of your screen if you choose the Individual 
Limit Fishing. It provides information about your individual quota. It shows you your 
quota, your last week's harvest, and the amount of your quota that remains. 
 
Questions 
Please think back over these instructions now and make sure the rules are clear to you, 
and that you understand how to make money.  
 
We will now have a practice round for the Group Limit Fishing. There is no practice 
round for the Individual Limit Fishing. Note that there will be some minor change on 
the screen. Since everyone fishes in the same fishing group, there will be no 
information related to the Other Group mentioned earlier. 
 
[Practice round] 
 
Prior to each season, you will be asked to choose whether you would like to fish in the 
Individual Limit group or the Group Limit group. After all subjects have made their 
management choices, you can see how many chose to be in each group by dividing its 
total quota by 3,000. 
 
You will choose your desired fishing group from a drop-down menu that appears at 
the beginning of each season. You may switch fishing groups between seasons, but 
you have to stay in the same group throughout the season. 
 
Questions? 
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The instructions for the experiment of Manuscripts 2 and 3. Original instructions are 
in Japanese. 
Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in the experiment today. During the 
experiment, you will earn money. How much more money you could make depends 
on your choices and the choices of others during the experiment. If you follow the 
instructions and make careful decisions, you could earn more money. Thus, it is 
imporatnt to understand the instructions very well. After the experiment, you will be 
asked to fill out a confidential survey. You will be paid in cash as you leave.  
Before beginning, please find your ID number. This ID number will be used to keep 
any decisions made at the experiment and the survey confidential. 
Please refrain from talking to each other or talking on the cell phone during the 
experiment and the survey.  
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to ask any of us. 
 
First, please find the following items in front of you. 
• Instructions (this paper) • Pen 
• Scratch paper • Record sheet 
• Calculater  
• Three boxes (red, green, yellow each)  
Please find your ID number on the sides of the red and green boxes. If you see 
a different number, please raise your hand.  
• Please find five 500 yen coins and five 100 yen coins inside the yellow box. If 
you see more or less, please raise your hand.  
 
The amount you will earn in the experiment depends on the decisions you and 
everyone else make during the experiment. 
In the experiment, you will be asked to repeat a task ten times.  
You are a member of a group of four people. Prior to every round, you will be given 
an allowance of 3,000 yen. You will be asked to decide how much of the allowance to 
keep to yourself and how much of the allowance to allocate to a group. Before the 
experiment, we will notify you privately which group you belong to, but you will not 
know who belongs to which group. 
In the case where the number of participants is not divisible by four, some of you 
simultaneously belong to two groups, and their decisions are counted in two groups. 
But only one decision counted in one of the groups is valid for payoff calculation. The 
decision counted in the other group is only used to make up for lacking members and 
is irrelevant for their own payoffs. You will not know whether you belong to two 
groups or whether there are those who belong to two groups in your group. You will 
only know the results relevant to your actual payoffs. 
In the experiment you will be asked to repeat this allocation decision ten times. After 
the sixth round, we will make some change to the rule. You will play with the same 
members throughout the experiment.    
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Steps to complete the allocation decision; 
• You are notified privately which group you belong to, either A, B, or C. All of 
you stay in the same group until the end. 
• At the beginning of each round, you are given an empty red box, an empty 
green box, and a yellow box with five 500 yen coins and five 100 yen coins. 
Consider this 3,000 yen (five 500 yen conts and five 100 yen coins) as your 
allowance. 
• You are asked to allocate this 3,000 yen either to yourself or to your group. 
You may allocate any amount from 0 to 3,000 in an increment of 100 yen. 
• Please decide privately how much of 3,000 yen to keep to yourself and how 
much to allocate to your group. Please do not discuss with your neighbors. We 
will never tell anyone your decisions, and no one will know how much others 
have allocated to themselves or to their group.  
• Please put the money to keep to yourself in a red box and the money to 
allocate to your group in a green box. Please transfer all 3,000 yen either 
to a red box or to a green box. 
• Please write down the amount you have kept to yourself and the amount you 
have allocated to your group on a record sheet. 
• We collect all the boxes and record everyone’s decision. 
• We distribute a result slip that includes the total amount allocated to your 
group and dividends from your group earnings. The total amount allocated to 
your group will be multiplied by two and distributed equally to every member 
of the group. However, no one will know who have distributed how much to 
the group. 
• Finally, please calculate your total payoffs for this round by adding the amount 
you have kept to yourself and the dividends from your group, and write it 
down on a record sheet. 
• This completes one round. 
 
Important 
How to calculate your total payoffs 
1. The amount you keep to yourself is your own earnings. 
2. The total amount allocated to the group by your group members is 
multiplied by two. Consider this as your group’s total earnings. The 
group’s total earnings are distributed equally to every member of the 
group.  
Regardless of how much you have allocated to the group, you receive the same 
amount of the dividends as the others in your group. Those who have not 
allocated any money to the group also receive the same amount of the dividends 
as the others in the group. The sum of the above 1 and 2 is your total individual 
payoffs for a round. 
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The following examples will help you understand how this experiment works. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why? The total amount allocated to the group is 3,000 + 3,000 + 3,000 + 3,000 = 
12,000. The total amount allocated by all the members in the group is 12,000 yen. This 
12,000 yen is multiplied by two and then divided by four to be shared equally among 
all the members. Thus, every member of the group receives 6,000 yen as individual 
payoffs. 
Group account  
Total amount allocated = 12,000 yen 
Total group earnings (12,000 X 2) = 24,000 
yen 
    
3,000 yen 3,000 yen 
 
3,000 yen 
 
3,000 yen 
 
0 yen 0 yen 
 
0 yen 
 
0 yen 
 
To allocate to the group 
To keep to themselves 
Equal dividends (1/4 
each) 
   = 6,000 yen per person 
Individual payoffs 
Mr. Satoh Mr. Suzuki Mr. Takahashi Mr. Tanaka 
    
Mr. Satoh Mr. Suzuki  Mr. Takahashi Mr. Tanaka 
6,000 yen 6,000 yen 6,000 yen 
 
6,000 yen 
 
Example 1: When every member allocates all of the allowance to the group 
In this case, everyone’s individual payoffs are the dividends from the group earnings (6,000 yen). 
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Why? The total amount allocated to the group is 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 0. The group earnings 
are zero, and everyone receives 3,000 yen, the amount kept to themselves, as 
individual payoffs.  
Group account  
Total amount allocated = 0 yen  
Total group earnings (0 X 2) = 0 yen 
    
3,000 yen 3,000 yen 3,000 yen 3,000 yen 
0 yen 0 yen 
 
0 yen 
 
0 yen 
 
To allocate to the group 
To keep to themselves 
Equal dividends (1/4 
each) 
   = 0 yen per person 
 
Individual payoffs 
Mr. Satoh Mr. Suzuki Mr. Takahashi Mr. Tanaka 
    
Mr. Satoh Mr. Suzuki Mr. Takahashi Mr. Tanaka 
 
3,000 yen 3,000 yen 3,000 yen 3,000 yen 
Example 2: When every member keeps all of the allowance to themselves 
In this case, everyone’s individual payoffs are the amount kept to themselves (3,000 yen). 
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Why? One of the four members allocated nothing to the group, and the other three 
allocated 3,000 yen each to the group. The total amount allocated to the group is 0 + 
3,000 + 3,000 + 3,000 = 9,000. This 9,000 yen is multiplied by two and then shared 
equally among all the members. Whether one has allocated to the group or not, 
everyone receives 4,500 yen from the group earnings. Thus, those who allocated 3,000 
yen to the group receives 4,500 yen as individual payoffs, but those who allocated 
nothing to the group receive 3,000 yen, the amount kept to themselves, plus the 
dividends of 4,500 yen as individual payoffs.  
 
Group account  
Total amount allocated = 9,000 yen  
Total group earnings (9,000 X 2) = 18,000 
yen 
    
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
3,000 yen 
 
3,000 yen 3,000 yen 
 
3,000 yen 
 
0 
 
 
To allocate to the group 
To keep to themselves 
Equal dividends (1/4 
each) 
   = 4,500 yen per person 
 
Individual payoffs 
Mr. Satoh Mr. Suzuki Mr. Takahashi Mr. Tanaka 
    Mr. Satoh Mr. Suzuki Mr. Takahashi Mr. Tanaka 
4,500 yen 
Example 3: Three members allocate all of their allowance to the group 
and the other one member keeps all of his allowance to himself. 
In this case, Mr. Satoh’s, Mr. Suzuki’s, and Mr. Takahashi’s individual payoffs are the 
dividends from the group earnings only (4,500 yen) while Mr. Tanaka’s individual payoffs 
are the sum of the dividends and the money kept to himself (7,500 yen). 
4,500 yen 4,500 yen 7,500 yen 
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Are there any questions up to this point? 
 
At the end of the experiment, two of the ten rounds will be chosen at random. The 
average amount of these two rounds will be actually paid. This means that all the 
rounds have a possibility of deciding how much cash you can earn. It is important you 
make a careful decision every round.  
 
We are about to begin the first round. Please think back over the instructions now and 
make sure the rules are clear to you. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.  
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Part 2 (to be handed out after the 5th round) 
 
We have completed five rounds, and we modify the rules for the rest of the rounds. 
 
Same steps as before;  
• All of you stay in the same group as before until the end. 
• At the beginning of each round, you are given an empty red box, an empty 
green box, and a yellow box with five 500 yen coins and five 100 yen coins.  
• Please put the moneyto keep to yourself in a red box and the money to allocate 
to the group in a green box. You may allocate any amount from 0 to 3,000 in 
an increment of 100 yen. Please transfer all 3,000 yen either to a red box or to 
a green box.  
• Please decide privately how much to keep to yourself and how much to 
allocate to your group.  
• Please write down the amount you have kept to yourself and the amount you 
have allocated to your group on a record sheet. 
• We collect all the boxes and record everyone’s decision. 
• We distribute a result slip that includes the total amount allocated to your 
group and the dividends from your group earnings. The total amount allocated 
to your group will be multiplied by two and distributed equally to every 
member of the group. However, no one will know who have distributed how 
much to the group. 
• Please write down the dividends from your group earnings on the record sheet.  
 
The following steps apply for the following rounds;  
• You are asked to fill out an order form for “dissatisfied 
face.” If you feel dissatisfied with the group allocation 
from other members in your group, you can send 
“dissatisfied face” as shown in the box. Whether you 
want to send “dissatisfied face” or not, please fill out 
the form by circling the corresponding statement. It 
costs 60 yen to order “dissatisfied face.” 
• If you didn’t order “dissatisfied face,” your final 
payoffs are the sum of the amount kept to yourself and 
the dividends from your group earnings. If you ordered “dissatisfied face,” 
your final payoffs are the sum of the amount kept to yourself and the dividends 
from your group earnings minus 60 yen, the cost of sending “dissatisfied face.” 
Please write it down on the record sheet. 
• We collect the order forms.  
• As many “dissatisfied face” slips as ordered by the members in your group are 
put in a yellow box with coins and returned to you with a red and a green 
boxes. Note that you also receive “dissatisfied face” you yourself ordered. You 
will not know who have sent “dissatisfied face.” 
Dissatisfied face 
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Are there any questions before we resume? 
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APPENDIX B. Survey Instrument 
 
The survey used for Manuscripts 2 and 3. Originals are in Japanese. 
This survey asks about your opinions and how you engage in shellfish fishery. It will 
provide important information as the results in the experiment. We appreciate your 
cooperation. The ID number will keep your answers in this survey confidential. We 
will not identify individuals from the answers in this survey. 
 
 
Please write down your ID number in the space provided. 
  
 
 
 
 
Q1. This question asks about your opinions. Please indicate how strongly you agree or 
disagree with the following statements on a five-point scale. Check only one box for 
each statement.  
 
 Strongly Disagree Disagree 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
a. These days you 
can't count on 
strangers  1  2  3  4  5 
b. In dealing with 
strangers one is 
better off to be 
cautious until they 
have provided 
evidence that they 
are trustworthy. 
 1  2  3  4  5 
 
Q2. The following questions ask you about how you share private, sensitive 
information that influenced your profits from shellfish fishing and/or its catch with 
other shellfish fishermen.  
 
a. During the 2012 season, how many shellfish fishermen did you 
share such information with? 
  
 
 
persons 
 
b. How many of the fishermen that you shared such information    
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with during the 2012 season are also family members?  persons 
 
c. We would like to ask you for the names of 5 fishermen that you shared most such information 
with during the 2012 season. Please raise your hand at this point. We will bring a separate 
sheet for listing their names.  
We will convert the names you provide to ID numbers, whether or not the person is 
participating in the research today. Please provide their full names. After we convert the names 
into the numbers, we will destroy all the sheets in front of you. They will not be used to refer 
to the answers in this survey. 
 
d. Please indicate the number of years you have known each of the fishermen you identified in the 
above question c.  
 
 
 Number of years 
Fisherman 1  
Fisherman 2  
Fisherman 3   
Fisherman 4  
Fisherman 5  
 
e. What do you have in common with each of these fishermen? Check all that apply. 
 
 
 
Family 
members1 
Close 
friends 2 
Boat and 
gear3 Age group 4 
Neighborho
od5 
Fisherman 1           
Fisherman 2           
Fisherman 3            
Fisherman 4           
Fisherman 5           
 
f. On average, how often did you share private, sensitive information that influenced your profits 
and/or catch with each of these fishermen during the 2012 season? Check only one box for each 
fisherman.  
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Every 
day  
Every 
few days 
Once per 
week 
Once 
every 
two 
weeks 
Once per 
month 
Every 
two 
months 
Once 
during 
the 
season 
Fisher
man 1  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Fisher
man 2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Fisher
man 3   1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Fisher
man 4  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Fisher
man 5  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
g. When sharing such information with these fishermen during the 2012 season, what kind of 
information did you share? Check all that apply.  
 
 
 Market1 
Buyer 
informatio
n2 
Specific 
hot-spots3 
Market for 
bycatch 
and its 
hot-spots4 
High gear 
density 
areas5 
Boat and 
gear6 
Fisherman 1             
Fisherman 2             
Fisherman 3              
Fisherman 4             
Fisherman 5             
 
h. How influential was the information you received from these fishermen to your profits and/or 
catch? Check only one box for each fisherman.  
 
 Not 
influential 
at all 1  
Not influential Influential  Very 
influential 
8  
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fisherman 1  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
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Fisherman 2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Fisherman 3   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Fisherman 4  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Fisherman 5  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
 
Q3. The following questions ask you about how you share general, public information 
that did NOT influence your profits from shellfish fishing and/or its catch with other 
fishermen.  
 
a. During the 2012 season, how many shellfish fishermen did you 
share such information with?  
  
 
 
persons 
 
b. When sharing such information with these fishermen during the 2012 season, what kind of 
information did you share? Check all that apply.  
 
Contents of information Check all that apply 
Market1   
Buyer information2   
Specific hot-spots3   
Market for bycatch and its hot-spots4   
Boat and gear5   
Other6（Please specify below）   
 
c. How often did you share such information with other fishermen during the 2012 season? Check 
only one box.  
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Frequency Check only one box 
Every day   1 
Every few days  2 
Once every two weeks  3 
Once per month  4 
Every two months  5 
Once during the season  6 
 
Q4. This question asks about your opinions. Please indicate how strongly you agree or 
disagree with the following statements on a five-point scale. Check only one box for 
each statement.  
 
 Strongly Disagree Disagree 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor 
Agree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
a. Shellfish resources you are 
fishing are currently 
abundant.  
 1  2  3  4  5 
b. Resource management in 
your FCA is successful in 
increasing shellfish 
resources or maintaining 
certain level.  
 1  2  3  4  5 
c. Fishery management in 
your FCA is successful in 
increasing fishermen’s 
profits from fishing or 
maintaining certain level.  
 1  2  3  4  5 
 
Q5. This question asks about how you engage in FCA implementing new rules in 
shellfish fishing operations.  
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a. Has your FCA implemented, modified, or discontinued the following operational rules while 
you are a member? 
• Pooling system 
• Collective use of fishing boats and/or gears 
• Collective branding and/or marketing of catch 
• Cooperative fishing (multiple owners jointly operate in one of their boats) 
• Collective landing of catch 
• Rotation of fishing grounds  
 
 Check only one box  
Yes  1 → to Q b. 
No  2 → to Q c. 
Don’t know  3 → to Q c. 
 
b. Please answer this question if you chose “Yes” to the above question a. What role did you play 
when FCA was implementing, modifying, or discontinuing the rules? Check all that apply.   
 
Role you played when FCA implemented, modified, or 
discontinued the rules  Check all that apply 
Have proposed the new rule 1   
Have convinced other fishermen for the proposed rule 2   
Have stated own opinion on the proposed rule 3   
Have voted for/against the proposed rule 4   
Other 5（Please specify below）   
 
c. Are you currently serving or have you served as an executive member of the shellfish group?  
 
Executive member Check only one box  
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Yes   1 → to Q d.  
No  2 → to Q6  
Don't’ know  3 → to Q6  
 
d. How many years have you been serving or have served as an 
executive member?  
  
 
 
years 
 
Q6 This question asks about interaction with other shellfish fishermen outside of 
fishery.  
 
a. Are there any shellfish fishermen in your neighborhood?  
 
Shellfish fishermen in 
neighbourhood? 
Check only 
one box 
   
Yes   1 →How may fishermen?  persons 
No  2  
Don’t know (Please 
explain why.)  
 
 
 3  
 
b. Do you meet other fishermen other than at the port? For example, at party, family gathering, etc.  
 
Interactions outside of the port Check only one box  
Yes  1 → to Q c.  
No  2 → to Q7 
Don’t know (Please explain 
why.) 
 
 
 3 → to Q7 
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c. On average how often do you meet other fishermen other than at the port? Check only one box. 
 
Frequency of meeting outside of the port Check only one box 
More than once a week   1 
Few times a month   2 
Once every few months   3 
Less than every half year   4 
 
d. What are those occasions? Please specify below.  
 
 
 
Q7 This question asks about experience on shellfish resources.  
 
a. Have you seen the shellfish resources depleted or drastically decreased? Check only one box.  
 
Shellfish resources Check only one box  
Seen them depleted  1 → to Q b. 
Seen them drastically decreased   2 → to Q b. 
Never seen  3 → to Q8 
Don’t know  4 → to Q8 
 
b. How many years ago did you see them depleted or drastically decreased? Check all that apply.  
 
How many years ago? Check all that apply 
Recently (now to 5 years ago) 1   
6 years ago to 10 years ago 2   
11 years ago to 15 years ago 3   
16 years ago to 20 years ago 4   
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More than 21 years ago 5   
 
c. How did you respond as an individual to such depletion or decrease in resources?  
 
 
 
d. How did your shellfish group respond to such depletion or decrease in resources?  
 
 
 
Q8 This question asks about you.  
 
a. What is your age?    
 years  
 
b. What is your gender?   1 Male  0 Female 
 
c. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?。 
 
 1 Junior high school  4 2 year college degree  
 2 Senior high school   5 4 year college degree  
 3 Technical school or some college  6 Graduate degree 
 
d. How many people are there in your household, not including 
yourself?  
  
 
 
persons 
 
e. How many of these people are 18 years old or younger?  
 
  
 
 
persons 
 
f. How long have you been fishing shellfish? Please provide the 
number of years of experience including this year?  
  
 
 
years 
 
g. Please provide the tonnage of your boat for shellfish fishing?     
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  tons 
 
h. Did you fish shellfish in other areas before?  
 
Yes   1 → to Q i. 
No  0 → to Q j. 
 
i. From what year to what year, did you fish shellfish in other areas? Please provide a specific 
year.  
 
Taisho era・Showa era・Heisei era ・
Western calendar  
(Please circle one) 
 
year 
  
to year 
 
 
j. Including yourself, how many generations has your family 
participated in commercial fishing?  
  
 
 
generations 
 
k. Do you engage in other occupation (including fishing other species)?  
 
Yes  1 → to Q l. 
No  0 → to Q9 
 
l. If you engage in fishing other species, please provide the names of the species. If you engage in 
other occupation, please provide the occupation.  
 
Fish other 
species  
  List the names.  
Other 
occupation    List the occupation.  
Other species 
and other 
occupation 
 
  List both the names of other species and occupation.  
_____________________________________________________________________  
This is the end of the survey. Thank you very much for your cooperation.  
